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TWO NOTES ON IDEALIZATION, ILLUSION AND DISILLUSION AS NORMAL AND ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES[1]

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Fairly soon after the beginning of her analysis a patient reported a dream in which the moon fell out of the sky into a dustbin. The night, however, remained bright as another moon was shining in its place. Her only comment on the dream was the rather sarcastic one that, of course, her previous psychotherapist would have said that the moon stood for either the breast or the vagina. In the absence of further associations, no interpretation was attempted and the dream was never referred to again. I shall return later to the significance of what was for this patient a characteristic piece of behaviour —giving me material which was tantalizing in its apparent significance, but doing so in such a way that I was unable to make any use of it.

I was reminded of this dream when, some months later, I was reading an English translation of some poems by Giacomo Leopardi, the Italian romantic poet of the early nineteenth century. One, an early fragment written when the poet was twenty-one, describes a dream in which the moon falls out of the sky and burns itself out in a field. The dreamer then looks up at the sky and is frozen with terror at the sight of the hole from which the moon has been torn. I quote the poem in full. It is written in the form of a dialogue between the dreamer, Alcetas, and his companion, Melissus.[2]

THE TERROR BY NIGHT (a fragment)

ALCETAS:

Hear me, Melissus; I will tell you a dream
I had last night, which comes to mind again,
Now that I see the moon. I stood at the window
Which looks out on the field, and turned my eyes
Up to the sky; and then, all of a sudden,
The moon was loosened; and it seemed to me
That coming nearer and nearer as it fell down,
The bigger it appeared, until it tumbled
In the middle of the field, with a crash, and was
As big as a water-pot; and it spewed forth
A cloud of sparks, which spluttered, just as loud
As when you put a live coal under water
Till it goes out. For it was in that way
The moon, I'm telling you, in the middle of the field,
Went out, and little by little it all turned black,
And round about the grass went up in smoke.
And then, looking up at the sky, I saw was left
A kind of glimmer, or mark, or rather a hole,
From which it had been torn, and at that sight
I froze with terror; and don't feel easy yet.

MELISSUS:

And well you might, indeed; for sure enough,
The moon *might* tumble down into your field.

ALCETAS:

Who knows? For don't we often see in summer
Stars falling?

MELISSUS:

But then, there are so many stars:
And little harm if one or other of them
Do fall—there's thousands left. But there is only
This one moon in the sky, and nobody
Has ever seen it fall, except in dreams . . .

It will be seen that, unlike my patient's dream, Leopardi's was a nightmare. The reassurance my patient gave herself during sleep was only provided by Leopardi's waking consciousness, and even then it is attributed not to the dreamer but his audience. An interesting minor detail is that the dream only comes to mind again when the dreamer sees that the moon is, in fact, still in the sky.

Although, working along the rather direct

[1] Paper read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society on 17 February, 1954.

[2] *Poems from Giacomo Leopardi*, translated and introduced by John Heath-Stubbs. (London: John Lehmann, 1946.) Quoted by the kind permission of translator and publishers.

lines apparently practised by my patient's previous therapist, one can immediately suggest an interpretation in terms of castration anxiety and the primal scene, the poem's full emotional significance can only be appreciated in the light of imagery recurrently used by Leopardi. For him moonlight represented a state of illusion and the setting of the moon disillusion. This is stated explicitly in his last poem, ' The Setting of the Moon ', which was written two hours before his death at the age of thirty-eight. In this poem, which is, unfortunately, too long to quote in full, the moon is described as creating ' a thousand images, illusory and fair '—' a thousand sense-deceiving objects ' in another translation—and its setting is used as a simile to describe the loss of hope which was for Leopardi the inevitable companion of growing old. ' Away depart the shadowy forms and beautiful illusions; less now seem those far-off hopes on which our suffering mortal nature learned to lean.' This poem, in which the setting of the moon is used as a symbol for a gradual, life-long loss of hope, justifies us, I think, in interpreting the nightmare of nearly twenty years earlier as depicting the threat of a sudden, catastrophic disillusion, the collapse of a ' secondary construction ' based on illusion and idealization which was maintained as a defence against a sense of despair and futility.

This point is well made in language proper to literary criticism by Leopardi's latest translator, John Heath-Stubbs,[3] in that part of his introduction in which he discusses Leopardi's philosophy of life.

'. . . Leopardi believed the normal condition, and the greatest evil, of human existence to be *noia* (" spleen " or tedium) and from this men sought to escape through various illusions of pleasure. . . . It is a purely negative state, antipathetic to the creative mood of the artist, so that every successful poem represents, in fact, a temporary escape from it. The loss of the ideals and illusions which make this escape possible is a continually recurring theme with Leopardi. . . . Lastly, we must remember Leopardi's intense feeling for the beauty of nature, closely linked as it is with these same themes. In particular he seems to be haunted by the image of landscape transfigured by moonlight, and the moon itself becomes for him a symbol of a transitory, though ideal beauty. In his early fragment, " The Terror by Night " (an actual dream-poem), he envisages, perhaps, the condition of a world where this light has been suddenly extinguished; and in his latest poem, " The Setting of the Moon ", which was actually written on his death-bed, the same theme is handled for the last time.

' That Leopardi's extreme pessimism sprang from a deep temperamental melancholy there can be no doubt, and his life offers many features which would interest a psycho-analyst. His relationships with women, though partly inhibited by the circumstances of his bodily deformity, give evidence of a certain abnormality, as well as a strongly developed capacity for passionate idealization. Ranieri states categorically that he never experienced the normal consummation of love. That the peculiar circumstances of his upbringing, and in particular his unhappy relations with his mother, played an important part in determining the course of his development, I have no doubt. I do not think it altogether fanciful to maintain that the feelings towards his mother may be connected with the development of his attitude to Nature. At first the beauty of Nature is dwelt upon in his poems, but Leopardi comes more and more to repudiate her, and to regard her as a force actively hostile to Man.'

It is, actually, fairly certain that ' The Terror by Night ' was written in what is generally recognized to have been Leopardi's most critical year, during which, by a process of sudden religious ' de-conversion ', he lost his faith and replaced it by the pessimistic philosophy of life described in the previous quotation. Another poem of the same period, 'The Dream ', describes ' the ghost of her by whom I first was taught what love is, and who later left me weeping '. For several months of this year he lived in a state of inertia in which he felt, as he said, ' like a living corpse ' and suffered from a temporary blindness, which, like his deformity, is attributed by his biographers to over-reading. A year earlier he had been overwhelmed by the discovery that he had ' a heart endowed with a capacity for loving so immense, that it despaired from the first of ever finding in this world an object adequate to its satisfaction '. This intuition of impotence followed his first infatuation with a female cousin, who was already married and a mother. (Unlike ' The Terror by Night ', ' The Dream ' is, presumably, not a genuine dream-poem, since it is a fairly close imitation of a poem by Petrarch. The facts and quotations in this and later paragraphs are taken from Bickersteth.[4])

Leopardi's impotence and the fact that he was the son of a dominating puritanical mother and an ineffectual though gifted father do, in fact,

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 11–12.

[4] *The Poems of Leopardi*, translated and edited by Geoffrey L. Bickersteth. (Cambridge: University Press, 1923.)

justify an interpretation of 'The Terror by Night' in terms of castration anxiety. A castrating, feminizing conception of sexual intercourse is surely depicted in the image of the moon crashing to the ground, spluttering like 'a live coal under water' and leaving in the sky 'a hole, from which it had been torn'. This interpretation can be reconciled with Leopardi's use of the moon as a symbol for illusion and ideal beauty if one assumes that the dream expresses an internal anxiety situation. The moon represents not the real, external penis but the idealized, internal penis of poetic creativeness which has been hypercathected as a means of overcoming the sense of despair engendered by recognition of his actual, sexual impotence. Theoretical considerations relating to the regressive effects of castration anxiety and the psychodynamics of the poetic impulse make it certain that this idealized penis is also an internal breast.

It is, however, no part of my purpose to explore the hazardous reaches of psychoanalytical literary criticism. My only reason for turning to Leopardi's poetry is in the hope of illuminating the psychological problems of idealization and disillusion in general, and, as a particular instance, my patient's dream. If one assumes that for her, as for Leopardi, moonlight represented illusion and the moon the idealized object that maintains the state of illusion, one can interpret her dream in a way which is not only meaningful in itself but which also accords well with the pattern of her neurosis. The moon falling out of the sky represents the loss of an idealized good object. The fact that it falls into a dustbin represents denial of the value of the lost object and its sadistic, anal expulsion, while the second moon shining in the sky shows that the lost object, its loss denied, has been immediately replaced by another idealized object.

My patient was the younger daughter of neurotic and unhappily married parents who separated soon after her birth. Her introduction to life must have been not only frustrating but tantalizing, since her mother made unsuccessful attempts to overcome her anxiety about suckling her baby by being hypnotized. In her second year she suffered total separation from her mother for a period of over three months. Two of her earliest recorded remarks foreshadowed aspects of her later development. They were 'Why should I always have to be unhappy just because Mummy is?' and 'I love my sister (i.e. not her mother) better than anyone else in the whole world.' At least as early as the age of four she began the series of infatuations with older girls, teachers and female friends of her mother, which formed the pattern of her emotional life. These passionate attachments all bore the marks of idealization, the objects being unattainable and frustrating since they were chosen from outside her own family and age-group and were inevitably less interested in her than she was in them. The sadistic motive of making her mother feel unwanted was apparent in several of these attachments. This contributed to her unconscious fear of her mother, which was expressed in a phantasy of being pursued by a witch or ghost, who, as her analysis later showed, was felt to reside inside her own body.

Those who idealize their love-objects live in a fool's paradise, and my patient's infatuations necessarily tended to be short-lived. Either the object was indifferent, in which case the relationship became too humiliating to be tolerated, or, even worse, it was responsive, in which latter case the discrepancy between her emotional expectations and what the object could really give her led eventually to disillusion, anger, and bitterness. These feelings, however, never lasted long. A short period of hatred or despondency was soon followed by the instatement of a new ideal, the discovery of a new perfect object, who would be able to satisfy all her desires and rescue her from her unhappiness. Although one moon had fallen out of the sky and momentarily all was darkness, another one could always be put in its place. But the object she had discarded could not really be thrown away as easily as it was in her dream. She felt, she once told me, as though she had murdered all her lost objects.

During her analysis this pattern was inevitably repeated in the transference. She came to me precipitately from a non-Freudian psychotherapist in a state of severe, hysterical depression with several accompanying conversion symptoms. In the first hours she oscillated between day-dreams of my taking her home with me and giving her tea with bread and honey —her night-dreams were more obviously erotic than this—and terrifying images of me in which I had large breasts that were crumbling to pieces. Later the frustrations of analysis led her to treat me as she had her mother. Since her analyst was a physician he had to be snubbed by her seeking her cure and salvation from

osteopaths, homoeopaths, and nature-healers. Since his therapy was a ' talking-cure ' involving no physical contact she had to try to overcome her sexual anxieties by plunging into hetero-sexual activities and invoke, unsuccessfully, the help of a gynaecologist in curing her frigidity. If any of these therapist mother-substitutes could be provoked into making disparaging remarks about psycho-analysis, so much the better. Telling me a dream in such a way as to arouse my interest and then by her comment on it challenge me to do better than her previous therapist, without in fact giving me any opportunity to do so, was part of the same pattern.

Although it was clear in this case that the mechanism of idealization was suborned to fulfil a sadistic purpose, it cannot, I think, be maintained that this is one of its primary functions. The purpose of idealization would seem rather to be to enable the ego (*a*) to deny feelings of hopelessness and emptiness which have arisen as a result of a withdrawal of cathexis from real, external objects, and (*b*) to evade the necessity of recognizing and resolving the ambivalence which would have to be faced if available, real, external objects were ever to be re-cathected. My patient had to idealize objects other than her mother since the only other alternatives were to lose all belief in life or to hate, and expect to be hated by, her mother or, in adult life, any other person from whom love might be attainable. Similarly, Leopardi's idealization of women is to be connected with the fact that, according to Bickersteth,[5] he ' committed to his notebook one of the most terrible indictments ever penned by a son against his mother ' even though ' he always treated her outwardly with the most scrupulous respect '.

It will be seen that I have attached central importance to withdrawal of cathexis from real, external objects as an instigator of idealization-processes. The initial tendency to withdrawal can be ascribed, according to one's theoretical predilections, to one of three possible factors: (*a*) a frustrating discrepancy between libidinal expectations and the amount of libidinal satisfaction actually experienced, (*b*) fear of the external object resulting from projection on to it of endogenous destructive impulses, and (*c*) a failure on the part of the environment to arouse the infant's libidinal expectations and maintain them by a modicum of satisfaction. (I shall return later to the significance of the distinction between the first and last of these three alternatives.) It will, however, be generally agreed that the tendency arises in the matrix of the infant's first emotional relationship with external reality, i.e. in its early relationship with its mother. There will, I think, be little doubt that in the material I have presented the obvious interpretation that the moon represents the breast is a correct one.

The close and complex inter-relationship existing between idealization on the one hand and withdrawal of cathexis from external reality on the other is illustrated by the fact that in everyday speech the word ' disillusion ' is used to describe two psychological processes that at first sight seem to be psychopathologically quite distinct. It is used to denote not only loss of illusions, i.e. the discovery that things are not as one had incorrectly imagined and hoped them to be, but also loss of the ability to find value and interest in things as they actually are. Indeed, the latter is probably the commoner use of the word. In this paper I have so far used it in the first sense to describe the disenchantment that is the emotional hazard of those whose stability is based on the over-use of idealization. I could, however, equally well have used it to describe the initial disturbance in object-relationships that sets the tendency to idealization going. Although this ambiguity can be taken as an indication of the extent to which human beings rely on ' secondary constructions ', it can also be seen as some confirmation of the idea which is so central to the thought of Winnicott [6] and Mrs. Milner,[7] the idea that an element of illusion enters into the realistic libidinal cathexis of external reality. If, as they maintain, illusion is an essential part of the cathexis of reality, then withdrawal of cathexis is, in an entirely uncynical sense, a process of disillusion.

This seeming paradox of supposing illusion to play an essential part in the cathexis of reality can be resolved, I believe, if one takes two considerations into account. The first is the

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

[6] Cf. Winnicott, D. W. ' Primitive Emotional Development ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **26**, 1945, 137; *idem*, ' Pediatrics and Psychiatry', *Brit. J. med. Psychol.*, **21**, 1948, 229.

[7] Cf. Milner, M. ' Aspects of Symbolism in Relation to the Discovery of the Not Self ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **33**, 1952, 181.

obvious but easily forgotten one that the notion refers not to the individual's total relationship to reality but only to the erotic component of the total cathexis. It refers not to the purely nutritive 'ego-instinct' aspects of the infant's relationship to its earliest environment but only to those parts of it which are concerned, even if only nascently, with love.

The second consideration to be taken into account is that this conception of the function of illusion can be taken as an extension and elaboration of one of Freud's earliest and most fundamental ideas. This is the idea that wishes tend towards hallucinatory self-fulfilment and that when the reality-sense is in abeyance, as in sleep, or has yet to be firmly established, as in infancy, cathexis of an hallucinated imago of the object leads to at least temporary satisfaction of the wish. This is, of course, not exactly the way that Freud himself put it. He wrote more in terms of hallucinatory gratification of wishes than in terms of hallucination of gratifying objects. But since he assumed that this involved regressive cathexis of memory-traces, one is justified, I think, in speaking of cathexis of an hallucinated imago. I shall return later to this point when I shall suggest that cathexis of this imago involves something more than a shift from perception to memory. Using this concept of an hallucinated imago, one can say, I think, as a first approximation that Winnicott and Milner have in mind the idea that the development of a healthy erotic relationship with reality involves that at the moment of consummation of a wish there should be a convergence and merging of this hallucinated imago (and its cathexis) with the imago of the available external object, not a shift of cathexis from one imago to the other. Failure to fuse these imagos leads to a divorce between the imaginative and intellectual functions that is, in principle at least, unnecessary. Successful fusion, on the other hand, leads to freedom from the belief that desire and reality are in inevitable opposition to one another and, in Mrs. Milner's words, to 'the development of a creative relation to the world'. I think Mrs. Milner would agree that this creative relation includes the capacity for ecstatic and joyful experience of external reality (i.e. ecstasy which is not based on manic defence). Absence of this ecstatic, creative element is probably often responsible for the sense of disappointment which seems so often to follow sexual intercourse even in individuals with apparently unimpaired orgastic capacity and which is so vividly expressed in the old Latin tag '*omne animal post coitum triste*'.

Disbelief in the possibility of finding joy in life and the associated divorce between intellect and imagination can be seen in Leopardi's view that illusions are a necessary escape from reality and his identification of Science with death and Poetry with life.[8] If translated into the language of psycho-pathology this implies the necessity for a transfer of cathexis from external reality on to the hallucinatory imago and its imaginative elaborations. This shift of cathexis leads to the creation of ideal and idealized internal objects, which are cathected at the expense of external object-relationships. Re-projections of these internal objects, like my patient's infatuations and Leopardi's belief in his Muse, represent an attempt to recover the capacity for object-relationships without having to deal with the difficulties that arose in the original external object-relationship.

This way of stating the matter seems to imply the formation of internal objects by a simple process of displacement of cathexis from one imago to another without involving introjection. One can see, however, that this is not the case if one considers the processes that underlie the primitive capacity for hallucinatory gratification. According to Freud it is based on the activation of memories of past satisfactions (and not on the presence of any innate idea of an object from which satisfaction is expected and which is automatically cathected in states of instinctual tension). Since the hallucinatory gratification is presumed to be an experience of pure pleasure, this involves dissociation of the memories of past satisfaction from those of past pain, even though the pain and pleasure will both have arisen in relation to the same external object. One must add, therefore, that splitting of introjected object-imagos (memories) into ideal good and ideal bad imagos is also involved. In other words the hallucinated imago is formed by a double process of introjection and splitting. This mode of formation explains why my patient's compulsion to idealize was accompanied by the phantasy of a witch residing inside her own body and why Leopardi as he grew older came to see in the nature he had previously loved a force actively hostile to man.

The relationship of these processes to the

[8] Bickersteth, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

problem of illusion can only be understood if one realizes that they presuppose that a certain primitive adaptation or response to reality has already taken place. Freud's hypothesis that the infant in states of instinctual tension tends to hallucinate by cathecting memories of past satisfactions assumes that it has already become capable of having gratifying experiences and that its drives to seek satisfaction, i.e. to wish, have already been activated. That there is a necessity for such an activation of instinct can be seen if one turns to the work of, for instance, Ribble [9] on ' stimulus hunger ', or the ethologists (Tinbergen and Lorenz) who, as Bowlby [10] has recently told us, have shown that innate patterns of behaviour require the presence, at critical phases of their development, of certain ' sign ' stimuli for their release. In the absence of these sign stimuli, potential patterns of behaviour never become manifest. It is Winnicott's contention, I believe, that early infancy is such a critical phase and that the importance of the early mother-infant relationship lies not only in the amount of satisfaction received by the infant but also in the degree of correspondence between the infant's latent impulses, wishes, or needs and the mother's provision of the kind of stimuli necessary for their release. Insofar as the mother arouses the infant's libidinal expectations and maintains them by a modicum of satisfaction, its perception and conception of reality will accord with the pattern of its inherent instinctive tendencies, and impulses will not merely tend to be directed towards an external reality which is subjectively felt to be good but will actually be developmentally bound to the imagos of the reality that has released them. An imaginative sense of reality will develop which is stable because its development is part of the infant's self-realization.

Subjectively, that is, from the infant's point of view, to the extent that external reality has played into its unconscious expectations, it will develop the illusion, as Winnicott puts it, that it has created its objects, or, to put it the other way round, will be spared for a while the awareness that its objects are not part of itself, have not been created omnipotently by its own desires. Though this illusion will require an eventual disillusion, the disillusionment will be confined to its belief in its omnipotent control of reality, not to reality itself. The healthy child's hero-worship of its parents and its belief in their omnipotence is to be seen as a normal process of idealization which tides it over this period of disillusion until such time as it can rely on its own powers and discovers itself as an individual, potent but not omnipotent.

If, however, the environment fails to maintain a modicum of satisfaction, impulses, to the extent that they have arisen at all in a frustrating environment, will lack firm attachment to the imagos of real, external objects and external reality will be subjectively felt as tantalizing and bad. The path to external reality not being firmly established, impulses will tend to be directed inwards and will attach themselves to the only other available imagos, the ideal objects created by splitting of introjected object-imagos. These ideal internal objects will certainly be present, to some extent at least, for the simple reason that psycho-analysis only has cognizance of living infants. Those that receive no stimulation, no gratification, die. The infant's illusion that it has created its objects, its imagination, and, indeed, its sense of reality, for it will in a way have created its objects, will refer not to external reality but to ideal, internal objects, and the stage will be set for the development of pathological idealization-processes of the kind described in the clinical material I have presented.

Summary

The first of the two notes is an analysis of two very similar dreams, one reported by a patient, the other recorded in a poem by Giacomo Leopardi (1798–1837). The central theme of both is the moon falling out of the sky. Material, clinical in one case, literary and biographical in the other, is presented to show that in each the moon represented an idealized internal object and its falling out of the sky disillusionment and the collapse of a defensive ' secondary construction ' based on illusion and idealization. The relationship of the anxiety inherent in both dreams to castration anxiety is discussed.

The material presented in the first note is used to provide illustrative examples for the second, which considers the relationship between pathological idealization, with its attendant risk of pathological disillusion, and illusion and disillusion as normal processes playing an essential

[9] Ribble, Margaret. *The Rights of Infants.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950.)

[10] Bowlby, John. ' Instinct and Object Relation Theories of Zoologists.' Unpublished paper read to the British Psycho-Analytical Society on 19 February, 1952.

part in the establishment of external object relations and 'the development of a creative relation to the world' (Winnicott and Milner). It is suggested that:

(*a*) Pathological idealization is the result of a defensive hypercathexis of imagos produced by splitting of introjected external object imagos and their later imaginative elaboration.

(*b*) That this hypercathexis is the result of a quantitatively significant lack of correspondence between the infant's latent impulses and the stimulation and satisfaction provided by the environment.

(*c*) That, conversely, to the extent that there is correspondence, the infant feels that external reality has 'played into' its unconscious expectations and acquires the illusion that it has created its objects omnipotently. The later 'normal' disillusion will be confined to its belief in its omnipotence.

(*d*) That in cases such as those described in the first note, this illusion of creativity becomes attached to ideal internal objects, leading to pathological states of illusion and idealization with their ever-present risk of catastrophic disillusion.

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SOME PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF THE GENITAL CHARACTER

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Freud has stated in his *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article that ' There is no reason for astonishment that psycho-analysis, which was originally no more than an attempt at exploring pathological mental phenomena, should have developed into a psychology of normal mental life.' The emphasis in psycho-analysis has tended to remain, however, more or less centred on the pathological. Perhaps too little attention has been paid to that ultimate state of maturity in man which we might presume to be present in the absence of these pathological phenomena.

The psycho-analytic concept of the mature human is indicated by the term ' genital character '. As a point of departure I should like to quote in its entirety the paragraph on this subject in Fenichel's (3) book, since I believe it to be the classical psycho-analytic view:

> A normal ' genital ' character is an ideal concept. However, it is certain that the achievement of genital primacy brings a decisive advance in character formation. The ability to obtain full satisfaction through genital orgasm makes the physiological regulation of sexuality possible and this puts an end to the damming up of instinctual energies, with its unfortunate effect on the person's behaviour. It also makes for the full development of love (and hate), that is, the overcoming of ambivalence. Further, the capacity to discharge great quantities of excitement means the end of reaction formations and an increase in the ability to sublimate. The Oedipus complex and the unconscious guilt feelings from infantile sources now can really be overcome. Emotions, then, are not warded off any more but are used by the ego; they form a harmonious part of the total personality. If there is no longer any necessity to ward off pregenital impulses still operative in the unconscious, their inclusion into the total personality in the form of traits of the sublimation type becomes possible. Whereas in neurotic characters pregenital impulses retain their sexual character and disturb rational relations to objects, in the normal character they partly serve the aims of forepleasure under the primacy of the genital zone; but to a greater extent they are sublimated and subordinated to the ego and to reasonableness.

The thesis developed here depends on the supremacy of the libidinal drive as an instinctual source of man's development to maturity and implies the *sine qua non* character of genital development and functioning for such maturity. Adequate genital functioning indeed serves as a remarkably good index, in a clinical sense, of man's ' maturity '. The thesis, however, does not clarify or explain, in and of itself, the coincident psychological concomitants of maturity, though it proposes that the phenomena of ' sublimation ' and ' subordination of the instincts to the ego ' occur. It is my intent to explore these concomitants further, since I am under the impression that there are certain common processes related to the achievement of maturity which require further clarification.

It is assumed in the concept of genital supremacy and orgastic potency that a fairly definitive kind of relatedness occurs toward the partner. This would be worth investigating further, both in terms of what might be objectively observed in this extension of self represented by such a relatedness, and in terms of the pattern of beliefs, phantasies, and presumptions which constitute an essential part of the relatedness and contribute essentially to its meaningfulness. I therefore propose to inquire further into the characteristics of the object relationships of the mature character. The need for such an inquiry is emphasized through the general rather loose usage of terms like ' external reality ' and ' objects ' which are assumed to represent some fixed, observable state of being, but which upon closer examination seem to represent involved concepts indeed.

Winnicott (9) has recently attempted to elaborate upon the infant's sense of what he proposes to call the ' me ' and ' not me '. This is an entirely logical and necessary direction of investigation. The inquiries in psycho-analysis into the development of a sense of reality have essentially been based upon observing and speculating as to what the human infant experiences and what phases can be detected

in the process of establishing its own boundaries. The speculations, oft-times well placed, have depended largely on adult recollections as revealed by psycho-analysis. There has been little consideration given to what the eventual characteristics of these boundaries are in the adult human whom we describe as mature. To rephrase this, we are apt to assume that the mature adult has attained an ultimate appreciation of reality, but this appears to be far from the fact.

The development of a clear delineation between self and not-self has its advantages in establishing and maintaining man's integrity as a separate being and in increasing his functional capacities in certain directions. An example of this is presented by man's capacity to advance beyond an animistic concept of the environment external to himself. At the same time this differentiation of self and not-self has grossly distorted other phases of the observable relationships of man. It has tended to abstract him, in his thinking, too much from the world around him. The sense of self can only have subjective reality. That we are discrete biological organisms is evident, but our inner sense of ourselves does not coincide in numerous particulars with our characteristics as they would be identified by an objective observer. We assume a sense of self essentially similar to our own in other humans only through and because of an inner conviction of the reality of this sense experience within ourselves. Even in our sense of our physical self we have established certain gross concepts of ourselves, as for instance our awareness of ' body boundaries ', but we maintain an extensive and personal view of even our physical selves by no means coincident with the data available to the objective observer.

Man is prone, in his more usual process of thinking, to assume that his observations of both internal and external events are ' objective ' in character. By this I am referring to an essential unawareness of the impact of his own emotional bias on his capacity of observation. The urge to assume this position of ' objectivity ' depends upon man's need to structure his environment so as to give him a feeling of security, which is often based, in a sense, upon a delusion. He needs to believe, whatever the facts, that his life is a meaningful thing and that that which he looks upon as his self is a purposeful unitary thing. I propose to use the word ' delusion ', since this is a construct on man's part based upon no conceivably provable grounds, but one which he feels compelled to cling to with the greatest tenacity—' as if his very life depended on it ', and so I believe it to be. I am not here making reference to any passive process by my usage of the term delusion. On the contrary, I look upon it as an intensely dynamic and highly charged process. If one chose to look at this process from another viewpoint it would appear that man is ' creating ' meaning, purpose, and security for himself, but insofar as he does this at the expense of denying observable facts it appears to me to be a delusional process, however efficacious it may be.

This act of belief is undeniably a product of the libidinal and aggressive instincts, and appears to coincide with what is commonly described as faith. This faith is based in the earliest child-mother relationship where the need to experience security through faith first manifests itself. One of the prime functions of psycho-analytic treatment is to reactivate and assist this primal faith in assuming once again a functional capacity and to aid successfully in repressing such disintegrative impulses as the patient may have unleashed as a part of his illness. I realize that to consider repression as a function of successful treatment represents a peripheral view in psycho-analysis, and has been considered mainly as applied to the psychoses (2), but I am by no means convinced that repressions in certain spheres do not occur as a healthy and essential part of the normally functioning adult.

Sperling (8) has advanced the thesis that what he describes as ' controlled delusions ' are derivations of partial libidinal instincts, and he raises doubt whether we could have ' rich and colourful experience without them '. The experiences he is describing are true illusions and as such can be corrected by evidence or persuasion. The experiences he describes are related to but are not the same as those described in this paper, since the ones described here are not and cannot be corrected by reasoning because of their indispensable character. This forced me to the usage of the term delusion. It is my hope that I can clarify this in my further considerations of the object relationships of the genital character.

The parallel in modern science and in psycho-analysis to the concept of *Logos* in ancient philosophy would appear to be very great and serves as a good example of this delusional process. This concept advances the idea of an ' immanent reason ' in the world, giving order

and regularity to the universe and thus to man. Its basic conception is that through such belief one would become emancipated from 'the tyranny of circumstance into the freedom of the eternal', and is in effect the religious concept of redemption. One finds equivalent utterances from prominent scientists of our day; they say that they would seek for order in nature and that the guiding principle shall be that such an order is inevitable. The logical extension is that there is order in man's existence as a part of nature. It is here, however, that the threat of perceiving of man as being controlled by a 'tyranny of circumstances' becomes too great and the flight begins into the thesis of the special destiny of individual man. One can observe this in the as yet poorly defined struggle between the concepts of determinism and free-will in psycho-analysis.

Psycho-analysis has increased man's capacity for objectivity, but it would be extraordinarily naïve to assume that this increase has by any means exhausted man's capacity to delude himself, which I am holding is essential to his very existence, however mature he may be. Such a capacity may be said to represent a curtailment of function in some realms, which is undergone in the process of attaining maturity. In this sense, the delusional process I am describing is essential for the full integration of the individual. We have all been repeatedly impressed by the periodic exceptional insights of both the child and the psychotic. In both of these the integrative functions of the mature level are impaired. This impairment occurs in the former as the result of as yet limited development, in the latter as the result of disturbance in the integrative process. The mature individual gains in integrative capacity, but suffers another kind of loss.

It would appear that this loss has to do with a decrease in sensitivity, at an unconscious level, to unconscious motivations within himself and as he may experience them from others. I suspect that he sacrifices a measure of awareness in his urgency to abide by the demands of controlling his own inner impulses and the outer world. It is observable that wherever there is a gross disturbance of the integrative process there is, along with the striking insights, a quite as striking tendency to depart from the conduct performances which we describe as mature. In the mature adult there would seem to be a decreased capacity to communicate with one's own unconscious process or with the unconscious process of another, as compared to the above-mentioned less integrated groups, but an increased capacity for organized conduct performances. Psycho-analysis proposes to explore the unconscious, but one need hardly assume that this could, in the most optimal of circumstances, extend far beyond the superficial level of the total unconscious process. This is tacitly assumed in the concept of the unconscious itself, since we predicate that the unconscious merges over into our biological selves.

In the child and the psychotic the 'delusionary' system of one's special destiny and goal in living seems not to be nearly so well developed as in the genital character. They are therefore more apt to see the immediacy of any given situation, stripped of its trimmings. The story of *The Emperor's New Clothes*, by Hans Christian Andersen, is a typical case in point. They experience stress in social relations because they cannot enter into a tacit conspiracy with others as to the meaningfulness and purposefulness of living and of relatedness. In the fable the adults are allowed to engage in a conscious conspiracy; in actual living it is an unconscious conspiracy.

This poses an interesting phase of the problem of communication and of sublimation, since sublimation depends upon the thesis that it is, in and of itself, a personally meaningful thing to communicate with others. The variable forms of sublimation inevitably represent channels of communication to others and constitute means of maintaining relatedness with others at a higher level of integration than is true of more primitive forms of communication. I take the view that if sublimation is successful it makes for greater satisfaction, but I would question whether such channels of communication would be sought without an inner and blind sense of the meaningfulness of our existence. In the poor child-mother relationship, where faith is lacking, it may be observed how the infant feels little impulse to engage in an experience with another, even at the cost of essential nutrition. It is as if the biological fact and necessity of relatedness becomes, on the psychological level, the 'meaningfulness' of relatedness and communication. It suggests itself that these experiences are the precursors of our later sublimatory activities.

Freud proposed in *The Ego and the Id* (5) that sublimation may be intimately connected with identification. He derived this from the

fact that sublimations arising in childhood depend upon the presence of models; upon incentives supplied directly or indirectly by the environment. In the mature adult the capacity to carry out the process of sublimation is presumed to be greatly increased from the release of the energy of pregenital strivings. It appears to me that this is in itself not enough and that it is also necessary to work out means of communication, a function of the ego. This is a capacity based on identification and in learning. It is true that one cannot learn with one's energies preoccupied elsewhere, but, given all the energy there is, learning is not a process which must inevitably occur by that fact alone. Sublimation as a quality of the genital character is thus not an inevitable birthright, but something which may be attained if one can find sufficient channels of communication at this higher level of integration for the release of energies, given that they are available.

The thesis developed in this paper manifests itself very strikingly in the ' family romance ' concept in psycho-analysis. While issue is not being taken here with its importance as a focal point in the development of emotional disorders, its extremely widespread character suggests that it may serve as one of the critical myths surrounding which man has been able to build up a construct of his own significance and meaningfulness. In this light the ' family romance ' would represent not only an attempt to protect against the oedipal dilemma through phantasy production, but would represent an attempt to establish one's own uniqueness and to underwrite the special purposefulness of one's existence. It represents a central example of man's flight from the idea of an existence bound to biological necessity and without evident goal or meaning. One can observe this phenomenon even more clearly in the setting up of the ego ideal, in connection with which the values and ideals of man can be most clearly observed (1). Wherein this ideal functions adequately, it proposes principles which are not to be challenged. It represents a blind ethical system, and this blindness is not an incidental but an essential requirement for it to function adequately.

The concept of a personal myth as to one's historical and immediate role in life and its alteration in therapy represents a further illustration of this thesis. In some circles it is suggested that psycho-analysis frees one of the personal myth and allows one to deal with ' reality '. I would suggest that psycho-analysis cannot and must not do more than alter a malfunctioning personal myth in such fashion as to allow this myth to operate again in the manner in which it must if man is to function as an integrated unit. It would seem that the ego ideal, as we consciously experience it, is little more than the surface layer of an elaborate system of phantasies. Related to it, if not part of it, there is, in the mature adult, an extensive system of beliefs. These beliefs are not of what one would like to ' attain ' but what one feels one ' is '. This constitutes a system which is carefully guarded by the integrated adult and is one of the essential secrets of his integration.

I should like to explore the concept of man's capacity to conceive of his existence as a personally meaningful experience from the standpoint of his peculiar capacity to attach himself in an almost indissoluble fashion to certain internal and external constellations which are experienced by him as objects. This was emphasized for me recently by a young married woman who heard that a young man, with whom she had had a most casual relationship some years before, had become engaged to be married. She had carried on a rather active phantasy life in which this man was included through the supervening years. Something seemed to threaten her choice of this young man as an object of her phantasies with her hearing of his engagement, and she reverted for a time to an old pattern of neurotic vomiting. Although she had no more and no less actual dealings with him, his suitability as an object of phantasy was disrupted. Although his role as a specific external object was very limited indeed, I would hesitate to look upon him as an internalized object of phantasy, exclusively, since he had also to meet certain requirements as an external object.

Man tends to require certain animate and inanimate objects around him, surrounding which he builds up an aura of security. This is a commonly observable phenomenon and that the concept of death is particularly inconceivable to man seems to depend, at one level of interpretation, upon the terrifying idea of the loss of the specific relationship to these particular ' objects '. Related to this need for ' objects ' and illustrated in the above case, is the tendency to establish what we usually describe as ' phantasies ' in connection with certain ' external objects '. We are inclined to see little

or no ' reality ' in these relationships. However, one can fairly regularly observe that the ' object ' invested with the phantasy is in itself a necessary thing. Further, one can observe that the person conducting the phantasy will undergo the symptoms of grief if for one reason or another the ' object ' alters its character and interferes with the internal balance which made it a suitable ' object '.

I now feel it appropriate to return to the description of the genital character in order to inquire whether it can be defined in terms of the fate of the libido alone. I believe that the fate of the aggressive instinct plays a significant role in the setting up of character at a mature level and that certain little considered aspects of the genital character, which I have been attempting to develop in this paper, could best be understood as component parts of the aggressive instinct. This is consistent with the developing interest and inclination in psychoanalysis to offer the aggressive strivings a much more central role in the development of character. Hartmann-Kris-Loewenstein (7) thus state, ' We are inclined to consider the contribution of neutralized aggressive energy to the equipment of ego and superego to be at least as important as that of libido ' and further on in the same article they say, ' The formation of a lasting object relationship not only depends on the fact that libidinal impulses must be inhibited and residual libido neutralized ; we assume that similar requirements exist in the economy of aggression.' I have not been able to find any references to a re-definition of the genital character in the light of these more recent considerations.

The theory of the death instinct has had a less widespread acceptance among psycho-analysts than has any other theory which Freud introduced and maintained throughout his life. Freud seems to have been driven to postulate it because of the limits imposed by the previously extant thesis of the existence of libido as the only id instinct. This stemmed out of the more or less constant association in his patients of both libidinal and aggressive strivings and the evident need to recognize their equal weight in the production of emotional disorder. Neither libido without aggression nor aggressive instinct without libido appeared to offer a sufficient basis for the development of neurosis. It seems to depend upon a fusion of the two (4). To extend this, it seems that the fate of the aggressive instinct plays a significant role in the setting up of character structure at a mature level and that certain little considered aspects of the genital character could best be understood as component parts of the aggressive instinct. I should wish to stress that this is not to deny the immensity of the contribution of the libido to the genital character but rather to add the aggressive strivings as an additional significant contributor.

The concept that there is within man, at an instinctual level, that which urges him to self-immolation is one from which man recoils. It perhaps represents the extent of Freud's courageousness that he could entertain the idea. It would appear to me that in his concept of the death instinct, Freud was attempting to come to grips with the far wider issue of man's objective state of being without regard for his individual preference for goal-directed, purposeful, self-determined performances. These later could be rationalized around his libidinal drives alone. A broader consideration of man insisted on the inclusion of his aggressive drives as well. This is brought out very clearly in Freud's essay ' Why War! ' in 1932 (6), where he states, ' In some happy corners of the earth, they say, where nature brings forth abundantly whatever man desires, there flourish races whose lives go gently by, unknowing of aggression and constraint. This I can hardly credit. I would like further details about these happy folk.'

As can be seen, man has great urgency to maintain his self-destructive impulses essentially outside of consciousness since they are profoundly threatening to his integrity. I feel it necessary to point out that I am not here making reference to the oft-times conscious goal-directed performances based in ethical and religious ideals which may be self-sacrificial in character. These are prone to be conscious and based in a profound faith in the purposes and aims of humanity or some segment of it. They represent rather the reverse of impulses to destruction, although admittedly they may have the same roots. While it is true that man experiences some peripheral awareness of his self-destructive impulses, I do not believe that he has any basic capacity to master them but must rather resort to repression. Such limited capacity as he has seems to be expended on rationalization rather than on true mastery, and man will and must continue to depend on a mythology of his significance and meaningfulness.

As has been noted from the description of the

genital character employed by Fenichel, no direct reference is there made to the fate of aggressiveness in the establishment of the genital character, although the usually expressed view is that the aggressiveness is libidinized. It interests me, in connection with the limited role offered to aggression as a prime motivation in the process of human maturation, that the first and perhaps most critical ' object relationship ' is commonly looked upon as having an intimate bond with the aggressive impulse as well as with the libido. I make reference of course to the infant's discovery of the breast and mother, and to their discovery as an object in the process of losing them, with the resultant mobilization of aggression in a first attempt, however feeble, at the mastery of an ' outside world '. If this represents the first laying down or, if you will, presentation of a pattern, it would suggest a primitive relationship of this aggressive impulse to all future relationships to objects and to the process of maturation.

Insofar as the clinical implications of this paper are concerned, the departure from the rigid self-not-self equation opens up possibilities for the more objective appraisal of functional units which may be composed of one, two, or a number of people. Heretofore it has been the custom for man, bound within the narrow vision of his concept of self, to envision behaviour perhaps too rigidly in terms of the interaction of one person with another person or persons. While this has been fruitful, it has imposed limitations upon the observational data since it has insisted upon maintaining the identity of the individual ' within ' the pair or group. I would propose that the specific identity of the individual, as such, is not only ' impaired ' in the child and in the psychotic, but that this ' impairment ' must persist to a significant measure in all humans, however hidden it may be. This ' impairment ' of the sense of self is by no means all destructive in character, since it makes for the sense of oneness of man among men; it gives man a sense of fitting into a mosaic in which he is an integral part. I cannot overemphasize the importance of this since it is unthinkable to man not to conceive of himself as participating in forming the mosaic.

I believe that the above concept has been in a measure employed, but it would be worth exposing it to a greater degree to the test of clinical experience. Children have numerous feelings, attitudes, and responses based upon a relatedness, not only to one or the other parent, but also to a parental complex, the mother-father unit. This has been much overlooked since it denies to each his identity and represents a threat, therefore, to our own individual identities. As can be seen, this thesis is based upon the threat to the sense of self through perceiving of oneself as merged with others as opposed to my earlier development of the threat to the sense of self through loss of object relations. Both represent potential sources of loss of the myth of one's identity and both must be defended against.

I have attempted to supply some of the theoretical substructure out of which we are in the habit of appraising the degree of maturity of our patients or of those who would be our patients. Certainly the degree and character of sexual development is one such means of appraisal. One hears, however, over and over again, that the most sensitive instrument of appraisal rests in the transference and that the resolution of the transference represents the final goal of treatment. I have attempted in this paper to postulate certain ' delusions ' which present, as it were, a necessary operation, based in what we describe as faith, which are essential if man is to function as a mature being. What we describe as the resolution of the transference is not intended to include the dissolution of these beliefs, and they are necessary if man is to function at the ' genital ' level. It would seem that the heretofore sharp delineation between the personality organization and functioning of the neurotic and the psychotic has been too rigid and that we have been prone to overlook or describe as dysfunction certain synthetic operations within the mature person which I perceive as constructive delusions. Finally, I have attempted to establish the relation between the ' object relationships ' of the mature adult and their instinctual origins on a sounder theoretical basis through further substantiating the critical role of the aggressive instinct in man's strivings.

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ON CASTRATION ANXIETY [1]

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In the libidinal development of the child, the castration complex plays a rôle secondary in importance only to the Oedipus complex, but as yet much of it is obscure and undelineated.

Almost all our knowledge of the masculine castration complex is contained in the works of Freud, according to whom it is the fusion of the following two circumstances which contributes most to its establishment:

(1) Castration threat as a punishment for masturbation and bedwetting, and
(2) The discovery of the female genital which lends reality to this threat.

'The boy enters the Oedipus phase; he begins to manipulate his penis, and simultaneously has phantasies of carrying out some sort of activity with it in relation to his mother; but at last, owing to the combined effect of a threat of castration and the spectacle of women's lack of a penis, he experiences the greatest trauma of his life, and this introduces the period of latency with all its attendant consequences.' [2]

Only one of these instances does not seem to have the same severely traumatic effect:

'In the course of these investigations [of sexual curiosity—M.W.] the child makes the discovery that the penis is not one of the possessions common to all creatures who are like himself. The accidental sight of the genitals of a little sister or a little playmate is the occasion of this. . . . We know how they [the boys] react to their first perception of the absence of the penis. They deny its absence, and believe they do see a penis all the same; the discrepancy between what they see and they imagine is glossed over by the idea that the penis is still small and will grow; gradually they come to the conclusion, so fraught with emotion, that at least it had been there and had at some time been taken away. The absence of the penis is thought to be the result of a castration and then the child is faced with the task of dealing with the thought of a castration in relation to himself.' [3]

And then we read in 'The Passing of the Oedipus Complex':

'When the [male] child's interest turns to his genital organ, he betrays this by handling it frequently, and then he is bound to discover that grown-up people do not approve of this activity. More or less plainly and more or less brutally the threat is uttered that this highly valued part of him will be taken away. Usually it is from women that the threat emanates; very often they seek to strengthen their authority by referring to the father or the doctor, who, as they assure the child, will carry out the punishment. In a number of cases women will themselves modify the threat in a symbolic manner by warning the child that this actively sinning hand will be removed, instead of his genital, which is after all passive. It happens particularly often that the little boy is threatened in this way not because he plays with his penis with his hand, but because he wets his bed every night and is not to be induced to learn cleanliness. . . .

'Now the view we hold is that the phallic stage of the genital organization succumbs to this threat of castration. But not immediately, and not without the assistance of further influences. For to begin with the boy does not believe in the threat, nor obey it in the least. . . . Not until yet another experience comes its way does the child begin to reckon with the possibility of being castrated, and then only hesitatingly, unwillingly, and not without efforts to depreciate the significance of what it has itself observed.

'The observation that finally breaks down the child's unbelief is the sight of the female genitalia. Some day or other it happens that the child whose own penis is such a proud possession obtains a sight of the genital parts of a little girl; he must then become convinced of the absence of a penis in a creature so like himself. With this, however, the loss of his own penis becomes imaginable, and the threat of castration achieves its delayed effect.' [4]

As can be seen from the foregoing, Freud's views on this question are by no means straightforward. In the first case he describes the boy's denial of the lack of a penis in the woman and how, in phantasy, he clings to this belief. Only

[1] Translated by Sara Kut, London.
[2] Sigmund Freud: *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, Chap. III, p. 13.
[3] Sigmund Freud: 'The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido' (1923), *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 246–7.
[4] Sigmund Freud: 'The Passing of the Oedipus Complex' (1924), *ibid.*, pp. 270–2.

a later castration threat arouses the fear of the real loss of the penis, and with it castration anxiety sets in. In the second case the position is reversed. The castration threat is denied and only observations of the lack of a penis in the woman are regarded as confirmation of possible castration; hence the traumatic effect. Yet it is hard to imagine how this, at first, ineffectual threat, in spite of later reactivation by actual observation, can become ' the greatest trauma of one's life '.

Freud did not miss the uncertainty of this exposition. He found that the castration complex also develops where no threat has, in fact, been administered. He therefore considered other anxiety-arousing factors, and drew attention to the contribution of Ferenczi, who ' traced back the mythological symbol of loathing—the head of Medusa—to the impression made by the female genitals devoid of a penis '.[5] And in his book *Moses and Monotheism* Freud speaks of ' an archaic heritage ':

> ' The first and most certain answer is that it consists in certain dispositions, such as all living beings possess; that is to say, in the ability and tendency to follow a certain direction of development, and to react in a particular way to certain excitations, impressions and stimuli. Since experience shows that individuals differ in this respect, our archaic inheritance includes these differences; they represent what is recognized as the constitutional element in the individual. . . . First of all there is the universality of speech symbolism. . . . In studying reactions to early traumata we often find to our surprise that *they do not keep strictly* to *what the individual himself has experienced* [italics mine—M.W.] but deviate from this in a way that would accord much better with their being reactions to genetic events and in general can be explained through the influence of such. The behaviour of a neurotic child to his parents when under the influence of the Oedipus and castration complex is very rich in such reactions which seem unreasonable in the individual and can only be understood phylogenetically, in relation to the experiences of earlier generations ' (pp. 157–9).

It has been suggested in psycho-analytic literature that forerunners of the castration complex can be found in the child's separation from his mother's breast at the weaning stage and later, when he is faced with separation from his faeces in the course of habit-training.[6] Freud, however, reserves the term ' castration complex ' to denote anxiety in relation to the loss of the genital organ only.

We are well acquainted with other infantile fears which are experienced as castration anxiety by the child or which are later on construed as such; fear of hair or nail cutting, anxiety related to tonsillectomy, appendicectomy, or some other minor operation which, in the analysis of adult patients, where they are invariably associated with the castration complex, can be traced back to the earliest years, from about the third year. (I have certain cases in mind here.)

When these traumatic experiences are reactivated in the analysis, they are often characterized by an attack of acute anxiety accompanied by feelings of dejection and utter helplessness. This experience is very similar to the emotional state of the child who has been left by his loving and protecting mother and finds himself at the mercy of strangers. The common feature of these cases is the fear of being separated from the love object, and in ' Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety ', Freud refers to castration anxiety as ' separation anxiety '.

But how does separation anxiety change into castration anxiety?

As we have seen before, Freud attributes this change to reality situations, namely to the castration threat and the discovery of the girl's lack of a penis. Now the castration threat does not always appear to be present and observation of the female genitalia alone does not seem to suffice, since the child was shown to react to it with denial and the phantasy of a penis which will yet grow. Finally, even the concept of the ' phylogenetic heritage ' does not seem to explain the emergence of so severe an anxiety at a certain age. And yet, the child in the phallic phase shows undoubted sensitivity to the possible loss of the phallus, which Freud attributes to the overvaluation of the penis in the phallic phase. But this does not yet explain the route this transformation of separation into castration anxiety takes; nor does it explain the selection of a particular developmental phase for this transformation.

Perhaps we shall understand this process better when we investigate the emotional state of the child at the height of his castration anxiety, which occurs in the phallic phase when the Oedipus complex is fully developed and its

[5] Sigmund Freud: ' The Infantile Genital Organization ' (1923), *ibid.*, p. 247.

[6] ' Der Kastrationskomplex von August Stärke, *Int. Z. f. Psa.*, 7; also Lou Andreas-Salome, F. Alexander and others.

eradication becomes necessary for biological and social reasons. Freud states:

'But it is not yet clear to us what occasions its [the Oedipus complex—M.W.] decay; analyses seem to show that the painful disappointments experienced brings this about. . . . Even when no special events, such as those mentioned, occur, the absence of the hoped-for gratification, the continual frustration of the wish for a child, causes the lovelorn little one to turn from its hopeless longing. According to this, the Oedipus-complex becomes estinguished by its lack of success, the result of its inherent impossibility.

'Another view would put it that the Oedipus-complex must come to an end because the time has come for its dissolution, just as the milk teeth fall out when the permanent ones begin to press forward. Although the majority of children pass through the Oedipus-complex, yet after all it is a phenomenon determined and laid down for him by heredity, and must decline according to schedule when the next pre-ordained stage of development arrives.

'One cannot dispute the justice of both these views. They are compatible with each other, moreover, there is room for the ontogenetic alongside the more far-reaching phylogenetic one. . . . Yet after all it is of interest to follow up the way in which the innate schedule is worked out, the way in which accidental noxiae exploit the disposition.' [7]

We know what inner conflicts and emotional battles the child is faced with in his struggle to find a solution to the Oedipus complex. All kinds of pathological manifestations can be observed. The most important are severe fears and anxieties, phobias, depressions, irritability, and aggressive outbursts which are characteristic of earlier phases of development. Fundamentally, these are separation anxiety. Under the pressure of inner and outer circumstances, the child has to give up his love object, in spite of anxiety—separation anxiety—which has to be overcome. How is this achieved?

(i) The boy's first phallic-sadistic strivings are directed towards his mother. Even though sternly rejected, they lead to infantile incestuous phantasies and to masturbation. Under the pressure of inevitable rejection of these incestuous drives, the little boy begins to keep his sexual experiences, as well as masturbation, to himself. Even where no prohibition of masturbation or castration threat has occurred, the child reacts in a similar manner. Guilt feelings, emanating from the growing super-ego, make their appearance. Repression of these incestuous drives occurs not only from external compulsion, but from inner necessity, because the child cannot, nor does he wish to, renounce the mother's love. The child's ego reacts as it did to earlier prohibitions, e.g. during cleanliness training. Fear of loss of love, or separation anxiety, are thus primary forces in repressing erotic impulses towards the mother. In order to safeguard the positive relationship to her, the mother, as the sexual object, is given up.

Such is the way to the first and most important sublimation. It seems self-evident to the child that punishment will be directed towards that part of the body which has committed the offence. And when the seductive organ is the penis which can arouse such pleasurable sensations with the aid of masturbation, it seems natural that fear of punishment will be shifted on to the penis. If the forbidden activity is continued, punishment will take the form of the loss or castration of the organ. Under these circumstances, the 'merest hint', or simply the discovery of the penisless woman, suffices to arouse castration anxiety. In this way, fear of separation from the mother can change into castration anxiety—even in those cases where castration has not been threatened. The phantasy of the danger of castration can thus emerge regardless of any influences from outside; solely from inner emotional causes.

This means that one can no longer regard castration anxiety as a reality anxiety. It develops from within, not yet as a result of pressure from the super-ego, but because the ego fears the loss of the object; rather like the neurotic symptom of the pre-oedipal phases. Castration anxiety is therefore separation anxiety displaced onto the penis, whence it now appears very like a neurotic symptom, with the structure of a phobia.

(ii) If this assumption is correct, the statement that the Oedipus complex succumbs to the threat of castration can no longer be upheld in its original connotation. It is far more likely that Freud's original assumption, that the onto- and phylogenetic influences on the emotional development of the child bring about the inevitable decay of the Oedipus complex, is correct. Hence the castration complex develops as a result of the displacement of separation anxiety onto the penis. Therefore, separation anxiety which withstood the dissolution of the Oedipus complex now reappears crystallized as castration anxiety, and thus it enables the onto-

[7] Sigmund Freud: 'The Passing of the Oedipus Complex' (1924), *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 269–70.

and phylogenetically necessary dissolution of the Oedipus complex.

(iii) Freud doubts whether repression is due only to castration anxiety, which does not exist in women:

'Furthermore, is it absolutely certain that fear of castration is the only motive force of repression or defence? If we think of neuroses in women we are bound to doubt it. For though we can with certainty establish in them the presence of a castration *complex*, we can hardly speak with propriety of castration *anxiety* where castration has already taken place.' [8]

We shall see later on that this view cannot be upheld if we are correct in regarding the castration complex as a phobia, since it then can also be detected in women.

(iv) By displacement of the original separation anxiety onto a new psychic content—the imagined loss of the penis—castration anxiety develops. This shift of a fear onto a new content is, as we know, the typical mechanism of a phobia. The castration complex takes on the structure of a phobia and with it becomes the first symptom of an eventual neurosis, although a neurosis need not, of course, necessarily develop. It really depends on whether the primary separation anxiety has been successfully overcome, or, to put it differently, if the dissolution of the Oedipus complex has taken place. Otherwise, separation from a love object in later years will be a constant source of castration anxiety. We well know the consequences from the analyses of adults: a disturbance of sex-life—constant dissatisfaction—neurosis.

Castration anxiety in women is a much more complicated problem which has preoccupied many authors. Freud's three papers ('Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes'; 'Female Sexuality'; and 'The Psychology of Women' (*Collected Papers*, Vol. III—German edition), as well as Karl Abraham, Franz Alexander, Helene Deutsch, Horney, Van Ophuijsen, Ernest Jones, Fenichel, and others, have contributed to this problem.

'The discovery of her castration is a turning point in the life of the girl. Three lines of development diverge from it; one leads to sexual inhibition or to neurosis, the second to a modification of character in the sense of a masculinity complex, and the third to normal femininity. We have learned a good deal, though not everything, about all three. The fundamental content of the first is that the little girl, who has hitherto lived a masculine life, and has been able to obtain pleasure through the excitation of her clitoris, and has connected this behaviour with the sexual wishes (often of an active character) which she has directed towards her mother, finds her enjoyment of phallic sexuality spoilt by the influence of penis envy. She is wounded in her self-love by the unfavourable comparison with the boy who is so much better equipped, and therefore gives up the masturbatory satisfaction which she obtained from her clitoris, repudiates her love towards her mother, and at the same time often represses a good deal of her sexual impulses in general.' [9]

Freud placed this whole process into the phallic phase and suggested that the little girl reacts to her lack of the male organ with penis envy, though not with anxiety. He excludes anxiety '. . . For though we can with certainty establish in them (women) the presence of a castration *complex*, we can hardly speak with propriety of castration *anxiety* where castration has already taken place.' [10]

According to my experience, castration anxiety can be observed in small girls even in pre-oedipal phases. Having discovered their own lack of a penis, they believe themselves to have been castrated and react with severe anxiety. This phantasy did not emerge in relation to a castration threat, but it is the result of the infantile belief that all human beings must possess a penis. If they do not have it, they argue, it must have been cut off as a punishment for masturbation. I should like to cite the following example, for which I am grateful to Dr. Rosenfelder: [11]

The mother of a little girl aged two years three months told the following story.

For some months now, the child will not let her mother leave at bedtime. She reacts to this separation with hysterical crying which can go on for hours. She says she is afraid of dogs and of the barking of jackasses (the child lives in a communal settlement in the country). One night she ran out of the children's house into her parents' room and refused to return to the children's house. Ever since she has slept in the parental bedroom. . . . Each time the mother tries to take her back, apparently asleep, the little girl wakes trembling and crying, 'The dog has bitten off my wee-wee.'

This worry about her genital began about four

[8] Sigmund Freud: *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1936), p. 81.

[9] Sigmund Freud: 'The Psychology of Women', *New Introductory Lectures*, p. 162.

[10] Sigmund Freud: *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1936), p. 81.

[11] I do not, of course, rely on this one case alone, but I have had similar cases of the same age-group.—M. W.

months ago, when she was one year eleven months old. It was particularly noticeable at bath-time when she treated her genital just like an object, with great care and affection. She would say, 'Ofrah is washing her wee-wee, the wee-wee is pretty and clean, Ofrah's wee-wee!' Precious objects, such as sweets and toys, would be slipped into her knickers near her genital. The discovery of her own lack of a penis had aroused her anxiety which was accompanied by the phantasy that it had been taken from her, that the dog, or the jackass, had bitten it off. From the child's behaviour it is perfectly clear that it is the fear of separating from her mother which has been transformed into castration anxiety. As long as the mother is present, the disappearance of her wee-wee does not worry her. This child has developed a castration-phobia.

We see quite a different picture in the phallic phase. As Freud tells us, the child, after the discovery of her own lack of a penis, gives up masturbation of the clitoris. The reason for this, Freud says (in 'Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes') can be found in the narcissistic injury she receives in connection with penis envy, which puts a stop to her competition with the boy. The acceptance of the anatomical difference between the sexes leads her away from masculine sexuality, into feminine channels.

Elsewhere Freud adds:

'Where penis envy has aroused a strong impulse against clitoral masturbation but where the latter will not give way, there follows a fierce battle for freedom in which the girl herself takes over, as it were, the role of the mother whom she has set aside, and expresses her whole dissatisfaction with the inferior clitoris by striving against the gratification derived from it.' [12]

Without detracting from Freud's exposition, I believe that the phantasy of castration as a punishment for masturbation is a most important factor in the repression of further clitoral masturbation and in forcing the little girl into (feminine) passivity and fear of any further sexual activity. The resulting disturbance of her sexual development and future sex-life can be most far-reaching. Normally, the girl turns away from her mother, whom she blames for her castration; penis envy emerges and finally she turns to her father when she substitutes the wish for a child from him for the wish for a penis. In those cases of which we speak here, this normal development has been gravely disturbed. I should like to cite here the dream of a woman patient who, from early childhood, has suffered from a severe obsessional neurosis:

'I am walking down the street. In one hand I am carrying a beautiful new handbag, in the other a parcel of dirty washing which I am taking to the laundry. Suddenly I realize that I have lost everything. In complete despair, I search for my things until I eventually find them. The bag has been completely squashed into little folds, but is undamaged. I am afraid that there might have been some secrets in the bag which are now known to all and sundry.'

Associations: 'The bag was round and reminds me of the testicles.' The patient was well acquainted with the male genital from early childhood. She had played sexual games with her older brother and she remembered that his testicles made the greatest impression upon her and aroused her envy. The loss of the bag means castration—she has an image of a horrid, open and bleeding wound. This phantasy had been confirmed by her mother who had constantly told her to be careful and neither to touch herself nor allow anyone else to touch her, lest a great misfortune should befall her. The mother was thinking of the possible damage to the hymen, but the patient believed that the danger might emanate from this terrible wound which must not be touched, dirtied, etc. 'All my life I have had this fear of the terrible and dangerous wound down below, and even now I am not quite free of it.' A woman in her middle thirties and the mother of a four-year-old daughter, she has to wash her hands thoroughly before she goes to the lavatory, in case her dirty hand might accidentally come in contact with her genital.

She does find her bag, but it is 'squashed into tiny folds or wrinkles'. She had held the infantile belief that her testicles had been squashed and were in fact the 'folds' she now had (the labia). As a child she had tried to smooth them down with her hand so so to hide the hole. She was sure to be the only one with a hole and believed that other girls were quite 'smooth' down there. One of her obsessive thoughts in adulthood was her fear of getting wrinkles in her face.

The fear that her secrets might be detected is the fear of being found out masturbating. The patient had unsuccessfully fought against it. One of her constant anxieties was lest she should be found out, especially by her mother. Moreover, she was afraid of having damaged herself by masturbation, and the slightest genital secretion caused her anxiety. Hence the 'dirty washing' which she takes to the laundry in her dream. She was petrified whenever she found the slightest stain on her underwear, which she examined closely.

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[12] Sigmund Freud: 'The Psychology of Women', *New Introductory Lectures*, p. 164.

The patient's whole life was under this spell of having been castrated, and it naturally interfered with her sexual satisfaction. She is still frigid, afraid of ' emissions ' and of the penis which ' might damage or tear something down there ', etc. This belief had the structure of a phobia—a castration phobia.

Karl Abraham brilliantly described the castration complex of the woman. Although he does not mention the term ' castration anxiety ', its existence is implied in the context:

'. . . for a woman's life gives cause enough to render the overcoming of the castration complex difficult. We refer to those factors which keep recalling to her memory the " castration " of woman. The primary idea of the " wound " is re-animated by the impression created by the first and each succeeding menstruation, and then once again by defloration; for both processes are connected with loss of blood and thus resemble an injury. A girl need not have experienced either of these events; as she begins to grow up, the very idea of being subjected to them in the future has the same effect on her. And we can readily understand from the standpoint of the typical infantile sexual theories that delivery (or childbirth) is also conceived of in a similar manner in the phantasies of young girls.' [13]

Abraham does not mention the term ' anxiety ', but every psycho-analyst has occasion to study cases of this kind, since they are quite common among neurotic women. He knows that they suffer from anxiety at their first menstruation. Instead of pride they show fear and distress. Fear of defloration may be so great that they cannot bear a man to be physically near them. I saw a case recently in which this anxiety led to separation from a beloved husband. Fear is engendered by the thought of pregnancy, and in confinement can paralyse the woman to such a degree that all co-operation is impossible. Curiously enough, I have observed that the fear of orgasm is also connected with masturbation.

Other similar observations can be added which all have their roots in castration anxiety, or where castration anxiety has at least been an important contributory factor. Fear of emission, as well as fear of expulsion of the penis, can lead to vaginismus. Another fear of the penis might be associated with masochistic tendencies which then produce phantasies of rape. These women sometimes live in constant fear of the man—the attacker—and unconsciously their abdomen is kept rigid. They suffer from various menstrual disorders. The rigidity can be shifted onto the rectum and anus with resultant constipation, or bladder disorders. Once this has been pointed out to these women, they can themselves observe the abdominal tension and partly avoid it. A woman patient brought the following dream:

' I find myself in hospital where an unknown doctor and patient come towards me. The patient points to her mouth and says, " Look what the doctor has done to me; he has not only extracted all my teeth, but he has used the anaesthetic to drill an enormous hole into my jaw, against my will." I am afraid and disgusted as I look into a deep, bleeding hole in her jaw. I want to insert my finger into it, I do so—and I wake up.'

Already during her recital, the patient gets excited, and she remembers the following frightening incident which occurred in early childhood:

She is in the Dolomites, where she goes for a walk with her father. Suddenly she watches her father hit a tortoise with his stick. The tail breaks off, and both the tail and the body of the tortoise are alive and move away in opposite directions. She describes her horror and how she burst into tears and refused to pass this way again in case she should come across the tailless creature or the live tail.

The patient understood that this infantile anxiety was castration anxiety, and she brought a second memory:

It was strictly forbidden to open the door of her father's surgery while he was examining patients. Once a small boy she knew visited the surgery. She heard the boy cry and was curious to know what her father was doing to him. She ' forgot ' the prohibition and opened the door. She saw that her father was manipulating the little boy's penis, and she fainted. ' Now,' the patient adds, ' I understand the reason for this shock. I thought, " Now Father is cutting off the boy what he has already cut off me." I soon learnt what my father had really done to the little boy. It was explained to me that boys who were not circumcised often had pains in their penis which could be relieved by a doctor. At this time I decided it was unpleasant to be a boy and I by far preferred to be a girl.'

Some time later the patient brings another dream:

' I find myself at my parents' home. A guard stands before a half-opened door and says, " It is prohibited to enter here." Nevertheless, I look through the opening and catch a glimpse of a large, wardrobe-like chest. Wires and ropes are attached to it, and it is dark and full of secrets. The guard's remark, " You will find a box like that in the middle of any house " seems to me full of hidden and

[13] Karl Abraham: ' The Female Castration Complex ', *Selected Papers*, 1949.

frightening meaning. I look around and the guard has disappeared. I quickly open the forbidden door [14] and walk in. At that moment, a red light goes on in the box and reflects onto a transparent bowl which is thus bathed in a reddish glow. It is such a glorious spectacle that my whole body trembles with pleasure. I think this is the Holy Grail, and it is in my home! I can hardly breathe for the joy of it, when I notice the unpleasant smell of electricity which emanates from the box. Horrified, I suddenly remember the prohibition, for I now know that this smell is deadly and if I continue to breathe it in, I shall die. But the red bowl still glows so magically that I cannot leave. I must remain where I am and watch. For one instant I feel both wonder and deathly fear, so that I do not know whether it is joy or fear which takes away my breath. Then, suddenly, I am overwhelmed with anxiety. The deathly fumes bear down upon me, my heart beats more slowly, one more second and I shall suffocate. I manage to pull open the bottom drawer of the box from which I gather some apparently beautiful objects, as a reminder of the wonderful joy I had experienced. Hardly able to breathe, I stumble to the door and, as I turn to leave, I find that the box is dark and ordinary as before. Completely exhausted, I throw myself onto the couch, and as I examine the objects I had brought with me, I find that they are all broken. I feel sad and dispirited.'

The patient associates to the wardrobe-like box which is dark and secretive. At first she thinks of the lift (*Fahrstuhl*), then of the female genital. Thus the guard's remark, ' Such a box can be found in the middle of any house ' now becomes clear, for ' house ' equals ' woman '. Thinking of the guard, she associates her father. The prohibition of entrance is the prohibition to masturbate. As soon as the father-guard has left, she begins to masturbate, however, and she gets pleasurably excited (the red light in the box). The flaming-red Holy Grail is the stimulated vagina which is so beautiful that the pleasure penetrates her whole body—she experiences orgasm. She is frightened (realizing the bad electricity odour—electricity stands for orgasm) and is reminded of the father's prohibition. Her fear of death destroys all joy and pleasure. The objects which had seemed so beautiful turn out, on inspection, to be nothing but broken remnants—a reference to castration as a consequence of masturbation. . . . Some time later, the patient brings yet another short dream: ' She has two scars on either side of her stomach '.

She associates: As a three-year-old she had suffered from infected throat glands and was operated on. Her mother happened to be ill at the same time, so that her father took her into the mountains to recuperate. He looked after her with love and affection, and she remembered this journey as one of the happiest times in her life. On returning home, father and mother were very close—' He was always at one with Mother '—and she remembers that he repeatedly chastised her for soiling her bed. The patient can herself interpret this dream: One of the scars is displaced from the throat operation, the other is due to castration. In this case, too, the operation at the age of three was identified with castration.

This patient began to have sexual intercourse at the age of twenty-one. She rationalized her tremendous anxiety as being due to fear of pregnancy, since she was not then married. In spite of taking all possible precautions, coitus was unpleasurable because so fraught with anxiety. The old symptom of constipation recurred until her marriage, when both the constipation and the anxiety attacks decreased. However, sexual intercourse remained unsatisfactory.

About twelve years ago, she spent a holiday in the mountains. Instead of taking care of herself, since she was pregnant, she undertook strenuous tours which ended in a miscarriage. Since then she has again suffered from severe constipation and accompanying pains. Treatment remained without effect. The specialists were of the opinion that she was suffering from a constitutional and untreatable constipation. In her analysis we saw that her whole abdomen was kept in constant tension and rigidity, which was connected with unconscious anxiety. As the anxiety increased, so did the tension and pain in her abdomen. This was especially marked when she was in company, where she gave the impression of a reserved, tense, and unbending person. Increased tension brought with it constipation and pains. The analysis showed that this complaint was a displacement from the genitals—a direct continuation of castration anxiety—which freed the genital organs and made sexual intercourse possible. It is worthy of mention that the analysis of the castration anxiety brought an end to this painful constipation.

One often meets other, similar cases, though not all are as clear and instructive as this one. They seem to prove that castration anxiety in women does exist. We can see quite clearly that in the small child, fear of separation from the mother is closely linked with castration anxiety. The example I brought was based on observation only—yet it was enough to show that it was separation anxiety related to the mother which had been displaced onto castration anxiety and thus created a phobia.

The case of the adult patient seems to be just as clear, though it was of course not possible to bring all the supporting material. Most important here is ' the dream of the scars '. It leads us back to infancy, ' the happiest days of her life ' when, after her glandular operation, she lived alone with her loving and affectionate father. On her mother's

[14] This is clearly a reference to the memory of the little boy in the surgery.

return, he once more applied himself to his work and left the child to the care of the unloved mother. The little girl's disappointment was increased by the father's punishment for soiling her bed, of which he had been told by the mother. The child felt lonely and rejected by her beloved father, who was ' at one ' with her mother. Separation anxiety was transformed into fear of castration by the angry, punishing father, who, in her phantasy, appeared as the castrator.

The patient brought a curious memory in relation to ' the dream of the handbag '. While she had a negativistic relationship to her strict and undemonstrative mother, she greatly loved her father who, in his turn, was very fond of her. It seems that whenever he could spare the time, he would take his small daughter into his bed in the morning where they played together. The mother was said to have protested: ' You might harm the child.' The patient believed this warning to mean that the father might seduce her. In view of the patient's petit-bourgeois, orthodox background this memory is probably a cover memory, hiding the wish to be seduced and castrated by her father. Here, as in the other case, the patient's ideal of the male partner was that of the seducer and attacker.

As I pointed out earlier, once this patient had become aware of castration, she decided ' it was unpleasant to be a boy and (she) by far preferred to be a girl '.

It is quite true that penis envy could not be observed either in this or in the analysis of the other patient. The wish to have a child also did not loom very large in the analysis of this patient, although she became a devoted and affectionate mother. But she seemed satisfied with one child.

The birth of a baby came as a great shock to the second patient, who subsequently developed a severe obsessional neurosis. The first symptoms had already appeared during pregnancy, though not until the actual birth of the child did the neurosis become properly established. The main content concerned the mother's ambivalence towards the baby, her unconscious hatred and wish to destroy the child. Only when she had overcome her castration anxiety in the analysis was she able to experience orgasm, and later on the wish for a second child emerged. The analysis was terminated after a successful pregnancy and delivery of a greatly welcomed and loved baby.

In both cases castration anxiety—as well as separation anxiety—had been transferred from the mother on to the father. In their phantasy, as well as in reality later in life, the man appeared as seducer and attacker (castrator) to whom the women felt nevertheless masochistically attracted. This was, of course, a repetition of the incestuous relationship to the father, for at first both little girls were affectionately tied to him. As we can see from the above example, he only turned into a castrator and attacker, after the emergence of castration anxiety.

It is interesting that Freud too links castration anxiety with separation anxiety:

' Here anxiety seems to be a reaction to the felt loss of the object; and one is at once reminded of the fear that castration anxiety, too, is a fear of being separated from a highly valued object . . .' [15]

We therefore come to the conclusion that in the girl, too, castration anxiety does exist. It has the same psychological structure as in the boy; an anxiety arousing phantasy of castration, which in the case of the girl has already taken place. The structure is that of a phobia. The lack of the penis does not in the least contradict the castration anxiety; on the contrary, it strengthens and confirms the girl's castration phantasy, ' I have no penis because it has been cut off '. This again is proof of the danger of masturbation or any touching of the genitals. Therefore, fear of masturbation is especially strong in girls.

The castration complex and more especially castration anxiety can be found in both sexes. It is no reality fear, but a castration phantasy which develops in typical fashion in the phallic phase, both for biological and social reasons, and then leads to an anxiety-laden castration phobia. Quite frequently it takes on the external form of a phobia, ' The horse (Little Hans), the wolf (The Wolfman), the dog or jackass, will bite off my penis ', or, in the case of the girl, ' he has already done so and given me a terrible wound '.

The phallic phase is the stage of phobic manifestations *par excellence*, and this, as well as many other phobias, then makes its appearance. This phobia emerges in connection with the conflicts of the Oedipus complex and their dissolution. It has the same affective root as other phobias, namely separation anxiety.

So far we see the similarity with other phobias. But these are the differences which give this phobia its special place and meaning.

This phobia does not bring about an easing or partial ' neurotic ' solution of the conflicts, as do the others, which transfer the fear from the incestuous object onto an indifferent object outside which enables the patient to retain the incestuous object. The castration phobia works against separation anxiety and creates the dilemma: ' To face the loss of the object or

[15] Sigmund Freud: *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1936), p. 106.

castration'. At the same time it helps to overcome separation anxiety which, with the help of 'displacement', is absorbed and thus contributes to the giving up of the incestuous objects, which is its biological function.

In the case of the girl, castration phobia, as described above, can become so severe that it brings about the immediate renunciation of the incestuous object as well as that of masturbation. Furthermore, it can lead to strong masochistic tendencies which interfere with her life, making it more difficult or even impossible.

Appendix

An Illustrative Case of Feminine Castration Anxiety in a Little Girl

Lika W., about three years old now, is an intelligent but difficult child. She has a feeding disturbance and vomits easily, often, it seems, to provoke her mother. . . . 'If you don't give me what I want, I'll be sick.'

Lika was about eighteen months old when her first fears emerged, though these were quite usual for her age.

Her mother took Lika regularly to be examined by a pediatrician. Since there was always a busy attendance, the efficient but brusque doctor had little time to spend on each baby, so that Lika was often handled energetically, and sometimes roughly. When she cried and kicked in protest, the doctor only gripped her the more firmly and sometimes got angry, shouting at her, even slapping her lightly. In spite of Lika's resistance, these weekly or bi-weekly visits continued until, at about one year, she began to cry as soon as she approached the doctor's surgery, and the medical examination had often to be given up because of her violent attacks of screaming.

As soon as the mother, who was in analysis with me, told me of these visits, they were stopped on my advice. But it was already too late, for the fear of the doctor had developed into an established phobia. On catching sight of someone in a white coat or apron, or carrying a small leather case, she began to tremble with fear, and to kick and scream, 'No doto, no doto', one of the first words she was able to speak. One day she overheard her mother referring to a doctor on the telephone and at once began to cry, 'No doto! No doto!'

On leaving her own home, she refused to turn left in the direction of the surgery, and would not enter a strange house, crying, 'Doto. Doto.' By means of displacement she defended herself against the anxiety-arousing image of 'doctor'; a similar mechanism can be found in anxiety hysteria. It took the mother many months to convince her that they were not visiting the doctor. However, by about the age of two, she had overcome this phobia of doctors with the help of her dolls, on whom she visited all those unpleasant experiences she herself had had to endure. She constantly threatened to punish them for their naughty behaviour, their refusal to eat and for vomiting their food, by taking them to see the doctor, where they invariably arrived, nevertheless. She herself would examine them thoroughly and treat them as she felt she had been treated.

I have recalled this incident because it is in no way unusual. There are probably very few young children who have not at one time or another passed through similar experiences. Adults and parents are quite unaware of their traumatic effect on these small children, and even to-day one can meet pediatricians who really believe that this is the most 'healthy' way to treat them. The third and most important aspect of this story will be considered later on.

Lika was about two years eight months old when she surprised her father while he was dressing. Daddy,' she cried, horrified, 'You've got a tail on your bottom.' A four-year-old little boy visited her a few days later. She insisted on accompanying him to the lavatory. Next day she demanded of her mother, 'Show me the tail on your bottom.' She fell upon her mother, tried to tear down her clothes, shouting, 'I want to see the tail on your bottom.' The relationship to her mother changed suddenly. She became obstinate, wilful, and had outbursts of rage and temper, while she appeared more loving and affectionate towards her father, in whom she showed more interest than she had done hitherto. A few days later she received a slight injury to her finger. In response to her screams, her mother rushed into the room where she found Lika trembling with fear, holding the injured finger in her left hand, crying, 'Blood, wound, wound.' Her mother asked to see it, but the child could not be persuaded to let go of her finger. It could only be examined after two hours, when Lika had calmed down. The skin was only slightly grazed. Nevertheless, the child continued to hold her finger and repeat, obviously very worried, 'Wound, wound, blood.' At the same time the mother noticed that the child touched her genital and tried to push various objects into it. The fear of the wound soon developed into a real phobia. The hitherto lively and cheerful girl became inhibited in her movements, feared to climb and jump in case she might hurt herself. She would not go near the gate where she had once knocked herself, explaining, 'Wound . . . blood.'

The slightest injury to another person would arouse her anxiety. One day she noticed that her father's nose was slightly scratched. She ran away, horrified, 'Daddy, wound on his nose.' If she saw a minor hurt on another child in the park, she called, 'Wound . . . wound . . . blood', and would not budge from her mother's side. The sight of a little boy who had two fingers missing frightened her greatly. Once again she would not eat, vomited

frequently, and was restless at night. She woke early in the morning and refused to go to bed during the day. She awoke in bad humour, cried easily, grizzled all day, and threw a temper at the slightest provocation. She hit her mother as well as other children, refused to play, and tore or destroyed whatever she could lay her hands on. She was obviously in a neurotic state.

The worst was yet to come, however. Lika had a small abscess in her mouth and one day, playing in the garden, she ran to her mother, her mouth full of sand. Here the mother committed a grave error. She scolded the child severely for putting sand into her mouth when she had already an abscess. From that moment Lika refused to eat altogether. As soon as she caught sight of food, she firmly closed her mouth, shook her head, and only whispered in reply to her mother's entreaties, 'Wound, wound.' At first she only drank water or cold sweet tea; after a few days she took cocoa and fruit juice. When she found she had taken a grape into her mouth she quickly spat it out with the words, 'Pips . . . wound.' She became so weak that she herself asked to be put to bed during the day, a thing unheard of when she was well. A few days later she could be persuaded to take small quantities of mashed food which she chewed carefully, but refused to swallow, spitting it out with the comment, 'Wound.' The abscess had of course healed long ago. She was especially afraid of any pips, which she always spat out immediately, along with everything else she was eating at the time.

As the child grew pale and thin, depressed and irritable, I decided on two measures. I advised soporific suppositories in very small doses, and I told the mother to assure Lika that one does not receive wounds by eating but that in fact, if small children do not eat, they might fall ill and get hurt. This seems to have led to an improvement, for Lika began slowly to eat small bits of food, soft bread, chocolate which could melt in her mouth, etc. One morning during this period, the mother overheard Lika's attempts at auto-suggestion according to Coué, when she told herself, 'Good girl, eat, no wounds; bad girl, doesn't eat, wound.' In this way she gradually overcame the eating phobia and became once more the bright and jolly little girl. She played all day with her dolls in the way described earlier. However, she is not yet quite free from her fears of getting hurt.

I described the doctor phobia in such detail in order to illustrate the difference between the two instances: On the first occasion, the onset of her anxiety was related to a reality fear of a person who had really tormented the child. To defend herself against this anxiety she resorted to displacement, a mechanism freely used by small children. This led to an extension of anxiety-arousing situations which developed along phobic lines and bore the character of an anxiety hysteria. In the second instance, there was no cause for reality fear. The precipitating trauma, the observation of the male organ, was a perfectly ordinary event which of itself would not arouse anxiety. The anxiety arose from within, from the realization of her own lack of a penis, and one cannot here speak of reality fear, but of neurotic anxiety—*castration anxiety*.

Castration anxiety developed in a small girl of two years eight months, as a reaction to the realization of her own lack of a penis.

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THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC VALIDATION IN PSYCHO-ANALYTIC INTERPRETATION[1]

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I

The subject-matter of interpretation is discussed in many books and articles in the psycho-analytic literature. With few exceptions, notably Siegfried Bernfeld's comprehensive article in the *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, published in 1932 (2), the literature deals mainly with interpretation as a part of psycho-analytic technique. The interest is focused on what, when, and how to interpret. The question of the validity of an interpretation in a scientific sense is rarely raised. In recent years a few authors have discussed the problem of the validity of psycho-analytic interpretations and have stressed the desirability of research in this area. Lawrence S. Kubie, for instance, has stated that ' analysis stands and falls by the validity of its specific interpretations in specific instances '. He has further commented on ' the importance of amassing the data of free associations for meticulous statistical analysis in a search for objective laws and guiding principles ' (15). Edward Glover, in an article on ' Research Methods in Psycho-analysis ', published in 1952 (10), has expressed the need for an ' attempt to control the validity of interpretation '.

The psycho-analytic practitioner, as a rule, is not concerned about the possibility of scientific validation of his interpretations. Many interpretations seem so obvious that he will not develop any doubts about their validity. In cases where he may not be sure of the correctness of an interpretation, he most likely will wait and see whether or not new material will confirm the interpretation. Freud, in his paper on ' Constructions in Psycho-analysis ' (9), compared psycho-analytic interpretation with the work of the archaeologist and pointed out that the psycho-analyst, through his prolonged contact with a living person, the patient, has a chance to correct his hypotheses, whereas such a chance is not as easily available to the archaeologist.

By and large, the therapeutic success or failure of an individual psycho-analysis seems to be independent of the possibility of scientific validation of the interpretations given; yet the problem of validation appears crucial to those who want to defend psycho-analysis against the charge of being unscientific.

The validation problem gains significance when we leave the realm of psycho-analysis proper and shift our interest to fields where psycho-analytic theory is applied to other techniques and other sciences. In psycho-analytically oriented psychotherapy, for instance, the chances of correction of an incorrect interpretation during the process of therapy are not quite as good as in psycho-analysis itself, because, usually, less material enters the process. The psycho-analyst who supervises any kind of psychotherapy performed by someone else is in an even more difficult situation in regard to interpretations. He is expected to interpret elements of the material produced by the patient on the basis of second-hand knowledge, without the benefit of contact with the patient himself.

In the case of the psychotherapist and the supervisor of psychotherapy, however, there is at least still a patient who may react to an interpretation in one or another way—may confirm it, or reject it, may improve, or not, etc. The situation is quite different where psycho-analytic interpretation is used in order to understand persons who are not patients. This happens in all the fields outside psycho-analysis in which psycho-analytic theory is applied, for instance in biography, literary criticism, history, or anthropology. Since a great number of books and articles can be found in the psycho-analytic literature in which attempts are made to use psycho-analysis for the interpretation of a variety of subjects, it is interesting to try to find

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the criteria of the validity of such interpretations.

The problem of scientific validation of psycho-analytic interpretations, therefore, is of interest in psycho-analysis proper as well as in applied psycho-analysis.

II

An inquiry into the criteria of validity in a psycho-analytic interpretation presupposes an understanding of the logical structure of ' interpretation ' in general.

The textbooks on logic, by and large, have little to say about interpretation. In a number of them interpretation is treated as a case of arguing by analogy. Analogy then is defined as ' identity of relation ' (H. W. B. Joseph (13)) or ' resemblance of relations ' (John Stuart Mill (17)). Logicians stress the fact that analogy never makes conclusive proof.

In Webster's Dictionary we find among the definitions of the word ' interpret ' the formulation: ' to translate into intelligible or familiar language or terms '. This is in line with the subsumption of ' interpretation ' under ' analogy '. When the psycho-analyst, for instance, interprets certain behaviour of the patient as transference from the patient's relation to his father, he points out an analogy between the patient's attitude and feelings toward his father and those toward the analyst.

If we concentrate on the kinship between interpretation and analogy, we become aware of one of the greatest difficulties in interpretation: there are always an unlimited number of ways in which something may be interpreted. This corresponds with the infinite number of propositions which may show analogy to any proposition in question. The problem arises which way of interpretation is most fruitful.

In those sciences where interpretation is of great significance, for instance, in the field of law, we find a long history of arguments as to which method of interpretation is legitimate. A statute law, for instance, can be interpreted historically by inquiring into the intentions of the legislator who drafted the law or into those of the legislators who voted for it; or, regardless of its history, it may be interpreted according to the general purpose as expressed in its preamble or the general purpose according to any given state of economic or social development, and in many other ways.

In the field of psycho-analytic interpretation, Bernfeld, in his above-mentioned article (2), has shown a number of possibilities of interpretation. According to him, interpretation can take place (*a*) according to intention (for instance, interpretation of slips of the tongue), or (*b*) according to function (e.g. ' The dream is the guardian of sleep '), or (*c*) according to diagnosis (x is generally known as a trace of A; x', i.e. the element in question, therefore is an indicator for A), or (*d*) through symbolic translation, or (*e*) through fitting the element to be interpreted into the totality of the patient's life experience (' in den Gesamtzusammenhang der Person einordnen ').

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of Bernfeld's distinctions. For our purpose it is most important to realize that one cannot speak of interpretation *per se*; that in any interpretation we have to look for a certain guiding principle or frame of reference. The psycho-analyst, for instance, may interpret a single element in a dream, using a number of frames of reference. The element may be meaningful when seen in relation to the patient's past experience, his recent experience, the transference situation, etc. The analogy between interpretation and translation, which, by the way, finds an expression in the meaning of the English word ' interpreter ', illustrates the need to be aware of the specific frame of reference within which interpretation will take place. The sentence, ' I intend to translate this Latin poem ', does not have any definite meaning unless I add the language into which I want to translate. Likewise, whenever we talk about interpretation of any proposition, the meaning is not complete unless we add the frame of reference within which the interpretation is to take place.

Dealing with the problem of the validity of any specific interpretation, we shall have to ask two preliminary questions:

(*a*) Which frame of reference has been used?

(*b*) Is this a legitimate frame of reference?

Such logical analysis of a psycho-analytic interpretation may, for instance, show that it presupposes the assumption of infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex. Obviously the legitimacy of such a frame of reference will be a condition for a decision on the validity of the interpretation. In other words: unless we are convinced that there is infantile sexuality and an Oedipus complex, we shall reject any interpretation within this frame of reference.

But the legitimacy of the frame of reference is only one condition for the validity of an interpretation. To use our example: not every

interpretation based on the Oedipus complex is correct. In order to determine the validity of a specific interpretation we have to find out whether or not there is an analogy between the proposition to be interpreted and the interpretation given. Using the terms of the logicians quoted above, one might say that we have to find out whether there is ' identity of relation ', or at least ' resemblance of relation ', between the two elements.

Siegfried Bernfeld, in the article quoted above, as well as in his paper on gestalt theory (3), has pointed out that Freud always ' deals with " gestalten ", not with bundles of elements connected with each other through associations of an " and " or " sum total " character '. A dream, for instance, may consist of a number of single elements, be they images, words, or sentences. In order to understand the dream it would not be sufficient to look at it as a sum total of the elements; the way they are connected with each other is just as important as the elements themselves. The configuration of the whole dream is a ' gestalt '. To see the gestalt quality of the objects of psycho-analysis is particularly important when we approach the problem of interpretation. An interpretation will be the more satisfactory, the better it can be shown that it fits into what is to be interpreted, as one complementary gestalt into another.

To illustrate the meaning of this ' fitting in ', let me use a rather trivial example: I remember the porter of a small village inn who used to give a rather peculiar check to guests who deposited luggage with him. Having no regular checks and not being too well versed in the art of writing, he used a piece of paper or cardboard which he tore into two pieces. One piece was fixed on to the luggage; the other was given as a check. This system was fairly adequate. The gestalt of the dividing line of a piece of paper torn into two becomes so specific that hardly anyone would doubt that the exact fitting together of the pieces identifies the luggage. Here we have a prototype of what is desirable in an interpretation: What is to be interpretated, as well as the interpretation, has a specific gestalt, and the two gestalten fit into each other so closely that one does not doubt their belonging together.

An example which Freud used in the seventeenth of his Introductory Lectures (7) seems to have the same structure. Freud mentions the peculiar symptom of a patient, a married woman, thirty years old. Several times a day she would run from her room into the adjoining one, take up a certain position at the table in the centre of the room, ring the bell for the maid, give her a trivial order or send her away without an order, and then run back again to her room. After some time in analysis, Freud learned about a traumatic incident that happened to his patient on the wedding night: her husband, many years older than she, had proved impotent. Innumerable times during the night he had run out of his room into hers in order to make the attempt, but had failed every time. In the morning he had started thinking that the maid might wonder that there were no traces on the bed linen, had taken a bottle of red ink and had poured some red ink on the sheet, but not exactly in the place where such a mark would have been. A large spot was on the table cover which the patient used in her obsessional symptom; this spot, the patient pointed out, reminded her of the red ink spot on the sheet.

Freud adds to the narration: ' After this there could no longer be any doubt about the connection between the current obsessive act and the scene of the wedding night, though there was still a great deal to learn about it.'

If we look upon this example of an interpretation from our point of view, it is obvious that the symptom in itself, as well as the story which interprets it, have a specific gestalt. The symptom in itself does not make any sense, but it becomes meaningful after Freud has unearthed the gestalt of the events that happened during the patient's wedding night. The two propositions fit into each other almost as closely as in the above example where the check fitted into the piece fixed on the luggage.

Such fitting together of two gestalten we find not only in content interpretation, as shown in the above example, but also in any other interpretation. Anna Freud (6), for instance, in discussing the interpretation of defences, mentions the case of a well-behaved, friendly girl patient who, when given any interpretation of her anxiety, broke out into volleys of contemptuous remarks. The analysis showed that the patient's late father had tried to train the little girl in self-control by making mocking remarks when she gave way to some emotional outburst. Here the gestalt of a certain behaviour of the patient in her analytic sessions proved to be analogous to the gestalt of a certain behaviour her father had displayed in his relationship to her.

Summarizing the above considerations, we

may state that in our search for criteria of validity we have to look for: (*a*) the guiding principle or frame of reference which determines the direction of an interpretation, and (*b*) the specific gestalt of what is interpreted and how it fits into the gestalt of the interpretation.

III

An analysis of most psycho-analytic interpretation shows that not only one but several frames of reference are used. This point may be exemplified by another case mentioned by Freud in the seventeenth of his Introductory Lectures (7).

Freud presents the problems of a nineteen-year-old girl. He elaborates particularly on the patient's ritual performed every night before going to bed. She had to stop a large clock in the bedroom and to remove all other clocks, including a tiny wristwatch. She had to put flowerpots and vases together on her desk. The pillows in her bed had to be arranged in a certain way; it was important to her that her large pillow never touched the back of her wooden bedstead. Only when these and a few other conditions were fulfilled could she fall asleep.

Analysing these obsessional symptoms, Freud gives a number of interpretations, of which, for the sake of brevity, I will mention only two:

(*a*) The clocks and watches, as well as the flowerpots and vases, are interpreted as sexual symbols representing the female genitals.

(*b*) The peculiar condition that the pillow must not touch the board is interpreted as a magic ceremony in order to keep man and woman, i.e. father and mother, apart.

Freud's argument in either one of these two interpretations is based on logical processes which fall into two groups:

(*a*) Some are based upon general and empirical psycho-analytic knowledge. In discussing the meaning of the patient's anxiety regarding the flowerpots and vases, for instance, Freud states: 'Flowerpots and vases are, like all receptacles, symbols of the female genitals.' The frame of reference within which Freud interprets the pillow-board ritual is that of the Oedipus situation.

Freud thus bases the above interpretations on two psycho-analytic theories—sexual symbolism and the Oedipus complex

(*b*) Further inspection of the two interpretations, however, shows that they are not exclusively based upon the two general principles. In both interpretations Freud connects the specific content of his patient's symptoms with specific material from her life experience. Discussing the patient's anxiety that the flowerpots and vases may break, Freud refers to an incident in her childhood when she had fallen while carrying a glass or porcelain vessel, and had cut her finger, which had bled badly. This incident, then, is connected with the patient's later concern about bleeding which, in turn, was part of her phantasies on defloration.

In the discussion of the pillow-board ritual, we learn about many concrete facts, among them the patient's insistence that the door between her and her parents' bedroom remain partly open.

It is essential for the understanding of the logical structure of a psycho-analytic interpretation to realize that it is based on two processes which have to become integrated. In the first process we make, within a certain frame of reference, an inference from a general empirical rule to a specific case. In the second process the interpretation connects certain elements of the specific life experience of the patient with each other. When we, for instance, know that many persons in their unconscious thinking use 'any kind of receptable' as a symbol of the female genitals, we can assume that 'flowerpots,' as part of an individual patient's compulsive symptom, may have the same meaning. But only when this inference is linked to the patient's individual life experience can we arrive at a genuine psycho-analytic interpretation.

The reason why these two processes are necessary cannot be found in any logical considerations, but in the needs of psycho-analyst and patient in the therapeutic process. Without general empirical knowledge the psycho-analyst could not select parts of the material the patient presents as clues for his understanding; he would find a flowerpot or a certain arrangement of bed pillows as uninteresting and senseless as the psychiatrist did before Freud. In the psycho-analyst's mind the inference from general psycho-analytic knowledge may start the process of interpretation, but the patient is not likely to react until he can be shown the connections in his own life.

In our search for criteria of validity we have to separate the process of inference from the process of making connections between parts of the patient's total life experience. Since an inference obviously can be valid only if the general principle is valid on which it is based,

we shall have to concern ourselves first with the problem as to what extent psycho-analytic theory has been or can be validated scientifically. Here we find answers in a great number of empirical investigations. Most of them have been surveyed and summarized in publications such as Robert R. Sears' *Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts* (19) and in the more recent article by Ernest R. Hilgard on 'Experimental Approaches to Psychoanalysis' (11). A great deal has been done in order to verify psycho-analytic theory, but, as Edward Glover has pointed out convincingly (10), there is a need for many more studies of this kind. In any case, the studies show that, in principle, psycho-analytic theory can be validated like any other scientific theory.

The difficulties of such validation will vary according to the specific nature of the proposition in question. The scientist who uses experimentation and statistics in order to arrive at so-called 'objective findings', finds it hard to deal with purely psychological entities, especially if they are not part of the conscious phenomena. He cannot observe, e.g. 'pain' or 'oedipal feelings' themselves; he needs something objectively observable which can be considered an index of such psychological factors. Difficulties of this kind, however, are not only encountered in the field of psycho-analysis; they are problems of methodology and scientific technique common to other sciences as well.

Some discrepancies in the outcome of studies to verify psycho-analytic theories are most likely based upon differences in the indices used. A number of researchers, for instance, have attempted empirical studies in order to test the Freudian theory on the significance of the homosexual conflict in the dynamics of paranoia. A number of those using a more or less superficial case study approach arrived at results which are not in line with Freud's theory; but the theory found overwhelming confirmation in a recent study (1) based upon Rorschach Test results. One can assume that homosexual tendencies may show rather clearly in a Rorschach protocol, while the subject, unless analysed, or at least interviewed by a person able to uncover unconscious material, may not express any feelings indicative of homosexuality.

The existence of such difficulties in concrete empirical studies, however, does not alter the fact that, in principle, psycho-analytic theory can be validated scientifically.

IV

At a first glance it may seem that the second process in interpretation, i.e. the search for connections within the patient's total life experience, is identical with the process of subsumption of an individual case under a general rule. To return to our example: From psycho-analytic theory we know that a 'flowerpot' in the unconscious production of a patient is likely to symbolize female genitals. When Freud mentions the material from the patient's analysis which is connected with the flowerpot symbol, he does give additional proof that, in this individual case, the 'flowerpot' is most likely to have this meaning. The material presented, however, does much more than merely prove that a hypothesis based on symbolic translation is correct. The insight that Freud's findings offer goes beyond the one frame of reference, i.e. symbolic translation; it leads into other areas, e.g. the patient's phantasies about menstruation and defloration.

In his article 'On the History of the Psycho-analytic Movement' (8), Freud made a statement which can be considered the basis of psycho-analytic investigation of the patient's total life experience. It reads as follows: 'It appeared that psycho-analysis could explain nothing current without referring back to something past; more, that every pathogenic experience implied a previous one which, though not itself pathogenic, had yet endowed the later one with its pathogenic quality.'

This means that in psycho-analysis one frame of reference holds a central position—that of interpreting the present out of the past. It furthermore means that all vicissitudes of the patient's life enter the field of psycho-analytic investigation. A trivial incident, such as the accident of Freud's patient when, as a child, she fell while carrying a glass and injured herself, may later take on a special meaning and may become as important as a catastrophic event in a patient's life. We might say that the psycho-analyst has to become an expert in the area of each patient's life, as if this life were an independent field of scientific exploration in itself. Within the realm of exploring the patient's individual life the question of whether or not some general theories, such as those of symbol interpretation, are correct and applicable, loses a great deal of its significance. This is a factor of great importance for the problem of scientific validation. The standard methods of validation, i.e. experiments and statistics, are applicable

to the study of more or less general hypotheses. If experiments, e.g. hypnotic experiments, show that a significant number of people use receptacles as symbols for the female genitals, we assume that this particular theory is validated. We test one single fact within one frame of reference, using a statistical population of many as testing ground. In the specific case we have diametrically opposite conditions: We are dealing with one person only, but this one person presents an indefinite number of experiences falling into an indefinite number of frames of reference. Statisticians have been interested in this problem, which they have called the problem of the ' unique case '. They have realized that here the standard statistical methods cannot be applied. I refer here particularly to Samuel A. Stouffer's ' Notes on the Case Study and the Unique Case ', which forms a part of a Social Science Research Council study on *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment* (22). Recently some statisticians, especially William Stephenson in his Q-technique (20), have been starting attempts to deal statistically with problems of personality centred in one individual. It seems, however, that these efforts, interesting though they may be, do not promise much help for the validation of interpretation.

What then are the criteria of validity which we can use where the regular tools of scientific verification cannot be applied? Robert Waelder, dealing with the problem of criteria of interpretation (23) compares the work of the psychoanalyst with that of the detective. He arrives at the conclusion that an interpretation appears valid if it not only offers an explanation for all the known facts of the case, but also finds confirmation in facts discovered after it has been made. This suggests a method of checking and double checking, which may be of great help in the practice of interpretation, but does not seem to satisfy the demand for scientific validation.

Ernst Kris, in a paper on ' The Nature of Psychoanalytic Propositions and their Validation ' (14), reports on a number of instances of confirmatory evidence, among them the particularly interesting incident published by E. Frenkel-Brunswik (5). In this case a patient had contradicted her analyst's tentative interpretation that in her adolescence she must have identified with the role Cordelia plays in Shakespeare's *King Lear*, asserting that she had never even read *King Lear*. Many years after the termination of her analysis this patient found an old manuscript from her schooldays: she had copied the complete part of Cordelia. However interesting this is as confirmatory evidence for an interpretation, this and similar cases of verification are based on coincidence. A method of verification which presupposes good luck in finding evidence, obviously, is not satisfactory.

John R. Reid and Jacob Finesinger (18) conclude a study on ' Inference Testing in Psychotherapy ' with the statement that we have ' to be satisfied with a degree of confirmation that is pragmatically sufficient '.

It seems that we can attack the problem of scientific validation with better chances of success if we see the element to be interpreted and the facts used in the interpretation as two gestalten which have to fit together. This implies that, in each individual interpretation, we shall have to raise two questions:

(*a*) Is the gestalt of the proposition to be interpreted, such as a dream or a symptom, as well as the gestalt of the material used for the interpretation, sufficiently determined by certain concrete elements and their interconnection to warrant significance?

(*b*) Do the two gestalten fit into each other?

Such testing procedure may be exemplified through an analysis of Freud's interpretation of the symptom of the patient who had the traumatic wedding night experience.

The symptom can be broken down into the following elements:

(*a*) Patient runs from one room into the other.

(*b*) She rings for her maid.

(*c*) She takes up a certain position in order to enable the maid to see a certain spot.

(*d*) This spot is a mark on a tablecloth.

(*e*) The process is repeated several times within a day.

(*f*) The elements (*a*) to (*e*) form part of one symptom.

The facts on which Freud bases his interpretation can also be broken down into concrete details, as follows:

(*a*) During the wedding night the husband ran from his bedroom into that of the patient.

(*b*) He expressed his anxiety about the maid's missing the blood spot on the bed linen by saying, ' It's enough to disgrace one in the eyes of the maid who does the beds.'

(*c*) He made a mark with red ink on

(*d*) the bed linen.

(*e*) He repeated his going from his to the patient's bedroom several times.

(*f*) The fact that all this happened during one night, the wedding night, combines the elements (*a*) to (*e*) into a unit.

It is hardly necessary to mention that each of the six factual elements in the symptom corresponds with one element in the facts which Freud uses in his interpretation. It also seems clear that it is this fitting together of all the elements which makes the reader feel that, as Freud puts it, ' there could no longer be any doubt about the connection between the current obsessive act and the scene of the wedding night '.

Frequently there may be some overdetermination. The repetition of the patient's going from one room to the other, for example, can be explained as representing the husband's coming to the bedroom several times, but this element could also be explained as based on the principle of repetition compulsion. Such overdetermination, however, would hardly ever substantially interfere with the significance of such analysis of an interpretation.

In principle, a similar analysis could be made in any case of interpretation. The idea suggests itself that there would be a positive correlation between the number of corresponding elements in the two gestalten constituting the interpretation and the degree of validity of the interpretation. Only a statistician could decide whether a mathematical procedure could be established in order to arrive at a certain standard ratio representing a degree of validity. But it seems plausible that such quantification could be achieved.

Of course we still should not be able to make an absolute ' true or false ' decision. But such a decision cannot be made in any other field of applied science either. Hardly any statistical study results in a correlation of plus or minus one. Usually the correlation will be a fraction of one, i.e. the evidence will only show that a certain correlation is likely to exist.

Glover (10) criticizes instances where justification of an interpretation is confined to the general statement that ' the material of the patient showed this or that '. If a standard procedure could be worked out which would require statements on the details of the two gestalten as outlined above, as justification of an interpretation, this might provide the safeguards of scientific validation which Glover demands.

V

In applied psycho-analysis the criteria of validity of an interpretation are the same as in psycho-analysis proper. There are, however, differences in the object of interpretation. The biographer or historian, as a rule, uses interpretation in order to understand the total personality of his subject. Specific parts of the life of a person, e.g. symptoms or dreams, are less likely to be of interest to the biographer or historian than to the therapist in his relationship to a patient. In literary criticism the focus may be either on the personality of an author or on that of the characters he portrays. In sociology and anthropology psycho-analytic investigation usually is aimed either at ideal types, such as ' primitive man ' or ' member of a democratic society ', or at cultural symbols or institutions which then are treated as if they were symptoms of a typical personality.

Richard and Editha Sterba's paper on ' Beethoven and his Nephew ' (21) may be quoted as an example of the use of psycho-analysis for biography. The authors are extremely cautious in making interpretations, but they present a wealth of historical material in such a way that the reader can visualize definite gestalten which fit into each other. We learn, for instance, that Beethoven withdrew from his brother Karl, when the latter married, that he later claimed Karl had been poisoned by his wife, that he called his sister-in-law ' Queen of the Night ', that he fought the marriage of his younger brother Johann, and a number of other facts which demonstrate Beethoven's negative attitude toward women. When we then read the details of Beethoven's relationship to his nephew, or when we study his famous three letters to ' the Immortal Beloved ', we see gestalten which fit into each other so obviously that we can interpret each out of the others. The technique used by the authors resembles that of a psycho-analyst who, instead of verbalizing an interpretation, confronts his patient with the material in such a way that the patient cannot help but understand.

Unfortunately many discussions in applied psycho-analysis lack the thorough substantiation of the material which we find in R. and E. Sterba's paper. In a recent paper, for example, an attempt is made to use the psycho-analytic method to inquire into such complex material as the achievement of India's independence and the attainment of equal status for the Pariah caste (16). A small number of facts known about

Mahatma Gandhi's life are used as means of historical interpretation. We find the rather dogmatic statement that 'the struggle for India's independence was a displacement of Gandhi's unconscious fight against his father, involving both his feelings of love, and of hate and revenge'. A great number of analogies are drawn, e.g. the analogy 'father—Great Britain', but the facts presented are of such different order and so incomplete that they do not seem to substantiate the conclusions.

Such all too daring interpretations are likely to discredit the use of psycho-analytic methods for subjects outside of psycho-analysis proper. From a rigid methodological point of view, one could argue that psycho-analysis loses its legitimate ground when applied to exploration of a person who is not a patient. It seems, however, that such argument would not be likely to prevent psycho-analysts or psycho-analytically trained students of other disciplines from extending the field of psycho-analytic interest beyond its application to a patient. Freud himself applied psycho-analysis to many other fields of knowledge and interest.

For the justification of applied psycho-analysis one can point to the fact that 'scientific truth' is always a relative concept. One may, for instance, argue that Beethoven's relationship to his nephew might have been interpreted differently if he had been interviewed or treated by a psycho-analyst. Such a possibility exists, of course; but one would also have to admit that in many studies of actual clinical cases we do not find as much material as in the paper on Beethoven and his nephew.

In the field of biography a German philosopher, Ernst Bertram, in his book on Nietzsche (4), has taken an extreme position by saying that any kind of biography is always a mythology. The historical gestalt of the hero changes according to the interests of those who deal with his life and his works. This statement will be unacceptable to many biographers and historians, but there seems to be a definite kernel of truth in it.

The question of the meaning of 'truth' in a scientific sense becomes particularly difficult when attempts are made to deal with a fictitious person such as a character in a play. This can only be done by using the logic of 'as if'. Ernest Jones, in the preface to his book on *Hamlet and Oedipus* (12), comments, 'I propose to pretend that Hamlet was a living person'.

The logic of 'as if' is also applied in anthropology and sociology, where ideal types are treated as if they were individuals. The question whether and to what extent such procedure is legitimate or fruitful is not a problem of psycho-analysis. But if in any of these fields the claim is made that a certain interpretation is a psycho-analytic one, the interpretation should be required to fulfil the two conditions: (*a*) that a psycho-analytic frame of reference is used, and (*b*) that the interpretation and its object can be visualized as two gestalten fitting into each other.

VI

To summarize: Glover, in his above-mentioned article (10), has stressed the need for 'application of such scientific checks as are appropriate to the special conditions of psycho-analysis'. Through the discussion of the question of scientific validation in psycho-analytic interpretation, an attempt has been made to show some of the difficulties encountered in the search for such scientific tools 'appropriate to the special conditions of psycho-analysis'. It is suggested that a method of evaluating the validity of psycho-analytic interpretations could be developed on the basis of Bernfeld's ideas about the concept of interpretation and about the gestalt character of psycho-analytic propositions. This method would essentially be an inquiry into the fitting together of the gestalt of what has to be interpreted with the gestalt of the interpretation, made within the frame of reference of psycho-analytic theory.

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SHAKESPEARE'S EARLY ERRORS

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Veterem atque antiquam rem novam ad vos proferam

1

If we could understand the motives that impelled William Shakespeare to the writing of plays, what were the reasons for his giving a whole life of wealthy imagination to the theatre, we might come into possession of the main keys to the psychology of the stage itself, of plays, the players, and their public. In the hope of contributing toward this achievement I have undertaken an intensive analysis of a play by the paramount dramatist which most historians regard as one of the earliest—if not the very first—of his creative efforts in theatre: *The Comedy of Errors*. Because of the crude frivolity, the juvenile character of this drama, scholars have not paid it serious attention. The eyes of psycho-analysis turn the more readily to it precisely because of this juvenile character. We know how the childishness of an artist will betray the deepest secrets of his mind, the unconscious origin of the passions of his life. If it is true that the *Errors* stands the nearest of Shakespeare's works to his infancy, we may expect to discover in it the primary springs of his fantasy, the driving forces of all his dramatic work.

Analysis of the comedy is not an easy task, for Shakespeare bequeathed it to us in a palimpsest form. There is plenty of evidence that he revised this product of his youth several times, and it did not reach the press until he had been in his grave many years. We need not be dismayed by the rapid shifts in quality of its stagecraft and the abrupt variations of the style. The changes in the drama will mystify us only when we lose sight of its substance, the farcical plot, which throws over all the sophistications of Shakespeare's mature art the unmistakable shadow of his novice mind. Scarcely any of his other plays exhibits so hearty an interest in plot as the *Errors*. The plot is the thing in which we shall catch the conscience of the poet. Shakespeare apprehended this fact and therefore laboured to fill the fabric of the comedy with snares and delusions, ever hopeful of escape from knowledge. With extreme cunning he wrote and rewrote the drama, turning it into a net of Gordian knots which nowhere present a single loose end to enable us to unravel the purport of the play. At whatever point we select to begin our analysis we are bound to use a sharpness without subtlety, to cut the fabric so that it can be untied with the loving patience it deserves.

Suppose we begin the investigation of Shakespeare's *Errors* with the obvious motive of the farce. Manifestly its purpose is to provoke laughter, extravagant, strenuous, far-fetched laughter, not without tears. The poet means to be merry, like his hero in the middle of the drama, ' in despite of mirth ' (III, i). With its wild, unbelievable story and dreamlike duplication of characters, the comedy aims at delirium. The prime emotion appears to be one of hysteria, as if the author produced it from a desperate want of hilarity, feeling that he must have merriment or run mad. He does not leave us in doubt about the source of this manic humour. It functioned for him in the same way that the clown Dromio of Syracuse serves his curious master. ' When I am dull with care and melancholy,' the master remarks, Dromio ' Lightens my humour with his merry jests ' (I, ii). Again and again Shakespeare stresses relief from a devouring sorrow as sufficient excuse for his jokes, no matter how ribald or fierce. He seems to have put such gaiety on the plane of athletic sports, considering it precious recreation:

> Sweet recreation barr'd, what doth ensue
> But moody moping, and dull melancholy,
> Kinsman to grim and comfortless despair . . . ? (V)

Below the surface motive of the comedy, then, we can plainly see the motive of evading melancholiac depression.

The intensity of the poet's depression on the threshold of his *Errors* may be estimated by the fact that he altered the raw Roman material of

the play in order to give it a groundwork of tragedy. For the sake of its sorrowful opening scene Shakespeare sacrificed elements from his Latin source which would have made the plot more plausible.

In the *Menaechmi* of his beloved Plautus the twins around whom the comedy revolves are separated by a commonplace event. The father takes one to a distant market town and the boy is lost in a crowd. A merchant finds the little Menaechmus and carries him away across the Adriatic Sea to Epidamnus. The lad's father dies of grief. Back in their native Syracuse the grandfather, learning of the double loss, and anxious to preserve the memory of the lost boy, who was named after him, changes the name of the remaining twin from Sosicles to Menaechmus. The new Menaechmus grows up and travels across the Adriatic hoping to find out what happened to his dear brother. Shakespeare desired more sensational reasons for the parting of the twins. He invented a tempest and a shipwreck to account for it. He refused to let the father die of grief, but increased the old man's torments by parting him from the second son. This boy leaves his father to go in search of a brother whom he has never known. And old Aegeon is compelled, years later, to sail in search of both his sons, across the Mediterranean Sea to Ephesus. Shakespeare completes his disruption of the family by having brutal seamen separate the mother from the child she saved in the wreck. In the midst of this welter of narrative we are disappointed to observe that he names the twins Antipholus and fails to explain why they have identical names. To augment the mystification he bestows on their twin servants the single name Dromio. We know that he got the idea for his two sets of twins from another comedy by Plautus, *Amphitruo*, but the Latin dramatist adequately accounted for his twins here by making one of each pair a god masquerading to delude mortals.

Plautus opens his *Amphitruo* with the statement, from the mouth of the god Mercury, that the play commences as a tragedy. Shakespeare may have been encouraged by this to start the *Errors* in the same manner. But the Roman playwright shows us nothing piteous and terrible, like the first scene of Shakespeare's play. Plautus's excuse for the tragic element in his work is that 'it is not right to make a play where kings and gods talk entirely comedy'. The tragic element in Shakespeare's work concerns no god or king, only the poor old merchant Aegeon, who has no parallel in Plautus.

What could have driven Shakespeare to make these drastic alterations in his material? Why did he discard the simple disappearance of a twin in a crowd for the barely credible separation at sea? The tempest must have had a special meaning to the dramatist. The central image of Aegeon's tragic tale, the splitting of his ship, must have exerted an irresistible fascination on Shakespeare's mind. He lavished so much imagination on the disaster that he neglected to make clear the reason for calling both of Aegeon's sons Antipholus. The reckless omission of this important detail gives us a glimpse of the hysterical haste with which the poet went to work on the comedy. His reason appears to have been overwhelmed by the images of the storm and the wreck.

He makes the old man speak of his misfortune as 'this unjust divorce' (I, i). Now, matrimony has often been compared to a sea, and divorce to shipwreck. How conscious of these metaphors the dramatist may have been, we cannot say. It is incontestable, however, that the thought of divorce was running in his mind when he composed *The Comedy of Errors*. Its central events occur in consequence of an estrangement between the hero, Antipholus of Ephesus, and his wife. And the two Latin comedies from which Shakespeare derived the raw stuff of his farce obtain their effects of fun from breaches of marriage.

So far as I am aware, only one of Shakespeare's critics, Frank Harris, has recognized that the poet's own alienation from his wife was a stimulus to the writing of the *Errors* (1). Unfortunately Harris's interpretation of the play raised more riddles than he solved, obscuring the merit of his discovery. He erred in attempting to sift details from the drama to fit his imaginary biography of the poet. In this essay I intend to steer clear of questions of biography, relying for argument exclusively on the text of the play and its literary analogues.

The 'unjust divorce' of Aegeon and his Aemilia is the work of wind, water, and stone, or the caprice of the goddess Fortune, as the venerable traveller insists. The alienation of Antipholus and his Adriana, on the other hand, is portrayed as an error, the climax of a series of errors. The marriage of this couple, Shakespeare seems to say, is nothing but a comedy of errors, indeed a mistake from the start. Adriana's sister suspects that Antipholus mar-

ried her for her riches (III, ii). He grew cold to her, if not cruel. Before the action of the play commences, he was in the habit of keeping late hours away from his house. ' His company must do his minions grace ', Adriana complains, ' Whilst I at home starve for a merry look ' (II, i). She accuses him of unkindness and he charges her with shrewish behaviour. Both are right. Yet until the confusions of the comedy begin, we are led to believe, their temperaments have never exploded in hate. For only a week (prior to the day of the drama), Adriana declares near the end, her husband had been behaving strangely.

> This week he hath been heavy, sour, sad,
> And much different from the man he was;
> But till this afternoon his passion
> Ne'er brake into extremity of rage.

From the lips of Luciana and Aemilia the poet casts the blame for the estrangement on the wife. They rebuke her for ' self-harming jealousy ', for breaking the peace of her household with wicked thoughts of her husband wandering abroad in pursuit of unlawful love. According to the judgement of these women, her conduct toward Antipholus is enough to explain his melancholy and the ' unjust divorce ' of their souls.

The dramatist's compassion for the melancholy Antipholus bears witness for our conviction that Shakespeare identified himself with the outraged husband. He had broken away from his own wife and felt a strong impulse to justify the act on the stage. It could not be shown straightforwardly, of course. In the first place the poet was too blind with tears of self-pity to see the naked truth. Moreover he sensed that his wife did not hold a monopoly of the guilt in their disgrace. He had the intelligence and the courage to admit that he had contributed wrongs and miseries to the marriage; but his courage took the peculiar path of confessing his sins under the mask of comedy. Adopting the counsel of his Luciana, ' Be not thy tongue thy own shame's orator ' (III, ii), he showed the world his shame by means of a variety of tongues. He discloses his guilt with a mirthy grimace while protesting, in an agony of remorse, that he is innocent. The core of the whole play is an apology for Shakespeare's errors in matrimony. He is not to blame, the drama pleads in its grotesque fashion: nor should the woman in the case be condemned, though discerning persons of her sex might decide that she was responsible. The fact of the matter, Shakespeare wishes us to think, is that the marriage had been wrecked because the bride and the groom did not really know the individuals they wedded. It was a case of mistaken identity.

In some such way, I imagine, the ego of the poet defended itself against his conscience or superego in the supreme court of his unconscious mind. I and my woman, the dramatist inwardly contended, have done nothing more damnable than entertain strangers as lovers.—She took me in, like Alcmena in *Amphitruo*, thinking that a hero was going to sleep by her side, and in happy ignorance she united with a god. Alas, poor god! He took in holy wedlock what he thought was an angel, and she turned out to be a termagant, at any rate a woman of torturing whims. Nevertheless, as Plautus says, ' The god will not allow his sin and fault to fall upon a mortal's head.' In our pitiable and ridiculous way we are trying to correct our mistakes. Anyhow, I am.—Thus seeking balm for hurt vanity, and excuses for his marital follies and cruelties, the dramatist contrived his *Comedy of Errors*.

The dramatic process in his unconscious took the shape of a dreamlike confusion of identities. He pictured himself as two persons, the husband Antipholus and his double, the unmarried twin, Antipholus of Syracuse, who is taken for the husband by his unhappy Adriana. There is nothing here to prove a split in the dramatist's personality. On the contrary, he has retained his ego entire and dealt himself the luxury of an alter ego. He demonstrates the sort of esteem for himself which makes people say of certain gentlemen that they are too brilliant, they should have been born twins.

The resemblance between the brothers Antipholus is more than skin-deep. The Duke of Ephesus indicates their true relationship when he exclaims.

> One of these men is genius to the other.
> . . . Which is the natural man,
> And which the spirit? Who deciphers them? (V.)

On the first appearance of the brother from Syracuse he reveals himself as a victim of the same unexplained melancholy that the brother of Ephesus suffers from:

> He that commends me to mine own content
> Commends me to the thing I cannot get. (I, ii.)

The Syracusan may well be described as the ' genius ' or spiritual double of the husband.

He is more lyrical in speech, and briefly manifests a tendency to speculative thought. On his arrival in Ephesus, weary from a long voyage, he delays his dinner to gratify a desire to look on the town, 'Peruse the traders, gaze upon the buildings. . . .' His enthusiasm for sights and insights leads him to bewilderment and hazard, but nothing can diminish it. He vows that he will 'in this mist at all adventures go' (II, ii). The Syracusan's intellectual faculties are never so vivid as his carnal ones. He is almost as brutal as his brother. Both of them are quick to beat their servants' skulls for similar audacities. They cherish in common a profound and unfunny antagonism to the woman Adriana. After making her acquaintance for an hour or two the Syracusan twin confesses,

> She that doth call me husband, even my soul
> Doth for a wife abhor. (III, ii.)

The Ephesian bursts into a fury against his wife for barring him mysteriously from their house. He orders a rope's end to be brought with a view to punishing her (IV, i). He even threatens to pluck out her eyes (IV, iv)! In short, his soul abhors her too. It is not the spirit of virtue in the twins that shrinks from the shrill lady. Shakespeare does not depict them as patterns of chastity. The Ephesian pays a bold homage to the harlot who runs the Porpentine inn. His brother makes love to Luciana shortly after their first sight of each other, and plans to leave her city the same day. The egoism of this fellow is oddly displayed by Shakespeare in his pretext for abandoning Luciana. Her charms, he says, 'almost made me traitor to myself'.

> But lest myself be guilty to self-wrong,
> I'll stop mine ears against the mermaid's song.
> (III, ii.)

His scruples do not prevent him from accepting the wifely services of her sister; he lets Adriana labour under the impression that she is doing her duty to her mate. The promptitude of the twins in embracing female hospitality is nearly equalled by their good-will to men, especially men of their station in society. To these singular features we should add their mode of showing anxiety as soon as they experience a loss of money. All these touches of nature make them more than kin. The creator wisely relinquished his attempt (traces of which survive in three old stage directions) to mark the twins apart by styling the Syracusan 'Erotes'—the amorous—and his brother 'Sereptus'—the stealthy.

Incidentally, the poet gives two different statements of their age. In the first scene we learn that the Syracusan journeyed at eighteen in quest of the other. Since then, Aegeon remarks, five summers have passed, or, to be exact, as he is in the final scene, 'seven short years'. To the father, then, the twins are twenty-five years old. The mother dates their birthday earlier. 'Thirty-three years,' she declares, 'have I but gone in travail Of you, my sons' (V). We are sorry to miss the evidence of those she calls 'the calendars of their nativity'. The two Antipholi are presented as men of 'gravity' and 'serious hours', but demeanour is no index to age. Adriana in chagrin asserts that her mate is 'deformed, crooked, old and sere' (IV, ii). But can we trust her testimony in the face of the romance of his twin and her sister Luciana? We cannot even be sure that Dromio of Ephesus tells the truth when he says, examining Dromio of Syracuse, 'I see by you I am a sweet-fac'd youth' (V). The cause of the poet's discrepant chronology lies, I feel sure, in his revision of the play at different stages of his career, and may be of use to biographers.

I have been unable to locate in Latin or Greek literature the name that Shakespeare chose for his ego surrogates. There was a famous artist, a painter, named Antiphilus in the era of Alexander the Great. Possibly he was remembered by the dramatist when he cloaked his unconscious self as Greek for *The Comedy of Errors*. The principle of determinism in the choice of names still challenges us to elucidate Shakespeare's designation for his doubles. It strikes me that the spelling 'Antipholus' was intended characteristically for a pun. We know how fond the poet was of trifling with words; he could truly be called a pun-addict. Also well known is his conviction that by means of wit and drama he could purge the stupidities, the intellectual diseases of the world (2). In the light of these facts I suggest that the name of his heroes may be translated into English as *anti-follies*. Otherwise the appellation is just Greek to me. If I am right in this surmise it would help to explain Shakespeare's failure to record the reason for the twins bearing the same name. The humane development, the culture of his psyche would not permit him free rein in self-righteousness. As a fool of Fortune in marriage he must have felt uneasy in his posture of justice above the fools of the world. In the conflict between righteous

vanity and the woe and shame of his ' unjust divorce ' the memory of the latter would suffice to make him oblivious of the motive for naming his protagonists Antipholus.

There is no difficulty in accounting for the name of the twin servants, Dromio. It is simply an Italian variation of the name the Roman playwright Terence bestowed on slaves in his first comedy, *The Woman from Andros*, in *The Self-Tormentor*, and *The Brothers*. Shakespeare unquestionably had Italian buffoons in mind when he created the brothers Dromio. A drum, by the way, was a typical property of clowns in his time.

As twin slaves of the Antipholi, one a bachelor like his master, all of precisely the same age, the Dromios could be viewed as simply burlesques of the aristocratic twins. They share certain qualities of their respective employers. The married Dromio, for example, expresses with his scullion Luce the lechery which his master has subdued and refined. The unmarried servant shows less carnality than his brother, and more religion and imagination. His spiritual attributes form a remarkable contrast of Shakespeare's dramatic method with that of Plautus, since the English artist modelled his Syracusan clown on the role that the god Mercury plays in *Amphitruo* as the double of the slave Sosia. The English poet transformed the divine Sosia into a human being with a rare talent for superstition, just as he changed the Jupiter who usurps Amphitryon's bed into a mortal proud of his chastity, with a rare talent for metaphysics. Between Plautus and Shakespeare, clearly, there was a progress of reason in theology, ensuing in the wake of a tremendous restriction of libido. The Syracusan twins, with all their fleshly frailty, are unquestionably superior in morals to the Roman gods. If the Roman dramatist has any advantage over Shakespeare in ethics, I would say that it consists of his superior passion for liberty. Plautus never lets pass an opportunity to express his sadness and hatred at the sight of humanity in chains. To Shakespeare's eyes the bondage of a Dromio was too light to be taken seriously. He seems to have enjoyed a feudal sense of intimacy between lord and labourer. Antipholus depicts the feudal idea when he warns Dromio not to let ' Your sauciness jest upon my love ' because ' I familiarly sometimes Do use you for my fool, and chat with you ' (II, ii). Their relation might be defined as even more intimate, anagogically. It is possible that Dromio incarnates the ' earthy-gross conceit ' which Antipholus deplores in himself (III, ii), that is the vulgar and servile qualities of the genius who created them both.

The Comedy of Errors contains another set of mental twins, who have eluded the scrutiny of Shakespearean experts and critics. It is conceivable that the dramatist himself was not aware of their identity. Their likeness is drawn with so much dexterity and painstaking cleverness that I am inclined to think he meant them to be equals and opposites. He struggled cordially to discriminate them, and the opinion of generations of scholars on their portraits is proof that he was too successful. The cost of this success, in my opinion, is the defeat of the dramatist's honest intention, and injustice to the woman whom he sketched twice as the wife Adriana and her sister. There are good reasons for thinking that when Shakespeare outlined their characters he proposed, perhaps unconsciously, to limn two aspects or phases of the same lady, his own wife. Luciana would then represent the girl he made his bride, beautiful, tender, and gleaming with extraordinary wisdom; and Adriana would stand for the woman she became, or rather the creature Shakespeare fancied lay potential in his bride. In changing her image to the two distinct heroines he surpassed the metamorphoses of his favourite poet, Ovid, whose mythic transformations he constantly held in the ' quick forge and working-house ' of unconscious thought.

The essential identity of the sisters emerges when we compare their characters in detail. The outstanding trait of Adriana is her shrewishness. Antipholus of Syracuse contrasts her with Luciana primarily on account of the unmarried sister's kind and courteous manner, her ' gentle sovereign grace ' (III, ii). Next to this quality he adores her ' discourse ', or adroitness in conversation. Now Luciana herself, though critical of her sister's headstrong attitude to Antipholus, testifies that

> She never reprehended him but mildly,
> When he demean'd himself rough, rude, and wildly. (V.)

Shakespeare presents the shrew as a model of tenderness in the scene where she humours her husband, believing him almost insane—' poor distressed soul ' (IV, iv). She exhibits her devotion to him in worry over his arrest for debt, which she hastens to pay off despite his torrent of insults. As for Adriana's ' discourse ',

we have every reason to believe her when she affirms that her conversation has been dulled and her wit turned barren by the chill hostility of her husband. 'If voluble and sharp discourse be marr'd,' says she, 'Unkindness blunts it more than marble hard' (II, i). There is no sign that Antipholus ever acted toward her with generosity, execpt before their wedding, when she was certainly Luciana-like. The unmarried sister, however, is by no means exempt from Adriana's defects. She too can pour a swift shrillness of epithets on people who offend her (II, ii). Her volubility on occasions can be bluntly evil (III, ii). We may trust the judgement of Adriana when she states that her sister will want to 'bear some sway' after she weds, and upbraid her husband if he strays from home to linger in sirens' taverns. Apart from temper and talent in talk the girls are supposed to be distinguished by their looks. Adriana speaks as if 'homely age' had deprived her of virgin loveliness, but a moment later she declares that a 'sunny look' from her husband would quickly restore her beauty: 'he hath wasted it' (II, i). If he had never led her to the nuptial altar she would have glittered precisely as alluring as her sister and the hostess of the Porpentine, whom Antipholus praises as 'Pretty and witty, wild, and yet, too, gentle' (III, i). Shakespeare does not tell how old she and Luciana are. If there is any difference in their ages, it is not enough to cleave their souls asunder. They too are one.

In the names of the two girls, I suspect, the dramatist has informed us, in his paradoxical way, that they are twins. If we take Luciana to mean 'the bright one', by the facile substitution (in accordance with Grimm's law) of a *t* for the *d* in Adriana, we could translate her name as 'the dark one'. It may also signify the lucent or luscious one gone dry. (For my purpose it is unnecessary to render the last syllables of their names more concretely. To the reader who wishes to take them as meaning simply Anna, I answer: As you like it.)

It is not unlikely that Shakespeare designed these 'witches', as Antipholus of Syracuse calls them (III, ii), to stand for the great moon goddess of their city, Diana. Another name for the moon divinity, in the religion of ancient Rome, was Lucina. The Syracusan worships Luciana as 'more than earth divine', hails her 'Fair sun', and speaks of her sister as 'night'. In the writer's unconscious, according to my surmise, the feminine 'sun' was nothing but the shining face of the moon. He symbolized her sister by the dark side of Diana. The name of this goddess might be interpreted, without stretching the patience of philology, as meaning 'the double one'. Frazer has observed that Diana appears in ancient myth like a partner of Janus, the two-faced god of Rome (3). The idea of the twofold deity could have provided our poet with the inspiration to change the setting of the *Errors* from Plautus's Epidamnus to Ephesus. Presumably he was tempted to keep the scene in Epidamnus, since the name appealed to his passion for puns and devilry. He made that town the birthplace of the Antipholi (I, i), and the Syracusan brother is told to pretend that he voyaged from there to Ephesus. When he plans to abandon Luciana his servant buys him passage on a vessel bound for Epidamnus. At all events Shakespeare made Ephesus serve his dramatic aims as a city of the damned. The Epidamnus of Plautus is a town of swindling, sponging, and seduction. Shakespeare's Ephesus is a town of deeds more dreadful, infernal crafts, 'And many such-like liberties of sin' (I, i). Its wenches, according to Dromio of Syracuse, are accustomed to cry, 'God damn me', which he says is equivalent to the prayer, 'God make me a light wench'. These girls are therefore worthy to function as ministrants of the moon. Dromio argues that their heavenly bodies are hellish: 'It is written, they appear to men like angels of light: light is an effect of fire, and fire will burn; ergo, light wenches will burn' (IV, iii). But Dromio, like his master, is an enemy of all things pagan, when these confront them in the flesh. For the literate Antipholus the cult of Diana would surely have poetic charms, with its visions of wildwood nymphs and vestals entranced or dancing by her silver flame. Outside poetry, however, he would agree with the illiterate Dromio that her religion was witchcraft or else sheer lunacy. Both master and slave are devout Christians—actually Roman Catholics—and according to Christian tradition the sylvan retinue of Diana eventually turned into ghosts and monsters, like the 'goblins, owls, and elvish sprites' whom Dromio sees everywhere in Ephesus (II, ii). In the period of Shakespeare a host of scholars were convinced that warlocks and beldames of hell worshipped her: 'in the night-times,' it is written, 'they ride abroad with Diana, the goddess of the Pagans' (4). The divinity receives no worship in Shakespeare's play because he converted Ephesus to a Christian

town. Nevertheless we can glimpse her ' sovereign grace ', divided among the women of the comedy, performing its magic in the afternoon and dusk. She exercises her spells not only through the dextrous Luciana and the sinister Adriana, but also through the unnamed inn-keeper whom Dromio fancies might be ' Mistress Satan ' (IV, iii).

By the supernal power of sex which Diana represents the characters are all flung into craziness. True, this does not occur until the hero Antipholus of Syracuse sets foot in the city. Shakespeare toiled hard to impress us with the notion that Antipholus is ever on guard against the power of sex. How could he act as the prime mover of its madness in the comedy? My answer is that, despite his piety, he is the evil ' genius ' of the *Errors*. To each of the women in it his apparition radiates a satanic magnetism, of which he is blissfully unaware. His Dromio seems to comprehend this. When Antipholus warns the hostess of the Porpentine, ' Avaunt, thou witch! ' Dromio dryly remarks: ' Fly pride, says the peacock ' (IV, iii). Apropos of the peacock, we recall that the bird was a companion of the goddess Juno, in whom Frazer has discerned a twin of Diana (5). So the Syracusan may rightly be regarded as a minion of the moon. Wherever he walks it looks as if lunacy prevails; no wonder he must ask himself,

> Am I in earth, in heaven, or in hell?
> Sleeping or waking? mad or well-advis'd? (II, ii.)

He might well speak of his experience in the words of another of Shakespeare's heroes:

> It is the very error of the moon;
> She comes more near the earth than she was wont,
> And makes men mad. (*Othello*, V, ii.)

The adventures of Antipholus prove to be ' well-advised '. He manages to enjoy himself among the Ephesians, and unites with Luciana in the end.

The omission of the moon-goddess from Shakespeare's *Errors* was probably dictated by discretion more than religious propriety. The educated subjects of Elizabeth were accustomed to hearing the Virgin Queen extolled as the English Diana, and literary allusions to the divinity of the moon were frequently assumed to imply an opinion of her Majesty (6). Shakespeare apparently endeavoured to banish all thought of Elizabeth from the minds attending to his farce. Perhaps he remembered the penalty inflicted on his forerunner Richard Edwards when that comic dramatist referred to classic Greek personalities in language that was construed as criticism of some Tudor courtiers (7). Shakespeare could not afford to have any wit of the royal court construe the function of Diana in his comedy as a joke on the Queen. He described the city of Ephesus, remember, as a hotbed of black magic, swarming with

> Dark-working sorcerers that change the mind,
> Soul-killing witches that deform the body. (I, ii.)

If he had introduced the goddess of these magicians in the play he would have risked damnation as one who hinted that Elizabeth was the mistress of mountebanks and hell-hags. Insofar as her Majesty is glanced at in the *Errors* it is through the glare of the authority of Solinus, the ' sweet prince ' of Ephesus. The Duke is barely more than an abstraction, law and order incarnate. The first syllable of his name, Sol, would serve to ward off suspicion that the poet delineated him as a deputy of Diana, the antagonist of the sun. Solinus will not stand for nonsense and moonshine; he is emblematic of system, a foe of anarchy, indeed a deputy of the superego in us all.

So Shakespeare expelled the magnificent moon-woman from *The Comedy of Errors*. A quick look at a concordance tells us that the moon is not mentioned even once. Yet the shadow of the goddess is perceptible in every scene. She glows above the heads of the women in their excitement or serenity and broods tenebrously over the men. When the young Shakespeare wrote the comedy, in the darkness of his unconscious, he must have offered a mocking reverence to her ' whom all Asia and the world worshippeth ', and echoed the cry of the silversmiths against the apostle Paul: ' Great is Diana of the Ephesians! ' (*Acts of the Apostles*, xxix, 28).

To the learned of Shakespeare's period Diana was the goddess of virginity. Luciana would therefore seem to be a truer embodiment of the Diana ideal than Adriana. Let us not be deceived by this seeming. The emphasis of the poet on the ' unviolated honour ' of the wife, her horror of the licentious (II, ii), her lack of offspring, and the gestures of frigid purity that drove her husband to the Porpentine inn, prove her deserving of a vestal's glory.

Shall we assent to the proof? Is it not also seeming, a tissue of ostensible truth? We have seen Luciana portrayed as a temptress, a siren

luring the bachelor Antipholus to ' self-wrong '. Shakespeare in fact makes her an advocate of hypocrisy. In the belief that Antipholus is her brother-in-law, she instructs him to execute his lust by stealth: ' Teach sin the carriage of a holy saint; Be secret-false ' (III, ii). The purity of her sister is no less illusory. Some may reject the accusations of her husband—' Dissembling harlot! ' ' O most unhappy strumpet! ' (IV, iv) —as products of fallacy, brought on by the revelation that she welcomes an unknown man in his absence. Those who think so should try to explain the slip of her servant Dromio's tongue when, early in the play, he talks of her husband's delay in coming home: ' Why, mistress ', he blurts, ' sure my master is horn-mad.' She responds at once to the indictment of adultery. ' Horn-mad, thou villain! ' He hastens to correct himself, ' I mean not cuckold-mad ' (II, i). From the psychopathology of such mistakes we can deduce a hint of veracity in Dromio's slip. Apparently his master has behaved like a man stung by fancies of his wife's adultery long before her afternoon's entertainment. Is it conceivable that the headstrong Adriana had done absolutely nothing to promote those fancies? Hours before he calls her strumpet she weeping brands herself with the stigma. She calls herself a ' stale ' of Antipholus. Later, in fantasy of his own sins, she announces:

> I am possess'd with an adulterate blot;
> My blood is mingled with the crime of lust.
> (II, ii.)

Her basis for this self-accusation is a mere metaphor of marriage, that she and her mate are in wedlock one. Under the tones of uxorious indignation we can detect the voice of repressed sensuality, just as under the chambers of Adriana we find dwelling the kitchen-wench Nell, or Dowsabel, whose lascivious advances frighten Dromio of Syracuse. The acuteness of Shakespeare's unconscious satire on the virginal sisters may be perceived in the third name he invented for the obscene kitchen-wench. He also calls her Luce, as if to invite comparison with the chaste yet hypocritic Luciana.

The truth is that the sisters, like the brothers, are impure in heart. Among the paradoxes of the comedy the confidence they display in their virginity and virtue is perhaps the most absurd. They are all sinners, all fools—what you will: ' Smother'd in errors, feeble, shallow, weak ' (III, ii).

2

Our investigation of the *Errors* thus far leads to the conclusion that the comedy was precipitated out of the poet's unconscious by marital troubles and disaster. We have still to elucidate the riddle, what made a gentleman of his courage and intelligence prone to sexual conflict and disaster? How did he ever come to entertain strangers as lovers? His marriage could not have been the first enterprise of this sort. Before he married he must have committed other erotic errors more or less like those he has caricatured in his play. In all his affairs of the heart, we may be sure, the blind god Cupid led him blind, quelling his intelligence and making his courage flare up. In the mist of passion he would go at all adventures, no matter what tortures and remorse might follow. The Narcissus in him could usually single out somebody to blame for his stumbling and sprawls. If not, there was always fortune to be cursed, or his birth stars.

The answer to our riddle must lie in the nature of this Narcissus in Shakespeare, the colossal self-love which could project itself into the twin heroes of the comedy and have enough energy left to make their twin clowns and other characters ruddily vital and radiant. From the Narcissus pool of his soul he drew the power —and ' will in overplus '—to surmount the tragic defeats and comic humiliations of his life. From mysterious fountains in the same pool his ego also drank sweet poison, mistaking jets of self-pity for the elixir of self-love, and so steeping itself in a melancholy that not seldom resembled madness. It was in flight from the peril of utter unreason that Shakespeare wrote *The Comedy of Errors*. For the play not only endeavours to explain the struggle of the poet's conscience with an event; it struggles to explain the poet, to assist the understanding of the stranger he felt was himself. To love oneself and win self-knowledge: is the feat possible?

So far as Shakespeare had the strength, when he composed the *Errors*, to venture the feat—handicapped by his terror of baring himself to taunts and mental rapine—he did it in meditation and development of his ' personae ', the two Antipholi. Naturally he endowed them with his admirable traits—his dignity, his noble charity and generosity, his affection for the arts of peace, his grace to women and good-will to men. Dignity or honour obliged him to add his less attractive traits—his impulses to jealousy and revenge, his severely controlled lust and

ferocity, and the will to lie, steal, mutilate, or kill. We have already noticed how the Ephesian, on being locked out of his house, commands the purchase of a rope's end to lash his wife, and later, when she brings a doctor for his distraction, threatens with his own nails to pluck out her ' false eyes ' (IV, iv). In a parallel scene of the *Menaechmi* the slave Messenio threatens to gouge out the eyes of some men who are trying to drag his master off as a lunatic. The memory of this probably lurked in Shakespeare's mind when he pictured the half-crazed husband menacing his wife. Antipholus vents his sadistic wrath on Dr. Pinch instead, applying fire to his beard, extinguishing it with pails of puddled mire, while his servant nicks the doctor with scissors (V). Meanwhile his brother turns thief with the golden chain that the Ephesian wished to give a courtesan to spite his wife. The theft ensues on the dinner which the Syracusan has obtained from Adriana by turning cheat. Afterward he and his Dromio scare off the two sisters and the courtesan with naked swords (IV, iv). These little larcenies and bestialities recompense the twins for their grand refusal to tread the path of unholy dalliance and adultery.

It is curious to see how the bachelor brother treats the house of Adriana like an inn, and makes love to one of the hostesses, immediately before the espoused one determines to dine at the inn whose mistress Shakespeare merely names Courtesan. In neither episode does the house become a brothel, like the home of Erotium in Plautus, where Menaechmus the newcomer dines with the prostitute at his brother's expense. The wish, which George Meredith styles sentimental, to get pleasure unpaid for is obviously behind the comic conception of both playwrights. But Shakespeare's horror of indulging the wish deprives his play of much humour. He presents Antipholus of Ephesus as a paragon of idealism in morals. ' How dearly,' says his wife, ' would it touch thee to the quick, Shouldst thou but hear I were licentious.' She conjures a vision of him tearing the wedding ring from her finger to ' break it with a deep divorcing vow ' (II, ii). Less than two hours later her husband gives the hostess of the Porpentine the chain he had promised Adriana, and takes or snatches a ring from the courtesan (IV, iii). It is likely that Shakespeare considered this a token of second wedlock, a marriage made in hell.

In the poet's self-portraiture his attitude to matrimony reveals a profound and painful ambivalence. Luciana lectures her sister on the divine rights of the male in wedlock and the necessity of obedience in wives. The essence of this sermon runs veritably through all of Shakespeare's dramas, apparently integral to his dogmas of church and state. At the same time he preaches the doctrine that male and female are incorporated at the wedding altar into one. By this ritual the wife partakes in the godlike rights of her mate, and therefore can limit or confine them. She can demand obedience from him. Shakespeare recognized the privilege, the sovereignty of the wife, yet could not bring himself to admit it frankly. Instead he tossed in childlike anguish between the horns of his dilemma.

The heroines of Plautus exhibit a pride of sex, or sense of feminine dignity, unknown to the women of *The Comedy of Errors*. Alcmena refuses to endure her husband's charges of unchastity. She demands her goods and slaves from him and prepares for divorce. The wife of Menaechmus, lacking her solitary strength, still castigates her husband for his thieving, and summons her father to protect her from outrage. Erotium is stronger: she storms at her double-crossing lover and drives him out of her house. The men in the *Menaechmi* and *Amphitruo* are forced to appease, cajole, and act subservient to their women.

Except in the case of Aemilia, Shakespeare commands his ladies to act subservient to their men. Even that grand dame mainly functions as a guardian of her men, and condemns the woman who troubles their voluptuous peace. The freedom that Aemilia enjoys from sexual bondage is the outcome of her holiness. She is a governess of nuns. For women who did not covet the virgin's gloriole, and set their hearts on independence, the poet seldom had anything but anger, mockery, and tears.

At the root of his agony seems to burn the irresistible urge to embrace strangers as lovers. His ego, as I conceive it, constantly hunted for objects on whom to shower the surplus of his libido, and invariably learned that the objects were doomed to be foreigners. Again and again he must have tried to join an alien soul to his own and waked from the dream of friendship or the honeymoon aghast and bewildered by the discovery that he was once more alone with the unknown, marvelling like his Antipholus:

> What! was I married to her in my dream?
> Or sleep I now and think I hear all this? (II, ii.)

The plot of *The Comedy of Errors*, if we interpret it truly, will provide us with clues to the mystery of the poet's tendencies in love.

Ordinarily when one hears the popular phrase, a man's better half, one thinks it refers to his wife. Sir Philip Sidney employed it in his *Arcadia* as equivalent to true-love. When Shakespeare uses it—or a variant—we cannot tell what he means. Sidney's usage appears to be intended when Antipholus of Syracuse appeals to the stranger Luciana as 'mine own self's better part' (III, ii). Earlier in the comedy we find the phrase aimed differently. Adriana, reproaching the man she fancies is her husband, exalts herself as 'better than thy dear self's better part' (II, ii). If we take this as a boast of superiority to the woman of his heart, we are confronted with an enigma. Who could this rival woman be? Judging by Adriana's jealousy, we might guess it is her husband's courtesan, though the wife gives no sign of having information about the temptress of the inn. Adriana simply suspects that his eye offers 'homage' somewhere (II, i). It is surprising to hear her, suddenly definite about his alleged sin, allude to the rival with the phrase of respect. Presumably Shakespeare designed it here for irony. The rest of Adriana's speech, however, is so earnest and tragic that we feel it imperative to search for a deeper design.

She pleads for compassion to the frostily intellectual Antipholus of Syracuse:

> How comes it now, my husband, O! how comes it,
> That thou art thus estranged from thyself?
> Thyself I call it, being strange to me,
> That, undividable, incorporate,
> Am better than thy dear self's better part.
> Ah, do not tear away thyself from me,
> For know, my love, as easy mayst thou fall
> A drop of water in the breaking gulf,
> And take unmingled thence that drop again,
> Without addition or diminishing,
> As take from me thyself and not me too.

Thus Adriana sees her husband's inner existence as a structure of three parts: himself, a 'better part', and herself, the best, the only one she calls estranged.

With the probe of psycho-analysis we are able to explore the identity of the second person of this trinity, and determine the moment of her mingling with the hero's self. Shakespeare has betrayed her unaware.

The simile Adriana employs for her spouse's original ego—a drop of water—is familiar to Antipholus, since he has employed it in soliloquy for himself. In one of his first utterances in the play he muses:

> I to the world am like a drop of water,
> That in the ocean seeks another drop;
> Who, falling there to find his fellow forth,
> Unseen, inquisitive, confounds himself. (I, ii.)

The 'breaking gulf' of Adriana's speech recalls the comparison of matrimony to a sea. The ocean of Antipholus he himself compares to the world. It strikes me as a less extensive vastness. Long before Edward Carpenter consciously thought of sex as oceanic, poets and other visionaries had established the likeness in their dreams, and written rapturously about the ocean unaware of its sexual analogy. The real meaning of Antipholus's ocean springs to view in the lines of his soliloquy that follow the mournful image. In these verses the 'fellow' he seeks becomes twofold:

> So I, to find a mother and a brother,
> In quest of them, unhappy, lose myself.

The emergence of the mother in the goal of his search may perplex us after reading the reference to his fellow, especially when we remember that Aegeon had not mentioned the mother as an object of his boy's voyages. No such motive appears in the *Menaechmi*, where the twins' mother, Teuximarcha, is named once and conveniently forgotten. In *The Comedy of Errors* the mother Aemilia plays a majestic and strategic part. Until the last scene, only her Syracusan son manifests a faith that she is still alive, but he manifests it only in these two lines. Shakespeare obviously found the subject too venerable or extremely touchy. My readers may seize this occasion to protest that the brother of Antipholus could not be sanely regarded as an object in the ocean of sex. Granting they are right, at the hazard of their tolerance, I am tempted to suggest that the 'fellow' whom Antipholus yearns to find is in a potent sense feminine. In view of my belief that the Syracusan is a 'genius' or demon double, it is logical (by the laws of folklore) to assume that he is seeking a body, a material form. Insofar as the Ephesian is earthier and more matter-of-fact he performs this material function. Since earth and matter are from ancient times symbolic of the maternal, I am led to wonder if the 'water' Antipholus longs for is not—more than just feminine—motherly?

In consequence of this reasoning we have to translate the quest of Antipholus for reunion with his mother as a dream-journey of desire

for rebirth. In dreams, and in dramas too, ' Birth is almost invariably represented by some reference to water: either we are falling into water or clambering out of it, saving someone from it or being saved by them, i.e. the relation between mother and child is symbolized ' (8). Shakespeare in fact nearly stripped away the last web of glamour between our scientific insight and his poetically concealed sperm-drop endeavouring to reach the womb. It will be noted that Adriana speaks of a drop of water falling in and then being taken from ' the breaking gulf '. To the woman there is hope of ultimate redemption for the ' drop '. To the malcontent Antipholus the falling drop is fated to devastation, to ' confound himself '. Nevertheless he travels on, ' unseen, inquisitive '.

Just as he fancies himself confounded and lost in the ocean of the world, he looks with fascination on the city of Ephesus and resolves to wander through its labyrinth of streets: ' I will go lose myself ' (I, ii). Shakespeare was well acquainted with the poetic practice of hailing cities as foster-mothers. His fellow-playwrights (for diverse examples, Thomas Watson and Thomas Dekker) fondly alluded to their birthplace London as a mother. To Shakespeare the metropolis must have seemed a stepmother, with all the charms and criminal appetites of stepmothers in fairy tales; for many years London let him starve for love.

At this point the sceptical reader will have ripened for me a cluster of pungent questions. Among the foremost perhaps is this: Will the venerable Aemilia fit into the equation which Adriana proposes for her distressed mate's ego? In other words, Is the mother his dear self's better part?

From the text of the comedy I have extricated but one piece of proof that Aemilia is the true rival of the wife in the heart of her son. In the final act Antipholus of Syracuse, flying from the wife and her compatriots, escapes into the sanctuary over which the long lost Aemilia rules. She and the Syracusan are of course ignorant of each other's identity. Adriana, frustrated, demands from Solinus protection of her marital rights, not knowing the relation of Aemilia to her man: ' Justice, most sacred duke, against the abbess!' Her grievance plainly sounds as if the abbess had stolen her beloved. Unconsciously, so to say, Adriana has fathomed the abyss of the Antipholus mind. Old customs of matrimony ordain that a man shall hold his wife above his mother in the scale of his values. The spouse is generally judged more valuable in political economy. So the miserable girl is justified in claiming that she is better than her husband's ' better part '. Love, notwithstanding, laughs at her priority. Safe in the bosom of the priory church the ' genius ' Antipholus can defy both wife and duke. The genuine Antipholus, by the dictates of Shakespeare's reality principle, stays outside the sacred refuge and faces the music of political economy. On his ego wounds the abbess cannot perform the miracles which her ' wholesome syrups, drugs, and holy prayers ' promise the spirit from Syracuse. With the confidence of maternal power she expects ' To make of him (the fugitive) a formal man again '. But she is powerless to make a healthy head of a family out of the profane or ' natural ' son.

A sequel question we have to meet is—How could Aemilia be the ' better part ' of the twins when one of them extols Luciana as his better part? The evidence for my answer is scanty and fragmentary, but it is the best we could hope to obtain from the poet at the stage of his self-knowledge and self-revelation where he wrote his *Errors*. My answer is twofold. When the Syracusan makes love to Luciana the poet revels in the illusion that the mother's image in this interval is demoted in his heart. And in that interval he is eager to entertain a stranger as a lover. The poet's unconscious remains undeceived by the gesture of demotion and goes ardently ahead with its drive for the assimilation of Luciana to the image of Aemilia. Whatever real person he had in view when he conceived the younger character vanished while the erotic scene was plotted; or rather her memory dissolved into the familiar and permanent memory of his mother. Luciana could become the ' better part ' of Antipholus solely by metamorphosis into Aemilia.

At once the vigilant reader will inquire, Does this mean that Aemilia is a simulacrum of the goddess Diana? I think, no. Diana in the drama—insofar as she is visible—is actually a simulacrum of Aemilia. She has been converted from pagan goddess to Christian abbess, from a queen of vestals to a governess of nuns. That is why the influence of the Ephesian moon-woman is felt throughout the play. The influence of the mother assumes the mythical radiance. She is the goal of the Syracusan's journey and therefore the driving force of Shakespeare's plot. In the love song of Antipholus to Luciana I find a faint proof of her

immanence in the moonshine of the dramatist's soul. He imagines her sister weeping continually till she creates a 'flood of tears'. Then he begs Luciana not to drown him in the flood—not to unite him to Adriana out of pity—since he wants her alone for his love:

> Sing, siren, for thyself, and I will dote:
> Spread o'er the silver waves thy golden hairs,
> And as a bed I'll take them and there lie. (III, ii.)

The waves are silver, we know, because the moon beams on them. By what magic could the golden locks of Luciana fall on her sister's silver tears? Only by identification of the two. This becomes possible to fantasy if we translate them into phases or aspects of a personification of the moon. But Antipholus does not dream of reclining on the moon; he visions himself on a white-crested sea. In the language of homely reality, he wishes to lie on his mother's breast and suck her milk. We can now understand why the two sisters, the bright and the dark, may claim to possess parts of the hero's self. Having convinced his ego of their semblance to his mother, they gained admission to her fane in himself and in turn enjoyed his idolatry. In exchange for this reverence they had to give up his love. Loving them signified to him 'self-wrong' and internal treason, i.e. betraying the maternal deity erected by his ego in childhood. Since the goddess belonged to none but himself, worshipped without prospect or hope of sexual intercourse, she could reign in his unconscious both as mother and as virgin. This psychic contradiction has its mythic parallel in the cult of Diana, who was revered for her strict and frosty chastity and adored for her warm sympathy with women giving birth. In the sanctuary of Diana at Rome her statue displayed many breasts, as if she herself had known the bliss of maternity (9). The Roman women, delivering their babies, invoked the assistance of Lucina, the moon.

Aemilia's children are restored to her at the end of the comedy, and Shakespeare downrightly indicates her stature in their twin minds. He denies the daughter-in-law an apology for Antipholus's truculence or a pardon for her faults. For the sake of popular romance he bestowed on Luciana three lines of reassurance of the other brother's love. There is no mistaking the significance of the happy ending. It is joy over the return of the twins to the supreme love of their life. For the sake of this overwhelming attraction one Antipholus is cruel to her rivals, and the other hardens his heart to the allurements of girls. Under the mask of the abbess we discover the secret cause of her son's unjust divorce. From some abysmal temple in his brain her moon-coloured idol governs his sexual tides. She is a jealous goddess, and will have no other mistresses before her. Union with another is iniquity to her, and she is never slow to revenge the sin. In retaliation for her child's efforts toward liberty, to hunt for a new love elsewhere, she flogs his ego from her stronghold in his head, with silver cords.

The wish for maternal pillow and milk brings to the surface of the dramatist's mind the idea of death. In the 'glorious supposition' that Adriana's tears and Luciana's hair have been made a bed for Antipholus, he is ready to believe 'He gains by death that hath such means to die'. In the midst of his ecstasy the thought of extinction becomes sweet to him. Why? The sole reply that occurs to me is that the mother in the dramatist's mind must be dead. Whether the woman in whose image he fashioned his goddess was really in her grave is a question beyond our present interest. Our business is to explain the connexion in Shakespeare's drama of the thoughts of mother and death. The apparition of Aemilia near the final curtain, like a *dea ex machina*, leaves me with an inkling that she is a holy ghost. Her sacredness is stressed to a degree unworthy of mortals, summoning to mind the observation that humans must perish before they turn angelic or divine. We can glimpse the phantom character of the abbess more plainly when a minor individual of the play defines in her presence the background of her home:

> . . . the melancholy vale,
> The place of death and sorry execution,
> Behind the ditches of the abbey here. (V.)

The odour of tombs and hecatombs hangs over the happiness of the comedy's last scene. Could such things be close to the mother of the poet's doubles if death was not irrevocably close to the poet's own mother in his thoughts?

Alert readers of the play will note the curious fact that Shakespeare designates the home of Aemilia an abbey and also a priory. She herself is always called abbess. In view of the poet's passion for paronomasia we may wonder whether he sensed a likeness between the spirit of the abbess and the abyss, the 'vale', behind her house? The airs of both are sublime and

malignant, capable of blasting mortal happiness. If our assumption of their likeness is correct we can proceed to unravel some of the most tenacious knots in the drama. The flourishing of the metaphor in the poet's head would mean that he regarded the matrix not just as a fountain of life—Adriana's ' breaking gulf '—but as a desert of death too. This ambivalence of his concepts of the womb and vagina would account for the antithetical nature of his two heroines, the lucid and cool yet golden Luciana and her arid and hot yet night-hued sister, each an embodiment of the divine mother in the dramatist's brain. When he regarded females as distinct personalities (aliens) his endopsychic mother acted as their prototype, the pattern of all beauty and wit. When he regarded them as creatures entwined in his destiny (lovers) she acted as their severest critic, an implacable competitor of the whole sex. In her activity as the model of loveliness she fomented tempests in his libido; in polar opposition she obstructed it, lifting before his mind's eye the rock on which the loves of his life were wrecked.

The rock in the sexual sea on which Aegeon's family-ship was split is specifically a symbol of the male organ which children often believe the mother possesses within her vagina (10). The infant mind, detecting the absence of the penis in infant females, commonly concludes that they have lost it, that the instrument of virility was mysteriously excised. The idea that stronger, elder females may have retained it persists, and mothers who evoke dread in their sons by exhibiting masculine qualities frequently appear in their dreams with the organ in full view; or else the nightmares show them brandishing emblems of it. By the poetic mechanism of displacement people shift their sentiments of dread from the clitoral zone to the mother's or vampire-woman's ' hard heart '. When the stony bosom surprises her children by abruptly yielding milk or kindness, folklore pays tribute to the sublime woman by picturing her as a rock which miraculously lavishes a reviving liquid when struck by a magic wand. In the *Errors* Shakespeare paid tribute to the sublime woman of his dreams by picturing her as an abbess, which may well be englished as *she-father*. It was the assertion of her masculinity in his unconscious that obstructed his endeavours to love other women. Whenever he engaged in sexual union he became acutely aware of the void in the vagina, and suffered the fear of losing his penis. Fantasies of his own castration blazed in his mind. Under the agony of such thoughts his ego prostrated itself before the maternal image and begged for mercy, repudiating the pursuit of happiness everywhere else. In short, he spiritually castrated himself. Having made himself a eunuch for the goddess's sake, he could approach her bosom with confidence and nestle down to delectable oblivion. We witness a theatrical mimicry of the act in the entrance of Antipholus to his mother's abbey. Cut off from his living family, the hero approaches the rock of the church and it opens to admit him, with the promise of ' wholesome syrups ' and holy whispers for his peace. Secure within the rock, lulled by his illusion of Catholic death, he could smile defiantly at remembrance of marital or political economy. Not the legion of hell nor the populace of Ephesus could prevail against the maternal stone. Nevertheless the ideas of castration and death were always associated in the poet's head with pangs of cuts and mutilations, sights and smells of blood, visions of skeletons and severed skulls. Even in the final felicity of his play the horrible recollection of such things sticks to his poetry.

Shakespeare was probably persuaded to let the last act take place among these ghastly adumbrations by reasons of dramatic economy. He wanted to disclose the brothers' identity and restore them to their parents on the same street where Aegeon was being led to execution for violating the law of Ephesus.

This entrance of Aegeon reminds us that we have yet to reckon his part in the ego of the dramatist. Surely, if the abbess is the image of Shakespeare's mother, the tragic merchant must somehow stand for his father. Judging by the play we would imagine that the dramatist did not live in awe of his mother's husband. Aegeon does not glow for us with the flame of ideality. He warms us with embers of a singular humbleness, the emotion of a man who knows how little history he is able to make. Shakespeare spends no moonrays of theopathy on him. He seems to have felt for the ineffectual old man a filial pity, bordering on disdain. Since he often felt similarly toward himself, experiencing failure after failure, the poet unconsciously installed his father close to the centre of himself, opposite but intimate.

So intimate was their psychic valence that it might be considered identification. There are moments in the speeches of Aegeon when the voice of the poet can be clearly heard. For

instance, in the father's narrative of the calamity that divided his family. He states that when the tempest menaced his ship not far from Epidamnum the sky conveyed to his thought 'A doubtful warrant of immediate death', which he himself 'would gladly have embrac'd'. We are granted no reason for this gladness in the face of the danger to his wife and babes. It makes sense only if we recall that the sea is a symbol for sex and drowning, to Shakespeare's unconscious, a mode of reunion with the mother. The poet is thinking of his own wife and offspring when Aegeon reports that the incessant weepings of his wife and the 'piteous plainings' of the infants forced him to hunt for means of rescue. Aemilia does not impress us as a lady capable of incessant weepings, but Adriana is almost perpetually in tears. Finally, at the end of Aegeon's tale, it is the son, brooding over the central tragedy of his life, the loss of maternal love, who sighs:

> Thus have you heard me sever'd from my bliss,
> That by misfortune was my life prolong'd,
> To tell sad stories of my own mishaps.

The misery and impotence of the son provide us with a mirror of the woeful and ineffectual life of the sire, a mirror which emits the virtues of the father and the genius of his boy. Barring these features, our verdict is bound to be that Shakespeare's personality was precisely what we should expect from the flesh of the heir to his father's natural shocks and outrageous fortune.

Naturally the paternal position in the dramatist's mind was not a static one. During remembrance of the father's fulfilments of claims to the mother's labour and love, the radius between Shakespeare's ego nucleus and the paternal image would certainly widen, and sparks of hate shoot across it. To the boy's way of thinking, the mother belonged to nobody but him. Intruders on their sacred privacy merited all extreme penalties known to savage and child. The father's intrusions were especially resented, because the world and the mother sanctioned them as good or just. Nobody but the boy seemed to object to the divorce of his mother and himself. On such occasions he could contemplate the thought of the father's extinction with a stern joy, the joy of justice done. Doubtless he exhausted his fancy in devising perfect punishments for the old man, according to the law of talion.

The memory of a particular paternal intrusion may have burnt in the poet's unconscious when he invented the legend of Aegeon. He sentenced the old man to death for having dared to enter the precincts of the holy city of Ephesus. Mercantile enmity—so runs the legend—incited the city of Diana and Syracuse to proclaim a state of hatred between them. They decreed a halt of their traffic and intercourse, and resolved, as Duke Solinus puts it,

> . . . if any, born at Ephesus,
> Be seen at Syracusan marts and fairs;
> Again, if any Syracusan born
> Come to the bay of Ephesus, he dies. (I, i.)

Aegeon is doomed to decapitation for dropping his anchor in the bay of Ephesus. He can be forgiven only when his sons regain the mother.

Here I will chance the suggestion that the name Syracuse may be interpreted as a pun. Since the dramatist altered the location of his comedy from Epidamnus to Ephesus, but preserved the home of his hero in Syracuse, I felt it necessary to examine the name for a possible motive for keeping it. Since it is pronounced Syracusa throughout the play, construing it as *Sire-accuser* did not strike me as too fantastic.

It has probably occurred to the alert reader that the name Ephesus may also be a pun. As a city of enchantment and witchcraft it may well have appealed to the poet as a region which *effaces* the true identities of men and women and puts in their places moon-animated *effigies*.

If an accusation of Shakespeare's sire prompted the invention of the framework of his plot, another accusation provided the substance of its middle event.

The first scene of Act III, perhaps the oldest portion of our palimpsest, communicates through its metrical antiquity a major trauma of the poet's childhood. Antipholus approaches his wife's door and finds himself locked out. His Dromio calls for servant-girls (all having English names) to open the door. The other Dromio, snug inside, inquires,

> Dost thou conjure for wenches, that thou call'st for such store,
> When one is one too many? Go, get thee from the door.

The persons in the house are eating a commonplace meal. With these words of Dromio the dramatist conjures up a different feast. The clown is informed that the 'master' stands outside; he pretends to be touched:

> Let him walk from whence he came, lest he catch cold on's feet.

Now psycho-analysis conjures up a vision of the child Shakespeare straining at the door of his parents' chamber and clamouring to get in. Possibly his humorous father responded in the Dromio way. Antipholus knocks at the barrier hard and listens to Luce the kitchen-girl deride him: 'Let him knock till it ache'. He rages, 'You'll cry for this, minion, if I beat the door down.' The droll inside remarks that the town is 'troubled with unruly boys'. Adriana orders the newcomer to go away. Injured and perplexed he lingers there, unable to comprehend how his woman could be so frozen-hearted when he stood in need of her warmth. In the autumnal gloom of his heart he murmurs, 'There is something in the wind, that we cannot get in.' His slave replies, 'You would say so, master, if your garments were thin. Your cake here is warm within; you stand here in the cold.' The forlorn master wishes he had an iron crow to wrench his way in.

Obscene notions raced through the dramatist's brain as he wrote the scene. He recalled the passage in Plautus where Amphitryon, knowing that his wife is entertaining a stranger and unable to gain entrance to her quarters, cries out that he will break in the door, and swears to destroy whomever he sees in his path, wife, father, anyone. No sooner does he raise his arm to execute his oath than Jupiter's thunder breaks from the heavens to arrest him. Amphitryon falls flat before the sound of the god. The piety of the Latin poet seems to have stirred Shakespeare to derision of the divine thunder. In the corresponding scene of his comedy the memory of the celestial admonition is evoked by a mere reference to the breaking of wind. The connexion between the anal and the heavenly thunder was long ago pointed out by psycho-analysis (11). That Shakespeare associated paternal efforts at dictatorship with flatulence may properly be disputed. We cannot doubt that he associated paternity with wind. The symbolism of the pompous epithet he invented for the sea, in the first scene of his play, cannot be comprehended otherwise. He calls it 'the always-wind-obeying deep'. The resistance of the real sea to air-force counted for nothing in his mind when he thought of the sexual sea, in particular his amorous mother, and her submission to father-force.

The memory of his banishment from the mother's room excited ideas of libidinal rancour and amorphous fears. Death-wishes against her and his father, too, must have surged in his head at the time of the trauma, and colliding with pulses of incest produced an unvanquishable terror, a terror he never overcame (12).

A friend, Balthazar, dissuades Antipholus from attacking the door, assuring him that the honour of his wife is unviolated:

> —your long experience of her wisdom,
> Her sober virtue, years, and modesty,
> Plead on her part some cause to you unknown;
> And doubt not, sir, but she will well excuse
> Why at this time the doors are made against you.

The friend warns him that violent entrance would bring down on his head 'vulgar comment', mob ridicule and calumny,

> That may with foul intrusion enter in
> And dwell upon your grave when you are dead;
> For slander lives upon succession,
> For ever housed where it gets possession.

Antipholus calms down, and determines to visit the wild hostess of the Porpentine inn,

> Since mine own doors refuse to entertain me,
> I'll knock elsewhere to see if they'll disdain me.

And so the scene ends.

What little master Shakespeare did when he departed from the forbidden chamber, we can reasonably surmise. Unruly boys of genius are as prone as the dullest lads to the frenzy and torpor of masturbation. When he grew up he wreaked a vicarious vengeance on his parents. He contrived in imagination to get his 'spirit' inside the coveted dwelling, with all its cakes and ale at his disposal, while his carnal self (in empathy with the father as husband) stayed outside with fever and chills.

Shakespeare never lost the conviction that slander was a family heritage, like a curse among the ancient Greeks. It is my conviction that he unconsciously proved it true, by rehearsing again and again, in young manhood and old age, in various disguises, the fatal scene of his infancy, thus inflicting on his children the iniquity of his parents. This repetition compulsion traverses and threads together all his dramatic works.

The sadism of the fantasies Antipholus indulges in after his exclusion reminds me that my summary of Aegeon's death sentence omitted a detail of grave importance psychologically. He is formally condemned because of his inability to pay an exorbitant fine, a thousand marks. The Duke grants him a day in which to collect the money among the Ephesians. By the lucky discovery of his rich sons the old man

comes within reach of it, but Solinus releases him from the fine. Money and its worries are never remote from the dramatist's mind. His Syracusan double, in the first act, is fearful that he may lose a thousand marks of his own. In the next act he is portrayed as obsessed with the idea of his gold. In the third he gets the chain his brother had requested and comments on the acquisition with pleasure:

> I see a man here needs not live by shifts,
> When in the streets he meets such golden gifts.

Later the Ephesian double is arrested for debt to the goldsmith, and the money for his freedom is given to his twin. We are not told the metal of the courtesan's ring, but there is no need to know. The poet's obsession on the yellow treasure is manifest without it. We note that he manifests it, not in ordinary conditions of trade, but luxuriously or anxiously. It glitters for him as gift, fine, or debt. One would think that he suffered from the craving to obtain it free and the dread of losing it. These emotions generally run high in the syndrome of the melancholiac. Psycho-analysis has linked his terror of poverty with the peculiar mode of sexuality known as anal erotic, which frequently explodes in demonstrations of sadism (13). In melancholy the passion for excrement characteristic of this kind of sexuality appears torn out of its normal context of absorbing interest in by-products, commodities, stock-piles, profit and thrift. The anal-erotic mood of melancholy serves as regression under the spur of anxiety to the state of mind where bowel movements signified gifts or obligations to the mother. If the child at this stage of libidinal development does not deliver the ordure on demand, or squanders it in caprice, he hazards the loss of maternal love. Conversely, in the unconscious of the chronically sad, the belief that they have lost maternal love may spur their intellects backward to infantile concern for their ordure, as something wantonly spent or else owed. Under the frown of the maternal divinity in their conscience, their egos writhe in guilt and look forward to doing penance for their financial faults. The result is the dread of penury which we find so active in the melancholiac, and which afflicted Shakespeare most of his life.

The first idea that comes to the abbess's mind when she hears of Antipholus's daily gloom is the likelihood that he has lost money: 'Hath he not lost much wealth by wrack of sea?' It is perfectly natural for the mother to worry over the disposal of his gold.

We must not let ourselves be fooled by Shakespeare's costuming of his heroes as merchants. His skull did not carry comfortably the cap of commerce; and he would not have masked his doubles as money-men if he had not been an apprentice in drama emulating Plautus, while steeped in sorrow in a period of financial distress. The Roman dramatist was not bothered by the morals and manners of the market-place. He worked for an audience of buyers and sellers, who rejoiced in the worship of Mercury, god of merchants and thieves. Shakespeare, on the contrary, worked for an audience of spenders and lenders, above all the courtiers of his Queen. Consequently he could not rest content with a hero like Plautus's Menaechmus, who was raised by an Epidamnian trader and inherited his cheap principles as well as his fortune. Antipholus of Ephesus is a soldier rather than a salesman. He was brought to the city by 'that most famous warrior, Duke Menaphon', the uncle of Solinus, and earned the latter's gratitude by serving him in battle, taking deep scars to save his life (V). In this conception of Antipholus as a warrior I sense one of those infant inventions which Freud named 'the family romances'. (14). Nobody understood better than Shakespeare how to spin these daydreams in which children strive to liberate themselves from disappointing and domineering parents by creating imaginary fathers and mothers of nobler blood and more generous hearts. In these fantasies they become the foster sons and daughters of monarchs, or else they are changelings, exiled or stolen from royal cradles and raised by poor but honest wretches who bear a strange resemblance to their real fathers and mothers. Shakespeare's transfer of the lost Antipholus to the care of the martial Duke Menaphon, instead of another merchant like father Aegeon, sounds like a 'family romance', and expresses a mild contempt for the old man's occupation.

It is difficult to see how the poet could have dealt with the paternal figure in a manner so supercilious and icy if the old fellow was still alive. The hypothesis that the father was dead has no cult to support it. If my interpretation of his personality is correct, the stately but futile old man could never mount in his son's mind to the pedestal of a god. After death he would stay a ghost. When Antipholus of Syracuse greets his father he asks, 'Aegeon

art thou not? or else his ghost?' The query may be taken as a conventional phrase of amazement on meeting an acquaintance long unseen or lost. There are features in Aegeon which give the word a lurid precision. He pictures his face as hidden

> In sap-consuming winter's drizzled snow,
> And all the conduits of my blood froze up. (V.)

His last words in the play are addressed to Aemilia; they contain not one quaver of affection or anticipation of happiness and peace. Instead he is pallidly conscientious, almost accusing, requiring her to tell the fate of the son she carried with her from the unspeakable rock. This duty done, he is mute.

3

The double Antipholus regains the divine Aemilia. 'After so long grief, such festivity!' she cries before departing with her family into the abbey. The felicity of the author, the actors, and the spectators, in the last episode of the *Errors* is so cordial and uncontrolled that one is reluctant to survey it from the standpoint of criticism. Yet the combination of childish and ghoulish elements in the scene needs to be illumined if we are ever to grasp the psychology of Shakespeare, and eventually the psychology of the stage. Is it necessary for the comedy to conclude in environs redolent of bloody graves? What have these to do with the dominant theme of mistaken identity, the entertainment of aliens as lovers?

The replies to these problems, to which our analysis inevitably leads, can perhaps be presented best in the form of a synopsis briefly reviewing what might have happened to Shakespeare before he could compose *The Comedy of Errors*. Whether the tale I shall unfold corresponds to the facts of the poet's life is a question for future biography to decide. It will suffice for me to point out that no other hypothesis on the play arranges its details in a coherent and rational structure, casting light on all its parts. What once appeared to be discrete and random inspirations, figures of speech, epigrams and exclamations—poetry scattered from a cornucopia without concord or intrinsic sense —now emerges in a network everywhere meaningful, reflecting real movements of life. By the Freudian dialectic we are able to discern the method in the dramatist's seeming madness.

First, there was a tempestuous period which culminated in the wreck of Shakespeare's family. | During an absence from home, in a strange city, he had violated his marriage oath; he entertained a stranger as a lover. He did it in absolute ignorance of the real lusts that impelled him. The woman of the adventure had unconsciously reminded him of the dark and marvellous stranger who had been his mother. After the adventure he felt that he had committed a loathsome sin. He thought it was adultery. It was imaginary incest: in a kind of dream he had ascended to his father's place by his mother's breast. The paternal image within him grieved and grew angry. As a child Shakespeare had reverenced his father's might: as a boy he had loved him for his athletic prowess and companionship. Always he had feared and hated him as the man whom his mother obeyed. The permanent residue of these emotions in the poet's brain, circling round the memory of his father, agitated him as self-condemnation. Weakness of paternal authority in his youth, the stealthy disdain he felt for the old man, left him secretly glad that he had done the deed. But the mental image of his mother felt polluted and betrayed. He dreaded her more than any other power in the universe, because she could shut him out from love and leave him eternally alone. To escape these punishments he would happily submit to her whips. The permanent residue of these terrors and the beatitude of their union in erotic pain, circling round the memory of his mother, tortured him exquisitely as self-damnation. With the father's ghost he felt as if he was in purgatory; now he had plunged into hell. He suffered from extreme masochism, and his narcissistic ego refused to bear it. Hunting for avenues of relief, he heard a rumour that his wife was false to him. The proofs were preposterous, but too opportune for his conceit to resist. He wanted an excuse to vent the sadism of his conscience; with barely suppressed exultation he accused his wife of his own crime, without daring to face her with the witnesses or evidence. He fled from her and her offspring, outraged and sorrowing over his exclusion from her love. Consciously he feared that if he faced her he might do something frightful. Unconsciously he flamed with a lust for destruction, which his ego habitually directed on the internal images or external effigies of his parents, because of the scars and frustrations they had imposed on his infant vanity. Sadist thoughts evoked unconscious remembrance of his anal malice to the mother, the way he scattered bowel-gold to

her disgust and ire, or refused to pay it forth till she became peremptory. This remembrance was sharpened by the fact that the time of his fury against his wife was also a time of pecuniary distress. Still he lavished money on inns and individuals who enjoyed his flow of talk. Observing that these luxuries only increased his misery, he retreated to a solitude where his main expenses were sweetly sour thoughts, tears, and poetry. He may also have been saddened by the funeral of a friend, for his mind dwelt fondly on graves and effigies of the dead. The urge to self-slaughter kindled memories of his passions of guilt and pangs of outcast love at the time his imagination first confronted the tombs of his father and mother. His heart felt eaten by remorse; the nerves of his maternal temple drained vitality from his Narcissus pool, just as he had once drained life-liquid from her breast.

The poet consciously defined the causes of his melancholy as he knew them in the questions that the abbess asks Adriana concerning the fugitive Antipholus:

> Hath he not lost much wealth by wrack of sea?
> Buried some dear friend? Hath not else his eye
> Stray'd his affection in unlawful love?
> A sin prevailing much in youthful men,
> Who give their eyes the liberty of gazing.

After the unjust divorce of his wife, in his refuge of tranquil contemplation and poetry, he remembered two comedies by Plautus which appealed to him as works of art full of semblances and lessons of his wicked experience. Turning over the ancient Latin leaves he discharged a heartful of pity and terror with laughter over their lusty gods, jealous husbands, and noble but stubborn wives. The infinitely funny intrigues struck him like a mixture of his own wishes and accomplishments. Possibly, with the aid of alcohol, he fell asleep on his copy of Plautus. Through the laughter and the sleep he replenished the libido in his Narcissus pool, and energetically renewed the ego struggle to control the drives of the id. The source of this new strength is the essence of Shakespeare's genius, and like all genius remains a sphinx to psycho-analysis. The physiology of narcissism may some day solve the riddle. Meanwhile we have our hands full with the problem of the devices by which the genius's ego manages the id. Shakespeare's ego not only declined to give the pulses of his id the outright ecstasies of sex and destruction they craved. He exposed them to the ridicule of the world, twisted, transmuted, and 'dolled' or puppeted up. Thus they got the sole outlet his conscience and commonsense could afford.

The basic design for the exposure, the plot, occurred to him in a dream. He crossed in fantasy the four twins of the *Amphitruo*, with its celestial cuckoldry, and the two twins of the *Menaechmi*, with its domestic quarrelling, cheating of prostitutes, and final satisfaction of restored brotherhood. The outcome was a farce about himself, on the surface displaying the will to believe that the source of his troubles was erroneous marriage, the mistaken union of strangers. He stated his plea of innocence according to his habit of paronomasia: 'Not mad, but mated; how I do not know.' He, put these words in the mouth of Antipholus, courting Luciana (III, ii), and showed their personal significance by repeating the idea from the mouth of Duke Solinus: 'I think you are all mated or stark mad' (V). Shakespeare was afraid to find out why mating checkmated him. To be mated, in the English of his lifetime, meant not only to be married; a single man mated was a man confounded, rendered impotent. Shakespeare's impotence resulted from incest-guilt after mating with a facsimile of his maternal idol. No sooner was he free of one facsimile than, like Antipholus's drop of water, he drifted wildly about 'to find his fellow forth', that is to mate again. Like that water-drop he was destined to be confounded and lost ('mated'), forever looking for a mother from whom he was forever in flight. The dream which *The Comedy of Errors* ensued displaced the passion of his quest, making its object a brother, a fellow-male, the dramatist's material self. Finding him gave the dreamer the pacific illusion that he was no longer estranged from himself. Latent in the dream was an odyssey of a motherless child, who accused his sire of separating him from the beloved, and sailed alone across a sexual sea to a maternal territory, in which, by the contrary lights of a lunar mother he reached at last the goddess of his desire, the mother-in-death.

By the inner dramatic method which Freud designates the dream-work, Shakespeare saw the fiercest of his unconscious wishes fulfilled. He wanted to rise to his father's place by his mother's breast. He performed the incest in fantasy in a variety of ways. (i) He divided himself into doubles, one of whom floats away with the mother when the father's ship is split.

(ii) His doubles end their vicissitudes in the bosom of the mother's church, itself a symbol of maternity. (iii) By identifying himself with father Aegeon he also attained his heart's wish: (*a*) he sailed the sea of sex as captain of a family vessel, ' giving honour unto the wife, as unto the weaker vessel ' (I Peter, iii, 7); (*b*) he guided his mast into the forbidden harbour of Ephesus, the town of the great mother-goddess Diana. (iv) By identifying Ephesus with the mother, the poet presented his double from Syracuse with a chance to lose himself in her midst. (v) In a regression to infantile rivalry with the father over food, he tricked the wife into serving him a meal while the hungry husband fretted outside. The poet puts emphasis on the sweetness of the meal, comparing it to a cake, an emblem of motherly labour. (vi) He at least made a gesture of sexual promise to the romantic facsimile of his mother whom he named Luciana.—It will be remarked that for each of these incestuous scenes, except the last, the dreamer provided a condign and cruel chastisement, bordering on bloodshed. (i) For floating off with the mother, one double endured not only the hardships of storm and wreck but also suffered a kidnapping by rude fishermen. (ii) For joining the mother in the bosom of her church, the doubles have to bear the sights and smells of its charnel background, a place of capital retribution. (iii) For riding the matrix-boat, the son-incorporating Aegeon is wrecked at sea, and for trespassing on the waters of Ephesus, he is menaced with a hangman's axe, a symbolic castration. (iv) For losing a twin-self in the city of Ephesus, the poet had to pay with the spectacle of the city loosing itself on the twin, hounding him—with his drawn sword—to ' melancholy vale ' and monastery (a house of symbolic castration, of ' eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake '—Matthew, xix, 12). (v) For tricking the mistress of the hero's home, his ' natural ' self must stand in impotent wrath and cold, an exile from her breast, or her larder. By these brutal exactions the poet mentally redeemed his soul from guilt. At the same time, in the theatre of his mind's night, he gratified his lust for falling together with his father and mother to destruction, or rather to sanguine chaos and the brink of death. The coalescence of both these lusts of sex and destruction took place in the fantasy of returning to the womb of the mother in her tomb.

Having accomplished his heart's desires in dream, he woke refreshed, and broke the long fast of his sadness with gusto and glee. Then, after some earnest reflection on raw material and art, he sat down to write *The Comedy of Errors*. In the affectionate endeavour to justify himself on the stage, he multiplied reasons for the conduct of his puppets, employing a technique analogous to the secondary elaboration of dreams. Next he carried out a tertiary elaboration: he issued his drama-work in a texture to satisfy actors and critics, fulfilling requirements of the contemporary theatre. He garnished the play with coeval allusions (' modern instances '), indicated erudition delicately, sprinkled the scenes with extra dirty jokes for the groundlings, ' wise saws ' and singable lines for students and gentry, and crowned the concoction with passages that bright particular ' stars ' could sink their histrionic teeth into joyously. Despite rubs and botches, contradiction and extravagance, he knew he had produced a gem comparable to the *Menaechmi* of Plautus, which was said to be that master's earliest drama. Would the world ever realize what it cost him? what bleeding fragments of his life he carved and morselled before he could set forth this dish fit for the lords?

Scripsi et salvavi animam meam.

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SLIPS OF THE TONGUE IN THE NORSE SAGAS

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Two cases of errors in speech are recorded in the Orkneyinga Saga (*Icelandic Sagas*, Vol. III, Rolls Series 34). I quote from Sir G. W. Dasent's translation. In the Earl's Saga it is related that Earl Rögnvald had fallen out with his kinsman Earl Thorfinn, and the two erstwhile friends made bitter warfare on each other. Rögnvald had burnt Thorfinn's house over his head, and Thorfinn escaped unknown. 'No man thought anything else but that Earl Thorfinn had lost his life there', says the Saga. However, as his body was not found it is evident that Rögnvald must have been haunted by the repressed dread that his enemy was still alive. The Saga then continues, 'Earl Rögnvald sat in Kirkwall and drew thither the stores he needed to have for his winter quarters. He had a great band of men and much good cheer. But a little before Yule, Earl Rögnvald fared with a great following into a little Papey to fetch malt to be brewed for Yule. And at even as they were on the isle they sate long over a roasting fire, and he who made up the fire said that the firewood began to fall short. Then the Earl made a slip of the tongue, and these were the words he spoke, "Then are we full old when these (fires) are burnt out." But he meant to have spoken that they would then be full warmed. And as soon as ever he found it out he said: "I have not made a slip of the tongue before this, so that I call it to mind. It comes into my mind what King Olaf my foster-father said at Sticklestead when I took him up for a slip of the tongue: If ever it happens that I made a slip of the tongue I might make up my mind that I should then have but a short time unlived. Maybe that my kinsman Thorfinn is still alive."' Then Thorfinn suddenly appears and sets fire to the house. Rögnvald escapes but is pursued and slain.

Reference to the Icelandic original might be expected to throw light upon the word associations that contributed to the slip. The actual words are: 'Tha maelti jarl mis-maeli, ok tok til ortha. Tha eru ver full-gamlir, er thessir (eldir) eru *brunnir*. En hann vildi that maelti hafa, at tha vaeri their full-*bakathir*.'

The Norsemen used at the end of the day to 'bake' themselves in front of a roaring fire, and rub themselves down when a bath could not be obtained. The King intended to say that if the firewood became exhausted, seeing that it was difficult to obtain, 'Then we shall be quite old before we are quite baked'. The words probably had something of the humorous turn which they have in modern English. Instead of this he said, 'Then we shall be quite old before these (fires) are quite burnt'. The Freudian explanation of the mistake is clear. In the Earl's mind was the unconscious fear that his kinsman was not dead and that the fires of his own life were perhaps well-nigh burnt out. He immediately recalls a similar slip on the part of his foster-father King Olaf; his last words are 'Perhaps my kinsman Thorfinn is yet alive'.

The slip that King Olaf made is related in the Flatey book, Col. 490 (*op. cit.*, p. 339) and is even more instructive. Just before the battle of Sticklestead in A.D. 1030, King Olaf is watching the gathering of his enemies the Norwegian freemen (*bondir*). 'Where they were standing there were berries on a mound. The King takes them and squeezes them in his palm. Then the King saw the banner of the freeman was set up. Then he spoke and said, "Miserable berries," quoth he. Rögnvald, Brusi's son, answers: "You made a slip of the tongue just now, King, you must have meant to say 'people'." "Thou sayest right, Earl,' quoth the King. "Thou wilt not make a less slip of the tongue when thou hast but a short time to live."'

The Icelandic original is richer in word associations than in the first case.

'Thar er their voru stoddir *ber* a einni thufu. Konungr takr berjum, ok *rennir* i *lofa* ser. Tha sa Konungr, hvar upp voru sett merki *bonda*. Hann maelti tha "Vesol ber," kvath hann. Rögnvaldr Brusa son svarar "Mis-maeli varth ther nu, Konungr, *Lith* mundir thu nefna vilja." "Rett sigir thu, jarl," kvath konungr, "Eigi muntu minna mis-maeli tha er thu att skamt *olifat*."'

In the first place we have here a very typical symptomatic action. The King is watching the assembly of the stubborn freemen (*bondir*) whom he has so often striven to crush. Where he stands the mound is covered with berries (*ber*). He takes some and squeezes them in his hand. The word used is *renna*, which means to make run, and is applicable alike to the juice of the berries, to the blood from a wound, or to the flight of his foes.

Even so would he crush his enemies and put them to flight.

But King Olaf was nervous of the issue of the fight. He knew well the numbers and stubborn spirit of the *bondir*. His irritation betrays his nervousness. When he saw the standard raised he meant to say ' Miserable crew '. The word he wished to say is *lith*. But a number of associations, many of which we can trace, rush into his mind. The first of these must certainly have been *lif*, life, and *lifa*, to live. This is shown by the irritable way he turns upon Rögnvald when corrected and says, ' When you have only a short time to live you will make no less a mistake '. Other associations with the lapsed word *lith* can easily be found. The verb *litha* from which *lith* is derived means to go, and also to pass away; *lifa* means to live or to be left, *lik* means body or corpse, *liggia* to lie or lie dead. Further, the word *lif* suggests *lofi*, the word actually used for the hand in which the King squeezes the berries. His enemies were the *bondir*, that is *buandir*, from *bua*, to dwell, live. (Compare also the phrase *bua um lik*, to prepare a body for burial.) The word alliterates with *ber*, berry or berries (it is used in both the plural and singular senses). An associative link may be the word *beria*, to strike. The suppressed thought was ' Perhaps this miserable crew (*lith*) of *bondir* will cause me to lose my life (*lif*) and be crushed as I now squeeze these berries (*ber*) in my hand (*lofi*).' It is easy to see how the King, instead of saying ' Miserable crew ', said ' Miserable berries '.

It is interesting to note both the characteristic irritation at being corrected and the superstitious dread which is shown of a slip of the tongue. The latter has its origin in a dim perception of an infirmity of purpose which may well be a factor in disaster. It should be remembered, too, that the actors in these sagas had only recently become Christianized. Rögnvald was fighting his own kinsman and shows by his words that he had a repressed sense of the evil of his deeds. Olaf, though he was soon to be regarded as a martyr and a saint, had all the old heathen barbarity, and had been a bitterly hard master to the Norwegian freemen. He must often have experienced a conflict between his instincts and the religion of peace. In the words of Freud (*Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, transl. Brill, p. 311): ' The greater part of superstition signifies fear of impending evil, and he who has frequently wished evil to others, but because of a good upbringing has repressed the same, will be particularly apt to expect punishment for such unconscious evil in the form of a misfortune threatening him from without.'

These beautiful examples are a great tribute to the freshness and first-hand observation in the Norse sagas. No book-learned clerk of that age could have invented these intimate psychological details. It matters not if they are rightly told of the characters to whom they are attributed. They come straight from the heart of the old sea-rovers. Thanks to the key which Freud has put into our hands we can unlock their secrets as easily as those of the words which the Norseman inscribed upon the runic stones he raised.

(Received 23 September, 1953)

BOOK REVIEWS

The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy. By John Oulton Wisdom. International Psycho-Analytical Library No. 47. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953. Pp. xii + 244. 25*s*.)

Of the various attempts to illumine psychoanalytically the lives of historical figures few have dealt with philosophers, though some attempts in this direction are to be found in the earlier volumes of *Imago*. The author of this book, who is exceptionally qualified for the task, has already shown his interest in the subject in short studies of Descartes and Schopenhauer already published in this Journal. The present work on Berkeley is undoubtedly the most outstanding effort in this field. Indeed, in its scholarship, thoroughness and detailed clarity of presentation, it ranks among the most important applications of psycho-analytical insight to biographical and literary material. True, as the title indicates, it is a study of Berkeley's philosophy rather than of his life. Nevertheless, since it endeavours to show how this philosophy was largely determined by the deepest strata of his psychic being, much light is thrown also on Berkeley the man, that remarkable combination of ecclesiastic, philosopher, mathematician, economist, tar-water enthusiast and would-be reformer of higher education.

The analysis of Berkeley's philosophy is recorded in 55 short ' interpretations ', each summarizing in a few lines the results of the immediately preceding discussion. Berkeley's fundamental conflict, according to the author, lies in an ambivalent attitude to faeces, which he regarded as both ' good ' and ' bad ', though the bad aspects, felt as ' poison ', predominated at the more conscious levels. The badness of faeces extended to ' matter ' in general, and matter, it seemed, could be abolished, or at least discounted, by a subjectivist philosophy of *esse est percipi*. Through this philosophy the external world could be subjectivized in the waking state, in much the same way as happens in the sleeping state in dreams. Matter, furthermore, according to this philosophy, was inert, could exercise no force or power. Active power which gives unity and order to our presentations must be sought in spirit. Pure solipsism seemed inadequate for this task, and therefore the ultimate power must lie in God, who in this capacity is the very antithesis of evil ' matter '. Such, however, was the underlying attraction to, and fear of, matter that its existence had to be strenuously denied, lest God himself should become material and poisonous. This ambivalence shows itself also in Berkeley's hostility to deists and mathematicians, whom he secretly envied for their ability to handle dangerous things and ultimately to turn God himself into poison. Later, as a still more desperate measure, he tried to identify himself with God, this being symbolized on an earthly plane by his attempt to act as founder and inspired teacher of a College in Bermuda—a less contaminated place than could be found in Europe. When, largely owing to the failure of Sir Robert Walpole to forward the promised money, this scheme fell through, Berkeley, who had been impatiently waiting in Rhode Island, returned to the British Isles and succumbed increasingly to a psychosomatic disorder, a ' nervous cholic ', for which he sought a remedy in tar water, a ' deobstruent ' which he hoped would free him from the internal poison which he was unable to keep at bay. In a chapter on ' childhood reconstructions ' it is inferred that Berkeley suffered in infancy from fluid stools. His desire to replace ' flux ' by orderly separated faecal masses led, among other things, to his objection to Sir Isaac Newton's ' fluxions ', as the newly discovered calculus was called.

In dealing with Berkeley's intestinal troubles, Mr. Wisdom makes use of his already published theory of psychosomatic disorder, in which resort is made to the suggested differentiating factors of projection and imagery. Those patients who are able to deal with their conflicts in terms of the experiences provided by the distance receptors—vision and sound—are liable to suffer on the psychological level only; those whose conflicts cannot be thus projected and which therefore find expression in the somaesthetic and kinaesthetic spheres succumb to psychosomatic complaints, Berkeley himself falling into the latter category.

Such in very brief and inadequate outline are the author's psycho-analytic findings. It is unfortunate that in Berkeley's case little is known of his childhood or of his relation to his parents or siblings. The reader can hardly help feeling that the analysis would have been amplified or modified, especially in relation to the Oedipus situation, had more data from the early years been available. But Mr. Wisdom has certainly made a very remarkable attempt with the material at his disposal, and thus thrown light upon the subjective determinants of the thoughts of one of the most original figures in the history of philosophy. As he is careful to warn us, however, this study of psychological origins, novel and indeed startling as it is in its results does not in itself permit us to pass judgement on the truth or value of the philosophy built upon these origins.

J. C. Flugel.

Drives, Affects, Behavior. Contributions to the Theory and Practice of Psycho-Analysis and its Application. Edited by Rudolph M. Loewenstein. (New York: International Universities Press, 1953. Pp. 398. $7.50.)

As a very obvious sequel to Freud's reformulated theory of instincts, psycho-analysis has been occupied with the interrelation of the two primal drives. Freud's views have been elaborated further in the researches of H. Hartmann, E. Kris, and R. M. Loewenstein, who analyze in detail the general function of theory in psycho-analysis. The fruitful stimulus provided by their theoretical presentations is reflected in the writings of the following authors: R. A. Spitz applies their views on aggression to his own findings in infancy. He traces the differentiation and eventual fusion of the drives through several stages, which are paralleled by corresponding stages of ego development and of establishment of object relationships. The results of damming-up and of defusion of the drives are illustrated on the clinical syndrome of anaclitic depression. M. Schur discusses the theory of anxiety. Stages of ego development are described in which a hierarchy of (danger) situations is correlated with a hierarchy of ego responses, of which ' somatization ' and ' desomatization ' at the respective ends of the scale are significant concepts for the understanding of psychosomatic phenomena. J. Lampl-de Groot uses the depressive states as a clinical basis for stating her views on the aims of the aggressive drive and on the interrelationship of the primal drives in the development of the ego and of object relationships. Relevant conclusions are drawn to the therapeutic possibilities with depressive patients. D. Burlingham gives clinical examples of states of enforced or voluntary motor restraint in children and in adults. Her observations bear out the close connection between the muscular system and energy discharges derived from both instinctual drives. H. Flournoy emphasizes the role of aggression against the rival brother in homosexual attraction. The eminence of the two famous inverts of antiquity, Socrates and Plato, is shown to be the result of repression and sublimation. M. Schlumberger confirms Freud's formulation of the structure of the epileptic fit as a condensation of the drives of Oedipus. The death of his patient in a fit is interpreted as an unconscious suicide ', a turning of the aggressive drive against the self. K. R. Eissler discusses in a detailed biographical study the moral masochism operative in Eckermann's relationship to Goethe. The gratification of Eckermann's self-destructive tendencies was the condition upon which his literary achievement, the writing of the famous ' Conversations ', was based in transcendence of his general mediocrity. The importance of masochism in artistic creativeness is pointed out.

A number of the published articles reflect a trend to correlate and to co-ordinate psycho-analytical data with those of biology and physiology. E. Jacobsen offers a definition, classification, and theory of affects. The affective discharges result from changes of tension around a medium level which is itself governed by the homeostatic principle aiming at general psychic equilibrium, whereas the vacillations are controlled by the pleasure principle. The relationships between these two principles are elaborated in reference to maturation processes involving control of primal drives and to various pathological conditions. D. Lagache examines the function of speech in the analytic situation as an action and thus as a manner of behaviour. A definition of behaviour is formulated on the basis of biological principles, broad enough to accommodate the ' requirements of psychology ' and the description of ' essential aspects of psycho-analytic experience '. F. Deutsch traces intersensory perceptions during analysis to the connection between sensory perception and object cathexis. Both are fused at an early period of life. Grouping in different phases of development builds up hierarchies of constellations. Configurations of sensory perceptions become specific for certain objects. Interchanges are due to defence against overwhelming pregenital drives. The effect of analytic treatment amounts to a reintegration acceptable to the ego. H. Lampl and R. de Saussure advance theories about the latency period and about female sexuality. In both papers correlations are established with biological principles.

A few papers deal with unrelated clinical subjects. P. Greenacre differentiates between penis awe and penis envy in girls, and describes their origin interrelationship, and effect on personality formation. A different development in boys is outlined. B. D. Lewin discusses the forgetting and remembering of dreams in their symbolic significance as oral phenomena and in the context of the theory of the dream screen. R. P. Knight deals with the therapist's twofold task in the so-called borderline states, namely (1) to survey the ego's measures against the pathogenic instinctual and ego-disintegrating forces and (2) to support these defensive ego activities.

Lastly, the relevance of the psycho-analytic theory of instinctual drives is applied to sociology. A. Freud illuminates the connection between the positive and negative attitudes of adult life and the child's early relationship to parents, depending on specific childhood events and on the defensive mechanisms employed by the child. Particular reference is made to the aggressive drive. Measures are suggested which are intended to safeguard the development of positive relationships in the adult. G. L. Bibring outlines the connection between a certain family pattern, in which the father is ' absent ' and the mother domineering, and the nature of the parents' relationship and its effect on the son. All combine to produce either a predominantly negative Oedipus complex or a reactive ambivalent fixation to an idealized mother. Prince Peter of Greece discusses the motives for polyandry and monogamy on

the basis of his study of a Toda polyandrous family. G. Róheim elaborates the significance of the Australian myth of the Milky Way as a symbolization of the libidinal desire for the mother displaced and projected.

For further details of the many other very interesting data offered throughout the reader is referred to the individual papers. The combined views represent not only a precipitate of a section of current psycho-analytic findings in the theoretical, clinical, and socio-anthropological fields, but they amount to a common line of thought or approach, a school of psycho-analytic teaching.

The book cannot fail to absorb the reader's interest and attention. It is a worthy document of dedication published in honour of one of the venerable disciples of Freud, Princess Marie Bonaparte, whose personal achievement has been analytically reviewed in Odier's Essay on Sublimation and whose high standing as writer, analyst, and teacher is the subject of the preface written by Ernest Jones.

E. Gostynski.

A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud. Edited by John Rickman. *Psycho-Analytical Epitomes No.* 1. New Impression. (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

The first volume of John Rickman's Psycho-Analytical Epitomes was published in 1937. During his lifetime the founder and editor of the series had the satisfaction of seeing it grow, though discrimination in the choice of works and the war years made this growth a slow one. Quite recently the publishers announced that the four volumes so far published are to be re-issued and that further works will be added in the near future under the editorship of Dr. W. H. Gillespie and Dr. W. Clifford M. Scott.

It should be noted that these newly printed volumes are bound very attractively in linen of bright blue colour.

The present volume contains selected chapters from Freud's books and papers written between 1910 and 1926, and it calls upon the reader to let himself be guided through some of the most difficult parts of psycho-analytic theory. After he has found his way through he will enjoy the satisfaction of having acquired not only knowledge of a cross-section of Freud's work but also some glimpses of its development. The latter he could not have achieved merely from the study of Freud's last summary, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (London: Hogarth Press) published only three years after this anthology. If the reader should desire to learn with ease more of the clinical side, as undoubtedly he will, this reviewer would still recommend the reading of Freud's *The Question of Lay Analysis* (London: Imago Publishing Co.) which apart from the discussion of the problem laid down in the title contains Freud's most concise presentation of what really happens in psycho-analytic therapy: a description in miniature of the neuroses and their cure.

All these publications will however one day be outdated when, thanks to the devotion of Mr. James Strachey and the support of our colleagues in America, the *Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud* is completed. The full range of Freud's work will then be at the reader's disposal from which to make his choice. Meanwhile Epitome No. 1 will have to be taken as an *hors d'oeuvre* which should stimulate and prepare the reader for a full course of Freud.

W. Hoffer.

Love, Hate, and Reparation. By Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere. *Psycho-Analytical Epitomes No.* 2. New Impression. (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953. Pp. 119. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

This work is in two parts—the first deals with Hate, Greed, and Aggression, the second with Love, Guilt, and Reparation—but it stresses the constant interaction of Love and Hate in the development and later adult functioning of the personality. The book is short and does not include the detailed evidence for statements, which the authors have gleaned from psycho-analytic work with children and adults. The infant's reactions to frustration at the breast are described; the hatred and aggressive craving, feelings of emptiness, uncontrollable explosive feelings and impulses leading to awareness of love (from desire), and dependence (from need). The infant is pictured in this primitive danger situation, with itself and its loved ones threatened by its destructiveness, urgently devising methods for achieving security and safety against these dangers. Feelings of guilt and love, spurred by an optimum amount of aggression, stimulate and maintain drives towards reparation and stabilizing of character. This book is not only a key study for all workers in psycho-analysis, psychiatry, and psychology, but makes enjoyable reading and throws light on difficulties in family relationships, bringing up children, choice of love partners, and other problems of common interest.

S. F. Lindsay.

Civilisation, War and Death. By Sigmund Freud. Edited by John Rickman. *Psycho-Analytical Epitomes No.* 4. New and enlarged edition. (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953. 8*s.* 6*d.* $1.00.)

John Rickman's second choice from the works of Freud comprises edited essays written twenty to forty years ago, among them Freud's letter to Albert Einstein on war and pacifism (1932). There is hardly anything in this collection which should be discarded as untimely or purely historical; Freud's reflections are as threatening and gloomy as if they had been conceived today. Still, in the interval between the two editions of this selection further

translations have made it possible to display another facet of Freud's insight into the nature of man and his societies. In the first edition the reader was struck by Freud's argument about the inevitability of internal aggression and the consequent probability of future wars. In this new and enlarged version John Rickman has added two further essays, of which one at least shows a somewhat different Freud; one who in spite of relentless and pitiless insistence on the dangers stemming from the aggressive drives reminds the reader of Eros and of his belief in it. How otherwise could he conclude his thoughts on Goethe, laid down in the essay 'On Transience' (1915), with the words: 'We shall build up again all that war has destroyed, and perhaps on firmer ground and more lastingly than before'?

W. Hoffer.

Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social Systems. Transactions of the Eighth Conference. Edited by Heinz von Foerster. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1952. Pp. xx + 240. $4.00.)

The present volume is the third of the series on Cybernetics to be published. It gives the impression of being even better than its predecessors. All volumes containing *verbatim* discussion must have weaknesses; the wonder is that the plan succeeds as well as it does. If we are willing to accept the defects inherent in such a scheme (and the present volume is unintelligible in several places), we shall be rewarded with a grand-stand view of acute minds grappling with difficult problems in borderland fields. The theme of the discussion is different kinds of Communication—between groups, between animals, and so on. Dr. Kubie's contribution on communication between the sane and the insane is perhaps the most striking part of the book.

J. O. Wisdom.

The Scientific Study of Personality. By H. J. Eysenck. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952. Pp. xiv + 320. 30*s*.)

This book has come somewhat late into the reviewer's hands, late, that is, especially in relation to the author's energy and creativity, which have already enabled him to produce two volumes since the present one appeared. As is now well known, Dr. Eysenck is a firm believer in the strictly 'scientific' approach as the only one that will ensure real progress in psychology and psychiatry; and in the field of personality this approach, in his view, is best served by the administration of simple objective tests giving definitely quantitative measures which can be treated by factor-analytical methods so that personality can eventually be described in terms of a limited number of 'dimensions'. In this approach, as he envisages it, there is no use for procedures which involve a large element of subjectivity or the accumulation of material which is difficult or impossible to put into quantitative form. Indeed, such half measures as projection tests, questionnaires, and ratings are regarded with almost as much suspicion as are psycho-analytic sessions or other forms of psychiatric interview.

Psycho-analysts will no doubt continue to feel that this insistence on rigid rules of experimentation and quantification is only too likely to blind the investigator to important aspects of the human mind which in the present state of our knowledge do not readily lend themselves to such procedures; and in this they can find support in the fact that the admittedly less rigid and more intuitive methods of psycho-analysis enriched psychology with a long series of working concepts (since proved of value in illuminating many other fields) which 'brass instrument psychology', for all its attempt at exactitude, had completely failed even to adumbrate. Dr. Eysenck remains unimpressed, and retaliates by pointing out that even after half a century of practice by psycho-analysts and other psychotherapists there is no clear proof that on the therapeutic side any measurable success has been achieved. Even as regards 'experimental psychoanalysis', or 'experimental psychodynamics' as some prefer to call it, in which attempts are being made to use psycho-analytic findings in such a way that they can be experimentally confirmed, refuted, amended or enlarged—a field where Dr. Eysenck might perhaps have been expected to exercise greater tolerance or even to exhibit some approval—he tends to remain sceptical, appearing to hold that the inspiration derived from psycho-analytic sources and the apparent confirmation of psycho-analytic findings in a good many cases are of doubtful value. Thus in his appraisal of Dr. Goldman-Eisler's work on oral character traits, which he admits is good of its kind and which appears at first sight to be a remarkable vindication (within limits) of Abraham's and Glover's clinically derived views, he points out that the psycho-analytic explanation in terms of a causal relation between early weaning and certain character qualities may be capable of an alternative interpretation in terms of hereditary factors, in the sense that introverted mothers may tend both to have introverted offspring and to wean them earlier than their more extravert sisters. Such a view seems indeed to be much less likely to be true than the psycho-analytic—environmentalist one (especially when we take into consideration the apparently confirmatory evidence from anthropology and from experiments with animals), but it has the merit of being: (*a*) possibly correct; (*b*) capable of proof or disproof by further appropriate investigation. The more obvious interpretation and the one which is most in harmony with already known facts is not always the correct one: and this exemplifies the value of Dr. Eysenck's sceptical attitude, even though it may appear strained and unappreciative to those who think primarily along psycho-analytic lines.

Indeed, if psycho-analysts can overcome their initial and very natural reaction to what might seem Dr. Eysenck's somewhat contemptuous dismissal of their work, a careful study of this book will prove a valuable exercise. His initial stimulus came from investigations carried out with neurotic service men and women (here amplified from material obtained from psychotics, normal adults, and children) and all his work—as Professor Aubrey Lewis points out in a Foreword—was thus built upon a clinical foundation, in which psychiatric categories played an important part; while in the psycho-analytic study of various types of personality—a sphere in which so far little has been achieved—preliminary measurements of the orectic 'dimensions' (' neuroticism '—which he identifies, perhaps on insufficient foundation—with the factor which has previously and bewilderingly been called ' general emotionality ', ' C ' and ' w '—' introversion ' and ' psychoticism ') isolated by Dr. Eysenck's laborious researches, may well in the near future prove an invaluable aid to the co-ordination of research in psycho-analytic clinics. Above all, they will find that Dr. Eysenck has a gift for lucid exposition of the methods and problems of factor-analytical research, a field which, in its own way, presents difficulties to understanding and appreciation no less formidable than those of psycho-analysis itself. Sooner or later psycho-analysis and personality research by objective methods, such as those so industriously pursued at the Maudsley Hospital under Dr. Eysenck's supervision, must come together, and as a preliminary step in this direction much can be learnt from this book by all those whose approach to the problems of the mind has been through psycho-analytic or psychiatric channels; and although the lesson could have been conveyed in more conciliatory and diplomatic terms, it is nearly always crystal clear.

J. C. Flugel.

Heredity in Health and Mental Disorder. By F. J. Kallmann. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1953. Pp. 315. $6.00.)

In this book F. J. Kallmann presents the results of his extensive investigations into the role of hereditary factors in the causation of mental disease. All the important research carried out over the past seventeen years is here included. The work is divided into three sections. The first two deal respectively with ' Heredity in Relation to Mental Health ' and ' Heredity in Relation to Mental Disorder '. In nearly all his investigations Kallmann has employed the method of comparative twin studies. In the first part of the book he not only describes the principles and methods of genetics but also produces an abundance of twin material to support his belief that ' The evidence of the over-all data presented in this first section in support of genetically determined variations in man's adjustive patterns and survival values is sufficient to indicate that human individuality and health are no chance phenomena reflecting only the degree of cultural pressures or the extent of instinctual drives. The capacities for health and adequate adjustment are fundamental biological properties with the common denominator of hereditary potentiality'.

While the second part of the book contains the results of investigations into the part played by heredity in convulsive disorders, neurological diseases, and mental defect, the interest of the psycho-analyst will be drawn to the reports on the functional psychoses. Kallmann has little to say about the psychoneuroses, regretting the difficulties of obtaining sufficient twin material for investigations equal in scope to that found for the psychoses.

Kallmann has observed from his 794 schizophrenic twin pairs that monozygotic twins are concordant for schizophrenia to the extent of 86·2 per cent., but dizygotic twins only 14·6 per cent. This, with other information, has convinced Kallmann that genetic factors are decisive in the predisposition to a schizophrenic illness. He does not believe that a mild attack of or freedom from the psychosis is due to a kind fate which protects the individual from severe environmental stresses. In Kallmann's opinion freedom from the illness results from a constitutional defence mechanism which is probably non-specific genetically.

If such theories are shown to be correct, then much of what is now considered important in the genesis of schizophrenia, e.g. adverse experiences in the first months of life, will lose its importance, and attempts by psychotherapy to correct and alleviate such early traumata will be unavailing. At best the hereditary predisposition will set an upper limit to what can be achieved irrespective of the type of psychotherapy employed. Similar considerations will apply to manic depressive psychosis and involutional melancholia.

Although Kallmann has tried to give adequate recognition to non-genetic influences in the causation of mental disorder, his training and orientation blind him to just those observations which psychoanalysts would consider important and tend to look for. Individual case histories are bound to suffer from lack of information when such a vast clinical material is utilized. Kallmann does not consider the psychological relationships of monozygotic twin pairs as described by Burlingham (1952). These must surely be of the greatest importance. The identification of one twin with the other continues over the years. ' In later years it is difficult to decide how much their similarity of appearance and behaviour has to be ascribed to their basic identity, and how much is a function of their identification with each other ' (Burlingham, 1952). It is by no means impossible that similar illnesses in monozygotic twins may be due not to a common inheritance but to identification.

Such criticisms of Kallmann's work do not imply an undervaluation of his research or of its results.

While they do not conclusively prove that hereditary factors are decisive in the causation of mental illness, they bestow upon the genetic influences the importance which of late they have tended to lose.

The last section of the book is devoted to a discussion of the contributions of genetics to mental health planning.

Thomas Freeman.

Adrenal Cortex. Transactions of the Fourth Conference, 12, 13, and 14 November, 1952. Editor: Elaine P. Ralli, Associate Professor of Medicine, New York University College of Medicine. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, 1953. Pp. 165. $4.00.)

This is a record of informal discussions between experts and research workers in this field and is, as would be expected, of a highly technical biochemical and physiological quality. The members, with the exception of Professor Hans Selye of Montreal, work at universities and other centres in the U.S.A., and there are two guests from Great Britain.

In an introduction, Dr. Frank Fremont-Smith stresses the importance of the multi-discipline approach and of free informal discussions, and warns against difficulties which may be partly semantic and partly psychological.

Professor Selye discusses mechanisms through which the adrenal cortex can produce qualitatively different effects. He explains his now well-known theory of stress and ' disease of adaptation '. He describes his experimental work on rats, and there are illustrations of his air pouch techniques in the skin of rats where experiments can be accurately observed and measured.

Selye believes that the adrenal cortex plays an essential part in causing the bodily changes which occur during adaptation to stress (e.g. to cold, infections, injuries, nervous strain, etc.). A stimulus from the target area provokes the pituitary gland to liberate A.C.T.H. The latter causes the adrenals to release mineralo-corticoids (which stimulate inflammation) and gluco-corticoids (which are anti-inflammatory). These are in proportion, but when this is disturbed, diseases of adaptation are produced. S.T.H. (growth hormone of the pituitary) also stimulates inflammation. Selye describes conditioning of these effects at various levels.

Dr. Ingle contends that the adrenals may play only a permissive rôle and that the adreno-cortical steroids may not themselves be the cause of the changes, and that some responses to stress are extra-adrenal. He describes his studies.

Dr. Sayers argues that the concept of diseases of adaptation is very difficult to prove or disprove, and that advances in methodology are necessary rather than to ' juggle concepts '.

Dr. Pincus mentions a point of psychiatric interest. He compared the total cortico-steroid output of thirty normal individuals with a slightly smaller group of schizophrenic personalities and found a marked variation.

Dr. Marthe Vogt of Edinburgh discusses the existence, nature and site of production of a salt hormone (mineralo-corticoid) secreted by the adrenal gland.

Dr. F. D. W. Lukens discusses adrenalectomy in man with special reference to adrenal surgery in cases of hypertension, and there is a valuable clinical and scientific discussion on the effects of adrenalectomy.

These Transactions are of considerable scientific merit and contributors describe original work. Selye's work is particularly challenging, since he finds a stereotyped response to various kinds of stress, and believes that the various modifications of the local and general adaptation syndromes which follow constitute the essence of most diseases.

S. H. Lucas.

Psychiatric Treatment. Proceedings of the Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Diseases. Vol. XXXI. (London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox, 1953. Pp. xiv + 451. 49 illus. 68*s.* 6*d.*)

This volume covers all aspects of psychiatric treatment except long-term psycho-analysis. Four of the eight sections are devoted to psychological individual and group therapy. They are of considerable interest to the psycho-analyst because they survey most of the work which is taking place in the vast borderland between psycho-analytic and clinical psychiatry. The problem of therapeutic goals and of the evaluation of therapeutic results receives due attention. The rest of the volume is devoted to the present state of physical treatments. Each section consists of four or five papers and is followed by a summary presented by a prominent expert and by extracts from the ensuing discussions. The standard of the contributions is almost invariably high.

E. Stengel.

The Initial Interview in Psychiatric Practice (with phonograph records). By Merton Gill, Richard Newman, Fredrick C. Redlich. (New York: International Universities Press, 1954. Pp. 423. $6.00. Records separate $4.60.)

In recent years an increasing number of psycho-analysts have concerned themselves with the detailed study of the therapist-patient interaction. Recording of interviews with modern techniques has been employed with the aim of obtaining objective data. Many psycho-analysts regard the taking of notes during treatment as harmful to the therapeutic process. The idea of a complete sound recording of sessions, which at the same time are being watched through the one-way mirror, must appear to them a major offence against basic therapeutic principles. Nevertheless, some psycho-analysts and psycho-analytically orientated psychiatrists have been bold enough to disregard the taboos protecting the

privacy of the consulting room, but so far little has been heard of the results of their studies. This book is an introduction into this new field of research. It is the first attempt to present combined printed and sound records of interviews in psychiatry. (The buyer of the book can, under certain safeguards, obtain the sound records for an additional charge.) The authors give a valuable survey of the principles guiding the psychiatrist in the initial interview. The realization that there is no stage in the patient-therapist relationship which has no therapeutic implication has resulted, or ought to result, in a reconsideration of the functions and methods of the initial interviews. This new orientation is the subject of the book, which is addressed to all interested in psychological treatment. The practising psycho-analyst will find much which is familiar to him, but he will nevertheless read it with profit, especially if he has to teach others. It introduces him to a new method of research which, having not been rejected by the patients, has come to stay for the time being.

The authors discuss the influence of psycho-analysis on interviewing techniques and the ways in which various workers have attempted to combine the need for diagnostic information with the therapeutic implications of the initial interviews. The contributions made by related professions (child therapists, social workers, psychologists) are also discussed. In their own recommendations for an initial interview technique the authors consider the following aspects as the most important: rapport, appraisal of the patient's psychological status, reinforcement of the wish to continue with therapy where indicated. The question of the therapist's ' activity or inactivity ' is also considered.

A special chapter deals with methods of recording and with the therapists' and the patients' reactions to it. The patients seemed to accept recording easily, while the therapists themselves reacted strongly against it. The authors found the records of great help in teaching others and in scrutinizing their own work. ' The degree of insight and understanding gained from listening to one's own interviews has to be experienced to be appreciated.' The printed records of the three interviews with the author's comments make interesting reading.

Whatever one may feel about this new method of recording, the question is no longer whether it should be used, but how the best use could be made of it. Obviously, it will be employed exclusively in centres of teaching and research. It seems that so far no psycho-analytical institute has employed this technique.

The authors of this book have refrained from premature claims. At this stage it is still an open question whether this method will make a material contribution to psycho-analysis and psycho-therapy, or whether it will, under the cloak of scientific exactitude, obscure the problems besetting those engaged in psychological treatment. One would like to know much more about the patients' attitudes, conscious and unconscious, to the method of recording. It is most unlikely that it does not somehow modify the therapeutic situation. Professor Redlich and his associates of the Department of Psychiatry of Yale University can be relied upon to go thoroughly into this and other questions. They are to be congratulated upon an important piece of spade-work.

E. Stengel.

ERRATUM

In the paper The Psychology of Poise. With a Special Elaboration on the Psychic Significance of the Snout or Perioral Region, *by Leo Rangell, M.D., Beverly Hills, California, published in Volume* 35, 1954, *Part* 3, *the following footnote was, the Editor regrets, omitted. It should be inserted at page* 323, *second column, end of last paragraph, after ' of the erect posture.*'

Turning again at this point from structure to clinic, we find that Freud has already alluded to and prognosticated the above findings and provided clinical confirmation for the primacy of their role. In his theoretical discussion following the presentation of the Rat Man, Freud writes, ' It turned out that our patient, besides all his other characteristics, was a *renifleur* (or osphresiolagniac). By his own account, when he was a child he had recognized everyone by their smell, like a dog; and even when he was grown up he was more susceptible to sensations of smell than most people. I have met with the same characteristic in other neurotics, both in hysterical and in obsessional patients, and I have come to recognize that a tendency to osphresiolagnia, which has become extinct since childhood, may play a part in the genesis of neurosis. And here I should like to raise the general question whether the atrophy of the sense of smell (which was an inevitable result of man's assumption of an erect posture) and the consequent organic repression of his osphresiolagnia *may not have had a considerable share in the origin of his susceptibility to nervous disease.* [Italics mine.] This would afford us some explanation of why, with the advance of civilization, it is precisely the sexual life that must fall a victim to repression. For we have long known the intimate connection in the animal organization between the sexual instinct and the function of the olfactory organ.'

FREUD, S. ' Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis ' (1909). *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, p. 382.

NEWS, NOTES AND COMMENTS

19th INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONGRESS

The 19th Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association will be held from 24 to 28 July, 1955, at Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the Swiss Psycho-Analytical Society.

Membership of the Congress is open to the following persons only:

(*a*) Those included in the list of members of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, published in the 108th Bulletin (*Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, volume 35, Part 4, 1954).

(*b*) Those non-members of the International Association, whose application has been countersigned by the Secretary of his or her local Psycho-Analytical Society, and has been approved by the Central Executive of the International Association.

(*c*) Candidates (students in training) of Psycho-Analytical Institutes, on the recommendation of their local Institute or Society.

(*d*) Husbands or wives and adult children of members of the Congress.

The *Congress Administrative Committee* (Chairman: Dr. Raymond de Saussure) has its office at: Tertasse 2, Geneva, Switzerland. All those intending to attend the International Congress are urged to make their arrangements as early as possible.

Provisional Scientific Programme: Sunday, 24 *July:* Registration and Reception by the Swiss Psycho-Analytical Society. *Monday*, 25 *July: morning:* Opening Remarks by the President, Dr. Heinz Hartmann. Scientific Session: four papers to the entire meeting; *afternoon*: two sections of five papers each with discussion from the floor. *Tuesday*, 26 *July: morning:* Discussion of 'The Problem of Transference' (summary of current views, four prepared discussions, discussion from the floor); *afternoon:* two or more sections of four papers each, with discussion from the floor. *Wednesday*, 27 *July: morning:* Panel on Perversions (General Theory of Perversions, several papers dealing with special aspects of perversions, discussion from the floor); *afternoon:* four papers to the whole meeting. *Thursday*, 28 *July: morning:* Business Meeting of the International Psycho-Analytical Association.

Titles and two copies of abstracts of individual papers should be sent to: *Dr. Phyllis Greenacre, Chairman of the Programme Committee*, 211 *Central Park West, New York* 24, *N.Y., U.S.A.*, before 15 February.

Arrangements referring to receptions and excursions will be announced later.

SIGMUND FREUD. LIFE AND WORK, VOLUME II: THE YEARS OF MATURITY (1901–1919)

By Ernest Jones (London: Hogarth Press) will be published in spring, 1955. The chapter headings will be:

Part I: Life

I. Emergence from Isolation (1901–1906).
II. Beginning of International Recognition (1906–1909).
III. International Psycho-Analytical Association (1910–1914).
IV. Opposition.
V. Dissensions (1911–1914).
VI. The 'Committee'.
VII. The War Years (1914–1919).

Part II: Work

VIII. Expositions.
IX. Contributions to Technique.
X. Clinical Contributions.
XI. Case Histories.
XII. The Libido Theory.
XIII. Contributions to Theory.
XIV. Non-medical Applications of Psycho-Analysis.

Part III: The Man

XV. Mode of Life and Work.
XVI. Character and Personality.

Appendix

Miscellaneous Extracts from Correspondence.

CLINICAL PAPERS AND ESSAYS ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

By Karl Abraham. Edited by Hilde Abraham (London: The International Psycho-Analytical Library) will be published in 1955. It will contain:

Part I: Clinical Papers

1. On the Significance of Sexual Trauma in Childhood for the Symptomatology of Dementia Praecox (1907).
2. The Significance of Intermarriage between Close Relatives in the Psychology of the Neuroses (1909).
3. Observations of the Cult of the Mother and its Symbolism in Individual and Folk Psychology (1911).
4. On the Determining Power of Names (1911).
5. Should Patients Write Down Their Dreams? (1915).
6. A Screen Memory Concerning a Childhood Event of Apparently Aetiological Significance (1913).

7. On the Psychogenesis uf Agoraphobia in Childhood (1913).
8. Some Remarks on the Rôle of Grandparents in the Psychology of Neuroses (1913).
9. On Neurotic Exogamy: A Contribution to the Similarities in the Psychic Life of Neurotics and of Primitive Man (1913).
10. A Contribution towards the Understanding of the Suggestive Effects of Medicine in the Neuroses (1914).
11. Some Illustrations on the Emotional Relationship of Little Girls towards their Parents (1917).
12. Some Remarks on Ferenczi's Paper on Sunday Neuroses (1919).
13. Two Mistakes of a Hebephrenic Patient (1921).
14. Psycho-analysis and the War Neuroses (1921).
15. The Rescue and Murder of the Father in Neurotic Phantasy-Formations (1922).
16. On Mistakes with an Overcompensating Tendency (1922).
17. An Octogenarian's Mistake (1922).
18. Two Contributions to the Study of Symbols (1923).
19. Psycho-analytical Views on Some Characteristics of Early Infantile Thinking (1923).
20. Psycho-analysis and Gynaecology (1925).
21. Concurrent Phantasies in Mother and Son (1925).

Part II: Miscellaneous

1. Review of C. G. Jung's 'Versuch einer Darstellung der Psycho-analytischen Theorie' (Attempt at a Representation of Psycho-analytical Theory) (1914).
2. The Cultural Significance of Psycho-analysis (1920).
3. The Day of Atonement: Some Observations on Reik's 'Problems of the Psychology of Religion' (1920).

Part III: Essays

1. Dreams and Myths: A Study in Folk-Psychology (1909).
2. Giovanni Segantini: A Psycho-analytical Study (1911).
3. Amenhotep IV. Psycho-analytical Contributions towards the Understanding of his Personality and of the Monotheistic Cult of Aton (1912).
4. The History of an Impostor in the Light of Psycho-analytical Knowledge (1925).
5. Psycho-analytical Notes on Coué's System of Self-Mastery (1925).

THE HONORARY DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF SCIENCE was conferred on Dr. Ernest Jones by the University of Wales. The ceremony took place at the University College of Swansea on 20 July, 1954. Thus the University of Wales appears to be the first British University to recognize psycho-analysis officially as a branch of science.

GREGORY ZILBOORG, M.D.—DOCTOR OF SCIENCE *HONORIS CAUSA*

The degree of Doctor of Science *honoris causa* was conferred on Dr. Gregory Zilboorg by the National University of Ireland on the occasion of the centenary celebration (1854–1954) of that University.

THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON CRIMINOLOGY: SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

This Congress will be held at Bedford College, London, 12–18 September, 1955, under the direction of a British Organizing Committee and the International Society of Criminology (President: Dr. Denis Carroll).

The main subject of the Congress is *Recidivism.*

The preparatory work is organized on a national basis and will be in the form of reports collated by ten well-known criminologists acting as Rapporteurs-Généraux.

There will be ample scope for individual papers and contributors.

The Congress is open to all scientists interested in criminology and to all those dealing with criminals. Psycho-analysts in many countries have expressed their intention of attending the Congress.

Further particulars will be sent on application to the Organizing Secretary, 28 Weymouth Street, London, W.1.

AWARD OF THE SAN FRANCISCO PSYCHOANALYTIC EDUCATION SOCIETY

An Award will be granted in 1955 for the best paper presenting a research problem, theory, or clinical experience pertinent to the application of psycho-analysis to the social sciences (anthropology, aesthetics, the arts, history, pedagogy, political science, psychology, psychotherapy, sociology, or social welfare). The award will be $250.00 and will be made only if the committee of judges feels that a worthy paper has been submitted.

Directions: Papers must be in English in form suitable for publication with footnotes consecutively numbered. Bibliography should be listed alphabetically and numbered in sequence, with name of author, title of article, name of publication, volume, number, page, and year. Papers should be double spaced, and the original and one copy sent. Long monographs should be avoided; such material to be abstracted in article form, which must be original and never before published. The copyright of the award-winning paper shall become the property of the Society, and the Society shall reserve the right to publish, in English or in translation, the whole or any part of it. Papers must be submitted before 1 July, 1955, and the award-winning paper will be announced at the Fall 1955 meeting of the Society.

Papers should be submitted to Award Committee: S. F. Psychoanalytic Education Society, 1637 Taylor Street, San Francisco 11, California.